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The Peril of Hifalutin

Huntington Wilson

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
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
FROM

Charles William Eliot









The Peril of Hifalutin

BY
HUNTINGTON WILSON
FORMERLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, ETC.
AUTHOR OF "STULTITIA" (SAVE AMERICA)



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PREFACE

THE object of this little volume is to emphasize the need of attention by the average American to the necessity of a realistic and practical consideration of our national problems and to warn against the dangers to America in meeting such problems, namely, the dangers of hifalutinism, of unsound idealism, of wild radicalism, and of ultra-conservatism. If America is to be made safe, whether in war or in peace, the average American in his overwhelming numbers must rise up and combat these perils. If the average American fails to study the nation's questions and to acquire and insist upon a realistic and practical point of view in dealing with them, then he himself will bring upon his country the crowning peril of all; he will write down public indifference as the epitaph of democracy with constitutional liberty through republican representative government.

A desire to contribute, however slightly, to a realization of the perils mentioned, and to a realization of

PREFACE

the fact that only by vigilance and study can the average American combat them and himself help remove the unbounded peril of popular indifference, is the excuse for making the following comment available in convenient form. It will be quite evident that no pretense is made of an exhaustive study of the subjects treated. The aim is rather to try to develop a realistic, practical and really American viewpoint; to call attention to a few typical questions which are the battle ground on which hifalutinism, unsound idealism, wild radicalism, and ultra-conservatism are to be fought; and to set forth some observations upon these matters which it is hoped may possibly be of some slight suggestive value.

My thanks are due the editor of the *Public Ledger* for his kind permission to include in this book various articles which appeared in that newspaper. There is included, also, as an appendix, a monograph from the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1916. Its attempted analysis of the relation of Government to foreign investment comprises some discussion of American diplomacy,—especially of the much misunderstood “dollar diplomacy,” to which allusion is made in the text.

HUNTINGTON WILSON.

Philadelphia, April 30, 1918.

THE PERIL OF HIFALUTIN

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The Peril of Hifalutin

I

THE DUTY OF CRITICISM

It is a duty of citizenship to give thought very earnestly to many questions of means to win the war and also to many large questions of policy that now brood over the future of our country. "Stand behind the President," "Don't rock the boat," etc., are good enough cries in their place; but they cannot be made conveniently to cover the multitude of all our sins. To make of them an excuse for the indolent shirking of thought and responsibility is to abuse them.

At this time the one paramount national aim is victory over the Teutonic power. The President symbolizes that national aim. In it all citizens worthy the name give the Administration whole-hearted, un murmuring support—ready to go "to the last man and to the last dollar." But this is not the citizen's whole duty. To win the war is the country's substantive policy. It is its policy *in re*. That is beyond questioning discussion. Questioning discussion of it dam-

ages the national interest and is unpatriotic. Alongside but distinct from that is the broad field of the country's adjective policy, its policy *in modo*. In this field fall questions of efficiency in ways and means, and there also may be placed questions of policy concatenated with our new associations, problems and relations, present and future, arising out of the war and out of our paramount policy to help win the war. This field is a proper field for discussion. In this field it is not questioning discussion, but the neglect of it, that may damage the national interest and that is unpatriotic. Here lie many matters that must not drift to decision through default of any clear mandate of public opinion. If the President seeks to reflect public opinion rather than to lead it, how shall he be guided if public opinion remain uninformed or inarticulate? Here is what the President himself has said on this subject:

"I can imagine no greater disservice to the country than to establish a system of censorship that would deny to the people of a free republic like our own their indisputable right to criticize their own public officials. While exercising the great powers of the office I hold, I would regret in a crisis like the one through which we are now passing to lose the benefit of patriotic and intelligent criticism."

To the ordinary powers of the Executive Congress has by law added almost limitless ones. Unlike Ger-

many, we have no legislative committee to participate in the framing of policies. Unlike France and Britain, we have no cabinet responsible to our Legislature. Unlike any other democratic country, our Cabinet cannot "fall" except at four-year intervals; our Cabinet secretaries are not interrogated on the floor of the House or Senate; we have no "appeal to the country" through special elections; we have no non-geographical means of electing to our Legislature the wisest heads if they have failed of election in one constituency; we have no coalition cabinets.

To a less degree than almost any other country have we a population habituated to close study, conscious responsibility, keen interest and intellectual conviction on a national scale upon political and diplomatic subjects. In this unique situation, without the patriotic and intelligent criticism which he bespeaks, the position in which the President has been placed must become intolerable in the appalling responsibility of an almost autocratic isolation. Honest men will find a clear enough war-time rule, which may perhaps be put thus: Honest, constructive and patriotic criticism *in modo*; unmurmuring, unquestioning support *in re* (i. e., prosecuting the war for victory over the Teutonic power).

Acting upon some such rule the nation will give no aid nor comfort to the enemy. It will also put all its intellectual and moral power, as it has already put

its physical and financial power, behind the Government to win the war. Thus will the nation perform an almost equally important duty by not withholding from its officials the advantage of the thought and feeling of the country upon all means to the end of victory and upon all the great questions of policy, which are incidental to the war and which it will be absolutely disastrous to our future to leave to the chance of any human being's personal predilection, or to drift, or to ephemeral expediency, or to haphazard determination through lack of the mandate of public opinion.

The press, the public men and the publicists of the United States, in the very fineness of their sturdy patriotism, are in danger of erring on the side of slighting that more laborious part of their duty—the duty of constructive criticism and suggestion.

Are the vast powers so generously accorded by the Congress being translated into swift action by skillfully co-ordinated administrative machinery? Is the labor problem being solved? Is the shipbuilding programme progressing as well as it can possibly be made to progress? Is the agricultural programme perfected? Are our relations with the British empire being given their proper place as the cornerstone of a permanent understanding of the English-speaking peoples, which should be the fundamental of our

future policy, the keystone and the solid nucleus of a league in defense of our kind of civilization?

Such are examples of questions of means and questions of policy linked to, but distinct from, the paramount and unquestionable policy of prosecuting the war to victory, in which latter the nation is bound to unanimity. People outside the Government are generally not very accurately informed in the wide field of those lesser questions of modes of action and of corollary policies. They take a great deal on faith. To do so is good. Never had an Executive a freer hand in a great task. But faith cannot take the place of watchfulness and of constructive criticism and suggestion on the part of the nation's leaders and the country's press as a steadying help and an inspiration to the Government in its trusteeship of the vast interests of the nation. The safeguarding of the nation's vast interests and the real furtherance of the Government's efficiency in the promotion of those interests alike demand honest, fearless, patriotic and constructive criticism.

II

THE USE AND ABUSE OF PARTISANSHIP

How, then, is public opinion to be brought to bear in a way to promote attainment of the aim of the war and to help bring the policies and ways and means pursued by the Government up to ever higher standards of wisdom, foresight and efficiency? How is really constructive criticism to gain a hearing and to effect anything? Individual citizens can do little. Press and periodicals and such organizations as the National Security League, the American Defense League, the American Rights League, and others, particularly if they work together, can do more. But it is admittedly difficult for any of these to reach the Administration under present conditions. Thus it is to the Congress as a forum and to a political party as an organ that public opinion must look for means to become effectively articulate. And this fact invites honest, unsentimental consideration of the question of the rights and wrongs of partisanship in this perilous time of war. Perhaps there can be found

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here, too, a formula as clear as the one already found to divide beneficial from injurious criticism.

It is easy enough to waive aside all partisanship as wrong. A fine patriotic impulse commends so handsome a gesture; but a dangerous habit of not bothering about important distinctions, even when they introduce essential differences, may lead to danger, if every meaning of "partisanship" is to be indiscriminately banned. It is a sad commentary upon the political life of this country that the acquired meaning of "partisanship" and "party politics" is so largely that of adopting opinions, standing for policies, and, whether in office or in opposition, striving, condemning, attitudinizing and contriving with a view to keeping or to gaining power merely for power's sake. Good Americans will have no patience in these days with such merely selfish partisanship. Without virtue in itself, it may in time of peace work some incidental good; but in time of grave crisis it should be treated with equal contempt whenever found to characterize the party in office or the party out of office.

But partisanship has another meaning. It is taking sides upon questions of policy. Aside from the national war aim, as to which there can be no two opinions, the whole field of policies and of ways and means is as open to honest patriotic and constructive difference of opinion as it is to such criticism. Such

opinion, jointly held by those like-minded, becomes justified partisanship. Expressed in political action, it becomes justified party politics,—something quite different in quality and purpose from the selfish “partisanship” and “party politics” of popular phrase, which is so rightly condemned. A safe criterion would seem to be this:—Attack or opposition by reason of partisanship is to be condemned; attack or opposition by compelling reason of patriotic duty, based on conscientious conviction, is to be commended. If it gains efficiency in being done through an organized political party, it should be all the more commended, even though it may then be called in one sense partisan. There is slight danger indeed that a single-minded patriotism will not always be circumspect, in the discharge of the duty of criticism by a political party, to measure with a due regard to the adventitious effects of the action taken the good sought to be achieved.

The efficiency and wisdom of men and of measures are the two legitimate subjects for cleavage of political opinion. In such countries as France and Great Britain, where the machinery of democratic government is more resilient and more constantly accessible to public opinion, we have seen such cleavages arise during the war and work beneficial changes in both fields. In our own more rigid system, in which executive personnel is fixed for four-year periods and

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is only slightly touched by the Senate's confirming power or by the potentialities of possible legislative thumb-screws, political action as to personnel is confined almost entirely to elections to the Congress at fixed intervals.

Thus, in the United States, political party action is mostly remitted, between elections, to questions of policy. In a country so evenly divided in party membership it would be absurd to assume that official opinion or the opinion of one political party, could alone be of use in contributing wisdom and efficiency to the conduct of affairs of unusual difficulty and unprecedented importance to the whole nation. By collecting, scrutinizing, making articulate and standing for whatever is good in the unofficial opinion of the country; by organizing constructive criticism and suggestion; by broaching policies of foresight, a minority party has an opportunity to serve the country. To receive consideration, opinion must be organized. Hence the great use of party even in wartime. It can assure that the whole, not half, of the national thought shall be brought to bear upon the national problems. It can act as a balance wheel that the machinery of government can ill dispense with in time of stress.

Speaking generally, coalition, "opposition," or stultified uselessness are the only courses open to a party not in power. Denied coalition, even in the form of

an advisory war council, there remains to a minority party, "opposition." Since the war began the rôle technically known as the "opposition" has been acted with an entire freedom from evil partisanship that has been beyond praise. If there has been error it has lain rather in a somewhat too great avail of the theory that deprivation of power carries with it freedom from the duty of uniting upon a programme of constructive criticism and suggestion. In the Senate, especially, a small section of the party in power has shown, on occasion, a correspondingly praiseworthy disposition to sacrifice slavish "regularity," just as the opposition has always sacrificed malicious partisanship, when great issues were at stake.

Partisanship and party action, like criticism, if honest, patriotic and constructive and directed to no selfish end but solely to the advancement of the national interests and the national aim to which nation and Government are pledged, will strengthen and safeguard the common purpose. In times like these, above all, the nation is all; parties of themselves are nothing. It is in the great things of statesmanship, not in the trivialities of "politics," that the nation is concerned; and it is only through the question of their utility to the evolution and carrying out of the best possible policies that we can be expected to think at all of party at this time. A conscientious "opposition" without malice or selfishness and a party in

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power which will not altogether sacrifice conviction to "regularity" should make possible alignments able to make opposition effective when surely demanded by the country's interests, while assuring that hearty support all Americans are eager to give the Administration on every occasion when they can conscientiously do so. The very regrettable failure to create a coalition war council still leaves a heavy obligation upon a minority party that counts half the population in its membership, and at the same time it increases the vast responsibility of the party in power. Partisanship, except the partisanship of an honest, fervid patriotism, is something the country will hardly excuse on the part of either.

III

THE ART OF ADMINISTRATION

Good administration requires constant and adequate motive power applied to a good machine to make the power effective. The motive power consists in clear purpose and strong, decisive will to achieve that purpose. But the power must not be like latent heat; it must be harnessed to its machine. Executive ability has been spoken of as "the art of passing the buck." The seeming slight hints a truth and an ability without which good administration is impossible. There are men of much ability whose idea of heaven would be to stand on a hill completely surrounded by stenographers and themselves to dictate every detail of the vastest affairs. Men of that nature can never be good executives. The passion for doing things oneself may be a virtue so long as the task is within the power of one human being to perform. When the task has passed beyond that modest compass, then the man, however brilliant, who cannot pass on his work to others, retaining only so much

as is appropriate to the capacity of one man, and choosing well the part he will retain, is not a good executive. Much of the motive power that is his remains latent. It is not applied to the machine. The machine is inevitably, by just so much, paralyzed. The product of the machine is, by just so much, reduced.

Executive ability, then, aside from talent, clear purpose and intellectual power, is judgment of men and faith in them—the choosing of the wisest collaborators and the delegation to them of great responsibilities. Through them the full motive power will reach the administrative machine. Otherwise a great part of the power must inevitably be lost because of the simple fact that in vast affairs the task of applying all the power to the machine is infinitely more than any one man can perform.

At the top of an administrative machine, then, is its executive, having as councilors as many trusted lieutenants as necessary to keep the whole of the motive power of clear purpose, prompt decision and quick transmission continuously operative. The principal executive can thus confine himself to “touching the high places” of policy, to orders, to approving in principle, to ratifying or amending finished plans presented to him, to the guidance of work along broad lines. His councilors distill from the mass of questions presented the compact essence

of what he must pass upon. His time is saved for this highest function and is not frittered away in attention to details.

The body of the administrative machine proper consists in a number of administrative entities corresponding to the number of broad subjects into which the work is divided. Each should comprise the best ability obtainable for handling every phase of the subject with which it is charged. At the head of each should be a general direction, resembling on a small scale the general direction of the whole machine already indicated. Each of these machines should gather to itself all that there is to be done in its field of work. Its functions should be logically divided below for the efficient performance of details and specialized tasks. The finished product of its functioning should automatically be united, sifted, simplified and co-ordinated in the process of reaching and being passed upon by the general direction at the top of any given department.

Within a well-organized department there are rules and checks to assure necessary consultation in order that there shall be no conflicts or overlappings and in order that it shall be impossible for a piece of work to go forth unless it shall represent the views of all the subdivisions within the department which are concerned with its subject matter. In a good administrative machine there is similar careful

provision for interdepartmental conference in the early stages of a project during the course of its working out, and finally when it has reached the departmental head and is ready for final discussion between him and the heads of other departments concerned.

Government is the most complicated of mundane affairs. For a Government it is, therefore, pre-eminently essential that the laws of good administration be observed. They make the difference between efficiency and chaos. If the foregoing attempt to indicate the nature of an administrative machine conformable to those general laws has had the least success, it will be seen that an executive department of government is in structure a miniature of the whole executive branch of government. Each department has its head, with his lieutenants and councilors. Those officials comprise the general direction of the department and the court of last resort in intra-departmental decisions. Below them is the departmental machine proper, with all its bureaus, divisions, offices, etc. Each of these strives to advance the work as far as possible toward the finished product. Every one of these, with exceedingly few exceptions, has its divisional organization and may be regarded, in a way, as a microcosm of the department or, indeed, of the whole executive branch of government.

From this fact it may fairly be concluded that the laws of good administration are natural ones, hardly more to be trifled with than are the laws of the biological cell. Some of their essentials are these: Responsibility and authority must be united in equal measure. Authority must be distributed until all of it can be used, that is, until it is all operative and no one man is charged with the use of more than it is physically possible for him to use to the best advantage. Those among whom the power is distributed should be those best able to use it wisely and to form the best possible general direction of the administrative machinery and the wisest councilors of its individual head. All work of one general kind should be concentrated in direction and subdivided in special aspects. Every agency interested in any phase of a subject should be invariably consulted upon that subject, and all such agencies should work together for the common aim. The machinery should be kept as simple as is practicable.

To use a happy phrase of General Crowder, there will also have some day to be instituted in this country a great deal of "supervised decentralization." Instead of piling officialdom sky-high at Washington, perhaps the States can be grouped in zones for the administration of increasing Federal business. But that is another story. It will be more to the point now to examine the present state of

affairs at Washington by the standard of these few simple principles of businesslike administration.

In attempting some constructive or at least suggestive criticism of the machinery and functioning of administrative work at Washington there is danger of injustice through either overrating or underrating defects which seem patent to an observer. This is due to the incredible difficulty of gaining up-to-date official information as to the organization, functioning or product of the great engine through which the nation is trying to execute the tasks of governing itself at home and of carrying on its part of the greatest war in history. Nine-tenths of the information referred to could not, it would seem, be of the slightest value to the enemy. Indeed, results obtained, if thoroughly satisfactory, would tend rather to discouragement than to "comfort to the enemy." It would seem that there must be some way of withholding from the enemy information that would aid him which need not involve at the same time depriving the American public to so great an extent of the facts even as to almost routine matters, to say nothing of questions of principle involved in important policy. It is rather singular that in the United States there should be enforced ignorance and lack of public discussion or political attention to so many matters which are the subject of unrestrained, spirited and constructive discussion in the countries of

our allies. Aside from dangers of inaccuracy due to the above considerations, the appalling bulk of our augmented governmental machine excludes from any comment of reasonable length all but the rough indication of a few aspects and examples of the problem.

The evolution of the departments at Washington had been from the first through a rather haphazard accretion of new functions to one department or another, with illogical results, whose defects had long been recognized. President Taft had put to work some of the country's most experienced efficiency experts who were to perfect a budget system and also to plan a far-reaching department reorganization which would undoubtedly have involved much redistribution of functions and perhaps some rearrangement even of the names of departments and of some of the broad division of subjects which those names should connote. Unfortunately, this work was not continued, and the country had to face the war without the strengthening of executive machinery which might otherwise have preceded the crisis. With the creation of a Shipping Board and a Council of National Defense and some other things, a gesture was at last made toward preparedness.

With the coming of war there were summoned to Washington a great number of men. Congress gave the President every desired power. The country made superb response in un murmuring acceptance

of every innovation and sacrifice and the President fronted his stupendous task having at his disposition as many as he chose of the country's ablest men, willing to sacrifice every selfish interest to patriotic service. The spirit shown by Congress and the country has been one to hearten and bring pride to Americans, and the President in his appalling responsibilities has received, as he should, the nonpartisan support of all citizens in the work of winning the war.

The question is, Are all these fine potentialities by this time being swiftly translated into action of the greatest attainable efficiency to win the war? And if not, why not? There is nothing to be gained in publicly slurring over what are generally admitted in private to be glaring defects of our administrative machinery and its functioning. The great talents and intellectual ability of the President embodying as he does the tremendous motive power of a great nation's high resolve and endowed by law with unprecedented authority are not being liberated as they should be for the national advantage. This fact is undoubted and is a grave detriment to the country. The obvious remedy would seem to be the creation of a true council of national defense or war council, composed not of specialists, but of men of the greatest wisdom, judgment and knowledge of affairs that can be found in the country, irrespective of political party.

Through such a council, with leisure for great questions, whom he could trust implicitly and to whom he could intrust all but the final touch of approval of great projects, and only through such an agency, can the President really mobilize and make promptly effective for the country's good his own great abilities and the powers he possesses, which otherwise remain slow and halting in their operation, through no fault of the President's, but from the simple fact that there is an absolute limit to the matters to which one human mind can give adequate attention.

The present Council of National Defense is a council in name only. It is composed of members of the Cabinet and of a few advisers in special fields. Especially in the avalanche of extra work due to the war, heads of departments and special advisers have in their regular duties every ounce of work and responsibility that they can bear if they are to perform satisfactorily their indispensable functions. Each of these officials must very properly concentrate upon the great work for which he is responsible. None of them as individuals, nor all of them as a body, can possibly be transmuted by a name into a war council or a real council of national defense. Such a council must be in constant touch with the President and must, like him, survey the whole field with a broad view, prepared to compound differences of opinion, to outline and pass upon the tasks of special

departments, to adopt or reject recommendations and to energize the whole of the war and governmental machinery. With such a council we should hear less of the needs of priority boards, of the dreadful lack of co-ordination and co-operation, of duplication of effort, of interminable delays.

The original Council of National Defense did good service and deserves the thanks of the country for its work in the directions of mobilizing industry, stimulating labor and systematizing the Government's purchase of supplies with a view to economy and quick delivery, and also in stimulating and centralizing almost innumerable bodies of medical, scientific and other workers called upon to contribute to our war efficiency. In industrial and commercial matters, due doubtless to a law excluding interested parties from participation in contracts on behalf of the Government, much of the organization working with the Council was later inverted, so to speak. From being governmental agencies many units of personnel became formally the agents of the industries or trades. This interesting adjustment seems simply to call for the creation of official points of contact to meet the former governmental units now metamorphosed into private ones. And this was presumably done.

Out of all the ruck of administrative improvisation there now emerge the following units which appear to be autonomous, that is to say, responsible to the

President and reporting to him: The war trade board council, the food administrator, the fuel administrator, the committee on public information, the aircraft board, the shipping board with its fleet corporation, and perhaps the censorship board. Through further evolution of this same kind, many of the remaining functions of the present Council of National Defense will naturally be consolidated in individual organization, some to be quasi-autonomous, but many to gravitate to and be absorbed into the organization of existing departments or other agencies.*

Much of the new administrative machinery remains in a state of flux. Many of the old departments are somewhat emersed in civil service tradition and loath to abandon the habitual cares of peace time for the drastic revolutionary action demanded by the entirely new efficiency, comprehensive decision and swift action indispensable to success in war. In some of the departments there are existing bureaus or divisions

* Such is the trend of recent administrative evolution. There have since been some other more or less spasmodic changes and partial adjustments. Much was heard of a departmental council within the War Department. The administrative machinery affecting labor has been through at least two rearrangements,—whether in the direction of complication or of real co-ordination it is not yet easy to be quite sure. The appointment of Mr. Schwab has strengthened the shipping board. Much is expected of Mr. Stettinius and of General Goethals in speeding and systematizing ordnance and other supplies. Whether the air-craft situation is due to bad organization or to inefficient personnel will doubtless be revealed. Even the best organization is of course nearly useless unless ably manned and well and promptly directed.

charged with the same subject matter that has been made the field of new agencies, and in such cases it is hard to detect signs of co-operation between the two. If these be wanting, of course, the ridiculous waste of energy is obvious. While no one wishes for a moment to belittle the praiseworthy work being done at Washington, it is a matter of common knowledge that our old friends, co-operation, co-ordination, common counsel, foresight, unification of effort and avoidance of duplication, are, like our old friend "pitiless publicity," more or less lost for the time in the roar and dust of the governmental machine as it goes through the throes of evolution toward efficiency.

Food, labor, ships and money are among the clearest of our necessities. Production, transportation, distribution, consumption and such questions are part of the great food policy. Are the Department of Agriculture, with its myriad agents, and the food administration working together as one great engine upon the food question in all its aspects? Are all the officials of the Department of Labor and Mr. Gompers's committee working in energetic accord upon their most vital problem? And is every military or other executive department concerned with some aspect of labor in close consultation with them upon its particular interest in the subject?

For example, have the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor and the food administrator

perfected a plan sure to supply sufficient labor for increased food production? Has the Shipping Board at last arrived at maximum efficiency? Is the Treasury Department co-ordinating the network and infinite ramifications of our official and private organizations to teach economy and bond buying to the American people? These are merely a few samples of questions that the American people would be glad to be assured can be answered satisfactorily.

If one watched a man eat something and grow sick, and then change his diet and get on much better, and if one imitated both his folly and its cure, then one could not claim much credit for sagacity in profiting by another's example. The American people are not called upon to display patience if their Government is seen content to make experimental errors when it has before its eyes the experiences of its Allies, showing clearly enough where are short cuts to efficiency without floundering through the bog of experimentation. With all due allowance for the colossal dimensions of the task, nevertheless remembering that America has been very many months at war and that the Administration had years of warning, it is reasonable to expect reforms at Washington that shall liberate the executive power so as to make it much more promptly effective and upon machinery much better co-ordinated, and shall so

secure quicker, surer and still more satisfactory results.

A real war council, continuously sitting, continuously deciding and authorizing in the name of the President, can alone meet the necessity of lengthening the executive arm to a point at which it can touch, regulate and keep in motion the vast machinery of the Government. To supply the President with able counselors, to be chosen by him and confirmed by the Senate, whose duty it shall be to think, to plan, to decide, to recommend—but never to act except by the President's authority—is no more to interfere with executive prerogative than it would be if Congress should appropriate salaries to give the President additional private secretaries. Such a real war council as has long been urged should quadruple the means of wisely transmitting the executive power to the administrative machine. Without such liberation of the force of the nation now vested in the President, how could even the best co-ordinated machinery of Government function safely and surely, and at high speed?

To use a homely figure, the presidential office is a reservoir of executive power, great in time of peace and now immensely greater through new laws passed by Congress. The conduit pipe to transmit this power to the administrative machine must be made larger if that power is to be transmitted promptly and

with the deliberation indispensable to wise counsel. The appointment of men of first ability to be trusted lieutenants and counselors of the President merely multiplies the President's ability effectively to exercise executive powers too vast to be passed on to the machine by one unaided mind, however great it might be. Such a war council, and especially if it were made at least morally ancillary to a small bipartisan joint committee of Congress to confer and consult with it on problems relating to the war, would liberate energy now bottled up, would co-ordinate the legislative and executive branches of government and would make the President's great powers and abilities many fold more efficiently available to the nation, which is so nobly dedicated to the triumph of right in this great war.

IV

THE PERIL OF HIFALUTIN

HIFALUTINISM, defined as pompous speech or writing "usually addressed to educated or half-educated audiences, who are supposed to appreciate bombast," has always been a curse to American politics. We are all familiar with it. To bolster one economic doctrine, we had "the free breakfast table" cry and the removal of customs tariff dues from tea and coffee, the result being to rob the national treasury of great revenues without holding down the prices of those useful commodities. To bolster another economic doctrine we had "the full dinner pail,"—which, however, did make good its promise. In the realm of emotionalism, we had the "bloody shirt" and many other cries. In the field of class prejudice we have had an overdose of cries of "Wall-Street," "special privilege," "the interests," etc. In 1912, and after, a bankruptcy of ideas and a prevailing lack of sincere issues laid the political party seeking to gain power (and then to entrench itself) so peculiarly

open to temptations to hifalutinism that it is not wholly surprising that it yielded to them pretty completely. The ghost of "the interests" was made to walk again. In China a "dollar" diplomacy (which was simply wise and practical diplomacy) was denounced. Afterwards it was sought to revive it when too late. In the Caribbean "dollar" diplomacy was carried on and even exaggerated under another name. Similar has been the policy towards combinations in industry and trade, to mention but a few examples. The expediency of a campaign naturally enough became the expediency of an administration, with which some of the tendency to hifalutinism remained.

With the gradual sophistication of the public in economic matters, the field of hifalutinism rather shifts to social ideas and to international relations, two relatively unknown subjects. As the mind becomes, through knowledge and critical thought, less accessible to hifalutin, the spirit remains the same. The ideal, rather than the real, becomes the surer basis for that particular appeal which always remains when facts for the intellect are lacking. The beginning of the war in 1914 brought international relations and unique opportunity for idealization in a conjunction sure to make the public mind unusually vulnerable to hifalutin. The war's churning up of social problems has inevitably broadened the scope of that vulnerability. A brief glance at this past his-

tory is useful just now only, perhaps, for the reason that understanding of the past is the sole known mode of appraising the present and of envisaging and endeavoring to prepare against the future. There could, however, be no weightier reason for a glance backward at this time. Only by clearly seeing past error can we hope to prevent fresh error of the same kind.

Although "simplicity is not commonplace and nobility is not hifalutin," we need not altogether condemn hifalutin. Esthetically it is good or bad according to whether one likes grand words or not, just as one may like Wagner or Victor Herbert. As a matter of efficiency, the question is whether hifalutin helps or hinders wise decision by the application of reason to facts. Subjectively, it is innocent or criminal according to its sincerity. Objectively it is of good or bad effect according to the soundness or the unsoundness of the doctrine it seeks to promote. Still less shall we condemn idealism. So long as idealism is attended by strict science, it is the guiding star of human progress. In pursuing the ideal *through practical means* politics is at its best. That is very different from the idealism that confuses thought with reality. The wish is father to the thought; but we shall hardly admit that the thought is father to the fact. Aside from its clap-trap forms, hifaultinism, in transcending the limits of facts and experience, readily makes itself a bridge over to

idealism; so that, for practical purposes, the two may be judged by the one set of standards. To reach over facts and appeal to ideals is the mode of the saint, the statesman, and the politician; of the true prophet and of the charlatan.

Even ideals are counters in the game of political expediency or opportunism. They are very explosive and dangerous ones and should be used with the utmost care and circumspection. Facts are far safer. Ideals are jealous of facts and the pursued ideal has a nasty way of turning upon its pursuer and fascinating him into blindness to facts. Hence the tragic casuistries to which all men are liable, which a Russian novelist so horribly depicts, and which Russia to-day so sadly illustrates. To make doctrines, or to make facts, the weapons of political expediency are two very different things. The distinction cannot be too thoroughly insisted upon, because the sincerest idealists are so painfully prone to confuse doctrine with principle. For example, some of them seem to think that by a world treaty they could abolish the balance of power, which, of course, they can no more do than they could abolish gravitation by a law against the grocer's scales,—simply because the balance of power, like gravitation, is a principle, not a doctrine. Another danger of idealism is its strong tendency to obsecrate its victims, and make them callous to all considerations except those favorable to the

ignis fatuus upon which their eyes are fixed. Hence it is that *doctrinaire* is a word of bad repute and that "reformer" is not a certificate of honor. It is as if the gods begrudged too high excellence and sent the corruption of casuistry to humble high aims!

It was hifalutin, it was the wrong kind of idealism, which, whether due to political expediency or to a mistaken statecraft, kept the United States out of the war from the date of the *Lusitania* until April 6, 1917. The same evils brought failure to sense and act upon the fact of the war in August, 1914, and brought failure then and there to prepare for war. The same evils left Mexico a festering tragedy. For a good while official utterance frequently reeked with the quality of those evils, often dangerously, sometimes beneficially,—as in the fine rally of the Entente Allies in the name of free institutions, and, *up to a certain point*, in a moral offensive as a subsidiary part of major strategy. By all means we want a moral, an intellectual and an economic offensive in conjunction with a military and naval one. As Cheradame points out, geography, ethnology, economics and national psychology enter intimately into true strategy. But to neglect practical propaganda and the economic weapon and to rely too much upon ideal "slogans" were a very dangerous mistake. The attitude of the peace societies towards preparedness for years before the war, and the credulous faith of our peace-ideal-

ists in the magic of treaties and arbitration is a perfect example of dangerous idealism. So is that class of opposition to universal service. Let us hereafter always remember the lesson to beware of dangerous idealism, wherever found.

Much as hifalutinism merges into idealism so does idealism merge into and get exploited by wild radicalism,—that is, the radicalism that hotly pursues unsound and impracticable aims by the route of unsound and dangerous doctrine and that, in the whole process, ignores facts, natural law, human nature, history, and experience. We have seen it at work in the fetich of the direct primary (now so fast being discredited); in the wholesale referendum; in the absurd proposals for the recall of judges and judicial decisions, and in various other unsound cure-alls. Very dangerous is the lazy optimism that believes there are short cuts to the millennium and that man can devise progress by *fiat*, in defiance of the laws of his nature. A classic example of hifalutin and wild radicalism was Bryan's silver campaign. Indeed, every highly specialized aim is the prey of the tendencies of hifalutinism, unsound idealism, and wild radicalism. We have observed the interplay between the three phenomena. We can see that a similarity in essence, working and effect enables us to group them together and to subject them to one set of tests, which really is the careful test of honest

common sense applied to actual facts. In its ceaseless use of fact, doctrine and ideal, political expediency will be dangerous if even in pursuit of the right aim its casuistry sets in motion too great a lot of incidental evil. Or, through sophistry, it may set aside the right aim and be directed to subordinate or unsound aims. And either of these things may happen either in well-meaning statecraft or in vicious and selfish politics,—in virtuous foolish idealism or in conscious self-seeking. Our history has often shown us casuistry of means and sophistry of aims both official and unofficial.

Such, then, is the gist of hifalutinism, unsound idealism, and wild radicalism: of political unsoundness generally. Ultra-conservatism is less interesting but quite as fatal. Aside from a minority of the hopelessly selfish as small as the minority of the wildly radical, the ultra-conservatism of the American people consists mainly in easy-going uninformed indifference. It is relatively easy to combat, because it is generally easier to convert an ultra-conservative to reasonable radicalism than to reconcile a wild radical to reasonable progress. The fanatic is articulate: the sensible citizen is less so, but he has the advantage of overwhelming numbers. The time has come for him to use that advantage. Whether in war or in peace the fate of the country depends upon just this majority. To combat the evils here discussed, that

majority of average citizens must go into the arena of public questions, each armed with the divining-rod of common-sense and information, and must cry down those who are unsound and awaken those who are politically moribund. Only so shall we keep our great country on the true path to its high destiny. We must do so to win the war. We must do so for the wise solution of the problems of peace.

V

ULTRA-RADICALISM AND THE WAR

Because the war is the only thing that seems real or worth thinking about at this time, because the elimination of the Prussian menace is the *sine qua non* of all our hopes, and also because the war brings into bold relief so many other things, it will be valuable and perhaps interesting to try a little to examine and classify the ultra-radicals and idealists of this country by looking at some of their reactions to the war.

First of all, they, with the administrations of those days, must bear the burden of responsibility, shared in part by a self-centered and indifferent public, for the facts of our obstinate neglect of preparedness and of our belated entry into the war. Their punishment is the fact that but for their visions of Utopia and their headstrong refusal of the vision of facts, the war might have been successfully ended before now. The honest pacifists show signs of having learned their lesson. Will the lesson stay learned or will they relapse to Utopianism at the first opportunity? For

one reason or another pacifist idealism permeates all classes of our ultra-radicals and professional idealists. So long as they oppose a system of universal military training demanded alike for national safety and for national well-being; so long as they wish to pin their faith entirely to a universal league of nations, they will require careful watching if America is to be safe. We have lately seen what treaties are worth. We know that even in countries upon which history, tradition, and blood have bestowed the highest homogeneity, revolution and civil war have sometimes occurred. Some of these civil wars of history we now justify as necessary steps in national and world progress. Yet in a world union composed of nations of every language, every habit of thought, and every tradition and degree and quality of civilization, of the most varying interests, we are asked to expect the general progress to be blissfully free of such disturbances! A league of nations may be feasible; but to be safe for America, it must rest upon a balance of power within it clearly on the side of ourselves and our English-speaking and other like-minded allies. To be safe, the doctrine of a league of nations must pay homage to the laws of nature and to the nature of man by taking as its keystone the principle of the balance of power, at which some visionaries are so fond of scoffing.

Among the ultra-radicals who enjoy the privileges

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of this free country, there is, perhaps, most excuse to be found—not, of course, for such insincere or wrong-headed leaders as may exploit them,—but for some few among the rank and file of the I. W. W. who have suffered much and have suffered through our Government's neglect of proper measures of paternalistic protection for the less fortunate of our citizens. There is also an explanation, although not an excuse, for the vagaries of our foreign-born recalcitrants, who ungratefully apply to a land that has too carelessly welcomed them their retrospective bitterness against institutions that formerly oppressed them. One can understand all too easily the pro-German and professional socialist group. Immensely significant is the fact that so soon as they at last saw that their beloved Bolsheviki had brought Russia to a point where the Bolshevik doctrines were likely to be extinguished beneath the Prussian heel, all these groups (except the definitely pro-German and the plain malice-aforethought anarchists of the I. W. W. type) turned suddenly from indifference or worse to America's war and became keen for the battle against Prussianism. Is this because of any sudden love of America? Not at all. Many such, like the Russian Bolsheviki, are Marxian international socialists, whose sole aim is to promote a universal proletarian revolution. To the Russian Bolsheviki the honor and salvation of Russia are relatively nothing. For

the moment they have achieved in Russia the absolutism of an autocracy of a minority of the "proletariat." That is what they wish to see in all countries. Beside this, their heart's desire, democracy is nothing to them; constitutions, laws and treaties are nothing to them. Their every act is determined by their one aim,—a universal proletarian revolution,—and must be judged in the light of this fact, or else it will be misjudged. They and their fellow-thinkers have hardly a good word for the splendid institutions of American democracy and for its great promise of a still finer future. In their ignorance and their egoism, or in slavery to their theories, they fail to understand that in America there is no "proletariat"; that there are no fixed "classes"; that here we are trying, and with very promising success, to combine liberty and protection in a proportion to equalize opportunity and increase happiness and general welfare.

Some few, too, of our little groups of "intellectuals" of the ultra-radical stripe might almost have been born in Russia, to judge from much of what they sometimes write. There are sporadic, self-constituted spokesmen of "liberal men everywhere" who in the vague name of "liberalism" promote the most curious doctrines and propaganda that one can see sprouting on the long-suffering soil of America. Such idealists do not seem over much interested in our de-

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mocracy as it is. They seem willing to fight for the millennium to the bitter end. For them it is Utopia or nothing. To them the war is for a "new social order"; for a documented league of nations resting unusually firmly upon an unusual number of "scraps of paper"! They idealize and applaud the Bolshevik autocracy while condemning the Prussian one; and they have the effrontery to do so in the name of democracy! They are very strong on internationalism as superior to nationalism, and, indeed, some of their writings at times invite the definite question whether they themselves are not Marxian socialists at heart. Altogether, "liberal men everywhere" would be rather astonished to hear some of the pontifical words of such spokesmen.

During two years and eight months a confusion of counsel, with blowings hot and blowings cold, had left the American people, prior to entering the war, somewhat muddled in their thoughts and somewhat numbed in their feelings. Given fresh German outrages and a three-line declaration of war by the Congress of the United States, they showed by their magnificent response how easily they could have been led on an earlier occasion. But the difficulty of the average person to realize danger, however menacing, until it is in plain sight, together with our distance from the theatre of war, undoubtedly justified some of the appeals made to various ideals as cries to arms. More

recently, the exigencies of Allied morale and solidarity explain to some extent the continuance of such appeals. If they appear sometimes excessive and transcendental, one has confidence that they are to a certain extent justified by expediency as part of the prosecution of the war. But amid all the slogans and expressions and reiterations of war aims, it is well to remember this. The Congress, which alone has the power to do so, declared war to vindicate our rights assailed by Germany, which was soon seen to mean that our war aim was once and for all *to remove the menace of Prussian dominion and so to safeguard the American Republic.*

VI

"AMERICAN BOLSHIEVIKI"

THE simple formula—to remove the menace of Prussian dominion and to safeguard the American Republic,—with the substitution in each of the Allied countries of the name of that country, is clear, unanimous and sufficient. The British formula of "Restitution, reparation and guarantees" is succinct, satisfactory and the same in intent. Lloyd George's more recent elaboration, so closely followed by the President, was doubtless actuated by the desire of an honest diplomacy to put before the German people and the world a workable idea of the sort of thing which would constitute a guarantee in fact of the removal of the Prussian menace. But elaborate statements for diplomatic purposes should not be allowed to vitiate the extreme simplicity of the subjective war aim of America and her Allies and thereby to confuse the public mind. Unfortunately, excessive elaboration has tended a little to do just this; and, so far as the public is aware, no great compensatory diplomatic

advantage has thus far resulted. Indeed, interpretations by ultra idealists and, on occasion, even our diplomacy have in this respect sometimes rather called for the warning of de la Rochefoucauld that "the subtlest folly grows out of the subtlest wisdom."

Suppose that a man's wife and mother were attacked and insulted and that he summoned his friends to protect them, to vindicate their honor, and to suppress their assailant. And then suppose that he stopped to explain at great length that he did this because he had a peculiar interest in the position of woman throughout the world. Suppose he said that the haremlic system of Turkey, for example, must be reformed; that the marriage system among the Hottentots was faulty, etc., etc. Would not his friends be rather bewildered to learn that they were in the fight for all those far-away reasons? There is such a thing as hitching one's wagon to too many stars. Besides the possibility of confusing the public mind, another objection to excessively complex idealization of a perfectly simple war aim is that it facilitates the "barkers" for every side-show. It plays into the hands of all those in this country who, consciously or not, are, like the Russian Bolsheviks, interested in the war largely for ulterior purposes. An idealistic administration can hardly escape being the rallying point and "easy mark" for all those with dangerously ideal-

istic axes to grind; and, justly or unjustly, it will be judged, in the long run, by all of its friends.

A little school of thought steeped in hifalutinism, unsound idealism and ultra-radicalism seems to have come to center in a tendency to a certain kind of “intellectualism” that is always red-hot for some kind of undefined “liberalism” and whose tone leads one at times almost to doubt whether the ideals of the Russian Bolsheviki may not be really rather more sympathetic to it than are the actualities of American democracy. The internationalism of this school is fervent; its ardor for actual American democracy, and for the simple war aim of crushing Prussianism to make this American democracy safe, has appeared at times about as luke-warm as if the beautiful phrases of some of its protagonists were flowing in a country neutral in the war. It seems that for some of these America’s real war aim is too crudely simple to fill the mind or satisfy the soul. It is well to bear in mind the fact that persons more or less touched with these ideas have even found official or unofficial place in the Administration; and that in the press and magazines a quite considerable number of members of the glittering school of thought referred to appear to be carrying on a systematic propaganda for their too transcendent views.

Of this school of thought are those who flatter the Bolshekivi of Russia in the name of democracy. Is it

a democracy that declares war on the majority of its brother Russians? If this school believe in democracy, why do they not rather call upon the Bolsheviks to reorganize their control of Russia upon democratic instead of proletarian autocratic lines? Are they, too, international Marxian socialists? For any other explanation there is the difficulty of ascribing to such egregious cleverness the stupidity or blindness needful to vindicate sincerity.

We need not here discuss the question why the President has not preached democracy to the Bolshevik autocracy as well as to the Prussian one: why he has not conditioned upon their democratization any unselfish assistance we may give, as we should like to give, the Russian nation. Our Government has the responsibility for winning the war and for conducting our diplomacy to that end, and it must have the means to know what attitude towards the Bolsheviks best serves its joint trusteeship of Allied interests, which happen to be the paramount interests of democracy in the world. Conceivably there are reasons why a guarantee of Russian democracy cannot be at once proposed to the Bolsheviks in return for their own discarding of proletarian autocracy in favor of national union. If so, that reason is certainly not to be found in the beauty of Bolshevik political and social fallacies. There may be no harm in a bit of flattery as a government's diplomatic move, but this other

unofficial calling of black white in solemn, stentorian tones is certainly most unwholesome for the public mind. When recently the President wisely addressed a message of good-will to the whole Russian people, through the Congress of Soviets at Moscow as the only available channel of communication, certain followers of the school of diseased liberalism had the effrontery, the blindness or the insincerity to try to palm off that wise act as intended exclusively and specifically for comfort and approval or even actual recognition of the Bolshevik régime! A little more fact and a great deal less idealistic fiction would promote democracy in Russia, and in the world. One may favor international Marxian socialism or one may favor democracy, and, in particular, American democracy; and it sometimes appears to be about time to ask a few of our radicals on which side of this question they stand.

In the mad pursuit of vague Utopias, our intellectual radicals are fascinated by the phrase "self determination of peoples." With a fine flexibility of mind they are able thus to emphasize a principle of nationalism while in the same breath lauding what tends to destroy nationalism and substitute internationalism. They wish to place our destiny at the mercy of a league of nations too sublime to need the support of a balance of power. This means, if it means anything, a deep faith that nations may be

trusted always to act unselfishly, justly and honorably. Yet when the question arises whether Japan shall make an expedition into Siberia, even with the mandate of her Allies, it is these very idealists who belie their confession of faith by being the first and loudest to shriek distrust of a nation which would form part of the league they hope for. Do they see no ironic humor in this?

Whenever crude truth is put forth to threaten any of the Utopian side-shows which seem so to obscure the war aims of the American Bolsheviki, they do not hesitate to exaggerate and exploit any real or fancied divergence of the Entente Ally war policy. Their fanatical preoccupation with ulterior and idealistic aims apparently somewhat blinds them at times to the real and sufficient war aim and to the essentially vicious and very dangerous character of anything tending away from that allied solidarity, which is no less real because of the curious official use of the term "co-belligerent."

Some years ago a young American socialist came to grief when, in the course of a delightful book, he trotted out his avowed doctrine, which seemed to amount to the thesis that if there were gathered together a sufficient number of men, sufficiently poor and uneducated, there would emanate from the mass supreme virtue and supreme wisdom. Crowd psychology holds no such promise, nor does national psy-

chology, whatever our Bolsheviki may think in their seeming adherence to the above proposition. Cant in the name of "liberalism" is often tinged with the shop-worn cry that the present is a capitalists' war. It delights in the assumption that its own kind of democracy would make wars impossible. Now, the principal belligerents in this war are democracies, excepting only the Teutonic powers, and Russia, first under the Czar, and now under the Bolsheviki. In a democracy, to carry on war requires the support of the people. In the theoretical case of an unrighteous war on the part of a democracy, these "liberals" would doubtless ascribe to capitalists all the selfishness and violence which such a war might connote. Upon what principle? Unavoidably upon the theory that selfishness and violence abound disproportionately among those who have some property. Do the criminal statistics of the country show this? Certainly not. Except in the case of autocracies, all this talk of war for the *ex-parte* interests of capital is sheer nonsense. Democracies carry on war for the interests of the whole nation. America and her Allies are doing so now. If the best democracies of to-day could not be trusted to avoid wars that were wrong or that were in the interest of classes, then the principle of democracy, in the present state of civilization, would be proved *pro tanto* a failure. In such case the failure would be that of the mass

of citizens and would hardly be curable by perversion of the principle of democracy to Bolshevism at home or by its extension abroad to internationalism and artificial universal leagues.

America's intellectual radicalism may be the nucleus of a potentially valuable asset in the political intelligence of the country. It is therefore desirable that it be converted to a salutary degree of realism; that it be induced to apply its sceptical criticism to its own ideals no less than to the actual conditions of the day. Meanwhile, we should take care to examine with cold scrutiny and with cautious reserve the often alluring appeal of those ideas. Naturally, along with a little of everything, we have some radicalism that is "yellow," that arises out of cynicism, vindictiveness, envy, or insincerity. And we have, no doubt, some conservatism touched with the same hue. For the rest, the very sincerity of an idealism carries with it, like so many other good things, its dangers. The exuberant optimism of youth or the exhilaration of intellectuality, the credulity of ignorance, or even the generosity of the heart, may expose to those dangers if we are not careful to keep immune by means of frequent and copious inoculation with common sense and reality.

VII

ULTRA-IDEALISM AND DIPLOMACY

Sentimentality, unreality and foolish idealism permeate the hifalutin school of thought very conspicuously whenever it addresses itself to diplomacy. The subject matter of diplomacy is international life. Much as the subject matter of individual life is personal relations, so the subject matter of international life is international relations. International law no more absorbs diplomacy than municipal law comprises our every-day life. Backward nations have no magic claim upon international society because they are small, any more than the troublesome citizen has a claim for indulgence if he happens to be of small stature. The howl about "secret diplomacy" is also largely "bunkum" where democracies are concerned. Their task is to have clear and enlightened policies of intelligent self-interest honestly carried out. A discreet secrecy in a specific matter of fixed national policy will often be as innocent and as necessary to success as the privacy of any individual contract. It

is wrong to cheat at cards, but it is idiotic to show your hand. As a by-product of the war we all hope for a better world and for a better America; but we shall not have a perfect world, nor one independent of the nature of man. Both in the conduct of the war, in the building of an ultimate peace, and in the improvement of national life in the United States, we must be on the alert to resist the evils of hifalutinism and ultra-radicalism.

“Imperialism” is another of the big words to which some of our “liberal men everywhere” give new meanings and then rant against with careless disregard of their own implications, which are often either insidious or silly. The Russian Bolsheviks, in the ardor of their single purpose of class war, have sought to place the generous freedom of the British Empire and the uplifting expansion of American influence in the same class with Teutonic enslavement of foreign peoples. Now about the only difference between a “free” country enjoying complete “self determination” and a land within the British Empire is this:— If a state is outside the British Empire, then the Government at London may make to it strong coercive representations upon some question. If a well-developed people is within the British Empire, and thus ostensibly lacks absolutely independent sovereignty, then London is not so likely to interfere with it! The British Empire is a natural growth. Everywhere it

has raised up and improved the life of backward peoples. Everywhere it has established justice, truth, and fair-play and has led the way to higher civilization. Just so with American "imperialism." Compare the life of the common people of California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona with that of the Mexican peon, exploited, ignorant, weltering in misery and turmoil. Were those annexations compatible, or were they not, with natural laws working for human progress? The question answers itself. Every extension of American influence, of American protection, guidance or control in the zone of the Caribbean is undeniably fruitful in bringing peace, prosperity, better government, and a freer, better life to the people affected. Every expansion of the Prussian power has been by intrigue, lies, bad faith and brute force; and in every case it has been by conquest and dominion, not over inferior peoples to their undoubted benefit, but over people *equal or superior to those who have asserted dominion over them*. In every case it has been sought to reduce them to the level of Prussian morality. Anglo-Saxon imperialism stops when it cannot make out a case before the court of civilization. Prussian imperialism stops at nothing.

When the Russian Bolsheviki seek to confuse the issue of the war by the blatant injustice of crying a "tu quoque" of "imperialism" at Britain and America, one can fancy that perhaps they laugh in

their sleeves at the slaughter of all the nations whose governments they hate; that they wish to see dissension and breakdown, in order that class war (their ideal) may subvene and that true democracy, which is foreign to their aims, may perish. This would be intelligible, at least. But how ascribe both good sense and good faith to representatives of our own "intellectuals" when they lend aid and comfort to this hostile cry; when by dark innuendo they accuse their own country and its racial, spiritual and actual ally of "imperialism"? Is this due to their usual failure to distinguish between a doctrine and a principle? World evolution, like the law, knows a "tortuous taking" when it sees one. World evolution, through the expansion and survival of the worthiest peoples of each epoch, is, like the balance of power, a principle, not a doctrine. However subtle, our dialectic principles survive and it is childish to try to talk them away, in however beautiful language.

A brilliant writer lately very skilfully confused American policy with Prussian imperialism. His argument at least conveyed the impression that there was no difference in principle between, let us say, a measure of American suzerainty at Panama and Prussian dominion by force over Roumania or Alsace-Lorraine. He also emphasized, at the expense of our Monroe policy, the internationalism (!) developed in certain European concerts about the Balkans and Tur-

key. It suited his purpose to ignore the fact that the selfish aims of each nation were the motives of action in all that Congress of Berlin style of internationalism. And so they will be in great measure in any internationalism in sight even to-day! The writer in question has unwittingly supplied an argument of befuddling ingenuity worthy of German skill, and the German propagandists will doubtless see that it is translated into Spanish for the delectation of the "sister republics to the south of us." But what are little things like that, if one is pursuing the ideal or is being very clever?

Let us admit the principles of national expansion and of the balance of power. Let us even admit the fact of human selfishness and the fact that, in our little phase of cosmic progress, God seems on the side of the big battalions and does not wish the righteous to remain foolish and unarmed and to leave the field to the devil leagued with science. Indeed, let us graciously permit natural law to preside over the world. In that way we shall clear our vision and address ourselves sanely to our part in the world's work. Impiricism is no substitute for "imperialism." We have to make national expansions square with the equity of facts, not with sentimentality, and conform to the constantly rising standards of chivalry, humanity and enlightenment that are held by the chivalrous in contradistinction to the brutal nations.

We have to limit our internationalism to that which rests upon a healthy nationalism, a scrupulous regard for the laws of human nature, an enlightened self-interest, and a balance of power in the hands of ourselves and our friends. It may possibly be proved in the court of events that through the rotten autocracy of the Czar, and equally through the impotent and anti-democratic autocracy of the Bolsheviki, the Russian people may turn out to have shown themselves to be unprepared at present to rank among the fit from the viewpoint of international evolution. If so, the loss of some of their eastern territory may be destiny's intended warning to them that they must gird themselves for true progress.

One of our American Bolsheviki propounded this question:—If Germany should evacuate and restore Belgium, Northern France and Serbia, should give up Alsace-Lorraine, should get out of northern Italy,—in short, should practically meet all the primary demands of the Allies; if she should relinquish all her colonies (and should also, by implication, forfeit the Bagdad scheme) on the one condition that she should be allowed to keep certain of Russia's Baltic provinces, could one regard such a peace as tolerable? By one of a different school of thought, he was answered that *if* Germany did all this, and *if* our present Alliance was continued with a policy directed to reorganizing the rest of Russia into a powerful democracy,

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doing the same for China, and leaguings the two with Japan and the rest of our Allies to suppress Deutchtum from the East; and *if* we of the West continued our wall of steel, our monopoly of the sea, and our moral, economic and political boycott to suppress Deutchtum from the West, then possibly we might feel that we were on a sure road to achieve our aim,—a situation where we were free from the menace of Prussianism. This radical idealist was horrified at such a possibility, and not at all because it was not practicable but only because it was not *ideal*! It savored of “the old diplomacy,” of the balance of power, and of all that the Utopians decry. And yet, unless the heart of Germany can be meanwhile crushed by an absolutely overwhelming aerial offensive, or by a military defeat, some such programme seems not altogether unlikely, whether in the name of a fictitious peace or in the shape of many years of “war as usual” in a sub-acute form less costly to human life. At any rate, the reaction of the Anglo-Saxon to “frightfulness” is the exact opposite of that of the Teuton, and the new offensive in the West may well recall to us the singleness of our war aim and the need to free our interpretations of policy from all traces of cant and to work with forethought for the ultimate achievement of that aim, however long the struggle.

If there were anywhere excuse for a war weariness

which might even momentarily allow unsound optimism to obscure cold reason and hard fact, surely such excuse would lie with our Allies who have for four years endured the agony and the terrific nervous, mental and moral strain of the war. Scarcely touched until now by this stress, America should be for her Allies an anchor to windward, standing especially for practical, far-seeing wisdom and common sense. Doubly heavy, therefore, is the obligation of this country to keep itself free from every sophistry and from the pitfalls of dangerous idealism.

VIII

SENTIMENTALITY AND REALITY

It is not only in "muddying the water" and in many ways confusing and obscuring the plain and all-sufficient reasons for which the nation, speaking through Congress, declared war, and the consequent purpose for which the nation carries on the war, that to give heed to the hifalutin school of thought may be dangerous to the national morale and clarity of aim. The souls of some of its exponents are too elevated, it seems, even for righteous indignation, the noble Anglo-Saxon counterpart of the base and puerile Teuton hate. Yet we know that the hot hate of righteous indignation is the essence of the fighting spirit. This spirit some still work to subdue with mawkish nonsense about the goody-goody German people. Every chivalry, code of honor, and religion has sought to crystalize ever higher standards of human conduct. The success of such efforts has marked the stages of civilization. Prussia adopted empty hypocrisy and spurned all true civilization. Prussia stood for the

brazen theory that her brutal aim justified any and every means. She taught these things for generations to the German people with such success that practically not a German voice in Germany is heard in protest here in the twentieth century against systematic villainies on a scale the world has never before seen. Success is become the only touchstone of German morality. Are we not to hate these people as they are to-day? Are we not to know and say frankly that the only guarantee against the Prussian menace will be a world situation in which these people shall be powerless to carry on their cunning and barbarous work, shall be held down and compelled to begin now to learn the ethics and morals of civilization? When they have done so; when they have really changed, if they can, it will be time enough for generosity.

The same mawkish sentimentality in some quarters has steadily opposed the threat of economic boycott, one of our most effective weapons in the long task ahead, and one which the President clearly indicated in one of his later addresses. Finally, our National Chamber of Commerce verified, by a vote of 1,200 to 100, the fact that American business men had the good sense to see the power of that weapon and the patriotism to be willing to use it. This fact, doubtless painful to some few "liberals" of a certain misguided kind, was welcome indeed to most Americans. So, too, the vigorous action of Congress in au-

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thorizing the Custodian of Enemy Property to break up the network of officially promoted German economic interest which the Kaiser's Government has spread here as it has throughout South America and the world generally.

On a day when our British kinsmen were pouring out their blood most generously in heroic resistance to the Hun's onrush, an educational officer at Washington, who evidently is not in recent touch with the Administration, speaking through the official bureau of information, created to promote the interests of America at war, *not* the interests of any special school of thought, found time to revive the discarded theory of the excellent German people in contradistinction from the Government whose crimes those same people seem so willing to applaud. This was done in connection with an advocacy of a continuance of teaching the German language in our schools. We are, forsooth, to eschew the sober hate of the evil even to-day; to prepare for a millennium which is to follow the war; to get ready to have relations with these delightful German people. Can anything excel this sickening counting the chickens of a reformed German race before the new bird has even been evolved? It has taken the Hun all these centuries to progress (!)—from Atilla to Atilla. To some idealists he looms benign to-morrow. It is a pity that anyone should still ask the American people to swallow this theory, and especially

from an official ladle, however unauthorized. When the present madness of the Prussian has passed and when the Teutonic race, in repentance and shorn of dangerous power, has learned the A B C of chivalry, honor, humanity and true civilization, if it be capable of them, then it will be time enough to consider the question of casting aside economic and moral boycott and military power as the sure means of *keeping the world safe for honorable peoples, for Anglo-Saxon civilization and for America*. Until then, an Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, Latin, Slav and Oriental league may well remain essential to a policy to make impossible the continuance or recrudescence of Teutonic pretensions and of the foul means employed by Teutonic hypocrisy. By all means let genuine adult Americans learn the German language so far as by doing so they can better fight Deutchtum. But let it no longer be made available in our schools as a convenience to the propagandists of "kultur."

This question of the German language in our schools touches in a way the whole issue between nationalism and internationalism; between the view that America is for Americans and is to seek solidarity in enlightened self-interest and the played-out sentimentality that would make America an asylum and a dumping-ground for all races irrespective of their potentialities as loyal, assimilable and healthy stock for American citizenship. Diseased liberalism and sound

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Americanism will be found arrayed on opposite sides on all questions touching this general issue. The lessons of this war should cause us to adopt a policy lacking neither decision, thoroughness nor force. We have seen the effects of the German newspapers, of the German alliances, societies, and "vereinen." We have seen the effects of our thoughtlessness in allowing this *imperium in imperio* to be planted, nourished and brought to its poisonous flower upon our hospitable soil. We see on all sides the results of an almost criminal neglect to look to the rapid Americanization, distribution and assimilation of our excessive immigration. The broad issue is whether America is to be run with the primary aim of becoming the best possible nation, with confidence that only so can it make its most effective contribution to world progress, or whether America is to be sacrificed to all kinds of sentimental and Utopian theories in directly seeking world progress through internationalism at the expense of nationalism. A policy based upon the only wise decision of this question of principle would be very unlikely to spend the money of the American taxpayers to teach to immigrants or to Americans of recent citizenship the languages of the countries from which their blood comes. Moreover, our public schools can find occupation enough in teaching the rudiments of learning, and especially the foundation of decent character, conduct and citizenship; and foreign lan-

guages may well be left to those who attend commercial schools and will need them in their business, and to those who carry their education to a point where it is important that they should peruse foreign literature not available in the English language.

A wise policy of assimilation would likewise tend to eliminate all the minor solidarities within the nation which run counter to the national solidarity which must hereafter be insisted upon. On the same principle must serious consideration be given to the question of buying out and putting an end to the foreign language press, with the exception, perhaps, of a few publications to be printed in English as well as in the foreign language, which could thus serve the newly arrived immigrant not only with information but with a "pony" for the study of English. It is not that the foreign language press as a whole is in substance baneful; but it can hardly be denied that it works as a deterrent to the learning of English and as an intellectual link with the country of origin, and, therefore, is inevitably, as now conducted, a hindrance to rapid assimilation as well as to the single-hearted and single-minded allegiance which America must hereafter unflinchingly exact from all citizens.

The namby-pamby sentimentality of the internationalist tendency accounts largely for the scandal of our failure to enact, even to this day, scientific immigration laws. The literacy test is, of

course, absurd; for it would inevitably preclude in many cases healthy and desirable stock while admitting degenerates, only the more dangerous because armed with a trace of education. Some years ago it was suggested that the criterion of admission should be an economic one based on the ratio between the wage-scale here and the wage-scale in the country of origin. It was pointed out that such a test could be elaborated so as automatically to exclude the most generally unassimilable races. One plan would be the admission of foreign laborers only under contract entered into by the Federal government on behalf of different States where labor was needed,—a plan which would work in perfectly with the task of distribution and assimilation and with the necessity of protecting American labor from any inequitable competition or economic disturbance. Some have suggested that admittances should be based, by races, upon fixed proportions related to the numbers of those races already here. All those who have scientifically studied the subject are agreed that examination should be made at the point of departure and that the most important question in the case of every immigrant is not whether he is educated, but whether he is of a stock readily assimilable and entirely free from physical, mental or moral degeneracy. How crying is the need of such a standard can be seen by reference to the appalling proportion of newly ar-

rived foreign blood revealed by the statistics of American asylums, penitentiaries, etc. In the face of all these real American concerns, the eyes of high-brow internationalism remain fixed largely upon the mirage of Utopia, not only in peace times, but, more tragically still, even during the war.

IX

IMMIGRATION AND LABOR

Just now the immigration question is chiefly interesting in the relation to the war of certain of its phases, notably that of the supply of labor, and, in particular, of agricultural labor. Nowhere is timely efficiency more vitally necessary than in planning to meet the demand for agricultural labor. The President cannot attend to everything. With a war council the country's mind would be easier as to this and its other vital interests. It would like to know, for instance, who will till the soil for the food we are to eat and to save for our Allies when so much manhood must be called to the colors.

From the fourth of February last the Federal Government undertook a registration of enemy aliens in the United States intended to be thorough both in its scope and its elaborate sufficiency for purposes of individual identification. That registration of enemy aliens had rather the look of a half-measure. For the enforcement of the immigration and naturalization

laws, for the selective draft, for the control of crime and for the matter of an inventory of labor resources a registration of all persons would have been highly desirable. By holding all house-holders responsible for the registration of those under their roofs, it would seem that even so great a task could be carried out within a reasonable time. Particularly because it is the truth that there is, so far as the public is informed, no reason to believe that the all-important problem of agricultural labor has yet been surely solved, there is a special reason why it would be desirable that the Federal Government should register at least all aliens. If such a thorough-going registration were carried out, then in case of default of agricultural labor it would be a simple matter for the Government to arrange for the admission of an army of Chinese laborers to be distributed where needed for the production of this year's crops. Such Chinese laborers could be admitted upon certificates giving them the right to remain under the supervision and at the call of the Department of Labor just so long as their labor was required as a war measure on the farms of the United States. Chinese laborers would be easily distinguishable. After the expiration of their right to be here, they could be easily identified and returned to China, because every Chinese would be required to show either his certificate of registration as an alien or his certificate showing him to be a Chinese brought

to this country by the Department of Labor in the ranks of an auxiliary agricultural army. With universal registrations, the same could be done even with foreign agricultural labor of any nationality. We need no mercenaries to do our fighting, but we may sooner or later need them to raise our crops. If so, such an arrangement would impinge in no way upon the interests of American labor nor would it add at all to the permanent foreign population. Here is a very practical reason why there should be Federal registration not of enemy aliens only, but of all aliens, or, better still, of all persons.

The introduction of contract labor under Government contract and careful Government protection and supervision and in a case where the home supply of labor for a national need was wanting would clearly be free, too, from all the objections to ordinary contract labor. As a measure *ad hoc*, and for a limited time, it could not fairly be objected to. Chinese labor is being used in France behind the lines. The Government surely owes it to the American people either to adopt some such measure or to give a convincing guarantee that they have assured not only ample labor for war industries, but also the agricultural army that is urgently and absolutely necessary if we are to have the bumper crops required from now until the war's end and the world's recovery from its devastations. "Food will win the war" perhaps, but has

the Government taken steps to insure the production of the food for this and the following years?

An encouraging activity of the Department of Labor at Washington was seen in the survey of labor conditions throughout the country summarized by the United States Employment Service. That report tended more or less to show that the country was suffering rather more from bad distribution than from actual scarcity of labor. Reports of the kind, if continued, should be a very useful guide to workers seeking to know where employment may be found. It was gratifying to hear, also, that various instrumentalities for dealing with the labor problem were being co-ordinated at the beginning of the year, although some of the announced appointments of personnel presented a riddle of a kind the country is growing accustomed to. News came from Washington, too, that the United States Public Service Reserve, a branch of the Department of Labor which has been doing a very useful but little advertised work, was initiating a campaign to recruit vast numbers of men suitable for the shipbuilding industry and willing to be listed as prepared to enter that industry where and when needed. Now come reports that there will be set up still further machinery for handling the labor problem.

If the Department of Labor is at last to undertake to be what its name implies, then there is hardly a

department at Washington upon which fall more vital responsibilities. It should be responsible for the supply of labor of every kind, and just now it is useful again to raise the exceedingly grave question whether means have been taken to guarantee the country the vast supply of agricultural labor which will be needed henceforth. This question is such a vital one that a trustful nation should not be asked to remain ignorant and able only to guess whether or not it has been satisfactorily solved. Why does the United States Public Service Reserve not list agricultural and other as well as shipbuilding labor? Why do not the Secretary of Labor and the Employment Service take the country into their confidence as to whether and how they have solved this question? It is a question calling for prompt constructive planning, foresight, and skilful administration. It is earnestly to be hoped that it is receiving such treatment.

X

REFORM AND RESTRAINT

Laws and constitutions, the only sure foundation of liberty and of true democracy, have ever been regarded as rather annoying obstacles by the type of ultra-radical, who demand the millennium and nothing less right here and now. That is a disposition that no American Government can afford to condone. It is, therefore, rather a pity that in failure to give the senate an opportunity to conform or reject on March 4, 1917, the, as a whole, somewhat mediocre cabinet; in taking over the railways, wisely, to be sure, but in advance of valid authorization; and, it is said, in a proclamation last February regarding the use of airplanes, there should have been official departure from sound constitutional practice. No harm has been done, but still its legal advisers should, as a matter of principle, always protect American administrations from falling at all into such courses, which, like the drift toward exclusion of the people's

elected representatives from their due voice and responsibility in matters affecting the conduct of the war, tend too much to an autocracy that may be pleasing to some "liberals" so long as they think its power will be used in furtherance of their own cherished ideas, but which is essentially bad for the Republic.

A dangerous school of radical thought is heartened, too, by the fact that, despite its extraordinary party partisanship, unprecedented in peace and still more so in war, the present Administration has yet found occasion for considerable *liaison* with the devotees of that school, and for occasional pronouncements susceptible of exploitation by it. A wise diplomacy plays every card that it holds, and no one need condemn as a diplomatic move a discreet measure of appeal even to overstrained idealism or to a German people endowed for the purpose with fictitious virtue. The shrapnel of a diplomatic offensive is not to be condemned even if very few of the bursting fragments strike the mark. But what may be done, within narrow limits, as a diplomatic move takes upon itself an entirely different complexion if it is carried too far, and if it tends to play into the hands of a well-defined propaganda that is entirely foreign, in its unsound aims, to American conditions or needs, and to the best traditions, thought and spirit of true Americanism. The little group of "American Bolsheviki" forget that America is not Russia, and that we have in this coun-

try no economic or social evils for which our splendid and flexible institutions will not afford us sound remedy. An American administration could certainly not forget these facts; but it would be very unfortunate if its official utterances should ever lend themselves to exploitation by a hifalutinism, an unsound idealism and an ultra-radicalism in which can be seen the germs of possible disaster.

The foregoing fragmentary and cursory comments may perhaps serve as a slight indication of some of the dangers of these poisons and of their workings in war as well as in peace. The American people will have to distinguish clearly between unquestioning devotion to their country and unthinking acquiescence in whatever political theories may be advanced. In doing so, both during the war, at the end of the war, and after the war, they will have to look now, as ever, to the Senate and the House of Representatives always to add a clear and dominating voice for common sense Americanism to the discussion of every question. So far as our present policy is swayed, and it should hardly be so swayed at all, by questions not strictly germane to the war, those questions and the different schools of thought which grapple them turn largely upon old problems of socialization which will doubtless be presented in new difficulty as a by-product of the war. There are, therefore, printed herewith a

number of chapters upon different aspects of socialization and upon a few other subjects perhaps not without interest at this time.

Unity of national spirit and aim, based on intelligent decision and self-discipline, is an absolutely different thing from unanimity due to unthinking acquiescence and compliance. The former is the way of democracy; the latter of autocracy. No citizen of a democracy can escape his individual duty to participate in the decision of the nation's problems. The response of the American people to the demands of the war has been magnificent. It is not the nation, but its leaders, who must bear the responsibility if the splendid spirit and resources of the nation have not been made as promptly and efficiently fruitful of results as should have been the case. The nation, however, is responsible for its chosen leaders and has the clear duty to exact from those leaders the direction and quality of leadership that its aims and its interests require. No blind support of any particular administration affords an escape from the difficult duties of citizenship in a democracy. Administrations are quite fallible and nothing should be permitted to confuse or obscure the plain fact that the nation's true interests may or may not always coincide exactly with the particular ideas and views of any administration. Any administration is always the servant of

the people and is its authoritative leader only when it follows courses which the nation approves. The nation, therefore, can never escape and must always be awake to its responsibility.

XI

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING ALLIANCE

A PERMANENT entente or alliance of all the English-speaking peoples will be the greatest event and the most far-reaching good, not only to America, but to the world at large, that can arise out of our association with the civilized powers of Europe and elsewhere in the task of sweeping the Teuton menace forever from the path of civilization. A little thought will convince the overwhelming majority of the American people of this fact. A wise leadership in our Government will see and act upon it. But in a democracy the degree to which wise leadership dare outrun the positive and active conviction of the mass of voters is, in a good cause, almost always too small for the country's good. Thus it is that political expediency and opportunism, based on lack of faith in the people, has been the most fruitful cause of disaster in democracies. Even when the necessity of a policy is clear, if it is outside the focus of intense

popular interest and desire, it may not gain cogent governmental advocacy. Witness the twin crimes of British military unpreparedness in 1914 and our own for many years prior to 1917. This Anglo-American affinity in the shortcomings of democracy is the very reason why there should now be made clear to the American people the facts of all the other worthier affinities and of all the common-sense considerations of policy and self-interest which point undeniably to a permanent close accord of the English-speaking peoples. If these facts be not made clear to the American people, another great national advantage may go by default.

To state the obvious with fiery zeal is a gift vouchsafed sometimes to successful politicians; but to simpler minds it is as difficult as "defying a mutton chop" in fine dramatic form. The stronger the case, the greater the restraining distaste for hyperbole. This is another reason why democracies are in danger of missing their obvious advantage.

Those of us whose education has not been too "practical" to allow them to stray even so far as the common sense of Cæsar's *Commentaries* will recall one thing—that Cæsar classified the people of the north according to their resemblance or difference in "language, institutions, and laws." A better criterion has yet to be found. It is this leaven that molds and this cement that holds to us our own newer popula-

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tions. It is this that gives us our national entity. The same bond is just as unfailing in the potentiality of its interplay between America as a whole and the British Empire as a whole. Better than any others can the English-speaking nations say to one another, "All the world is queer save thee and me—and thee's a little queer"—which is as near the ideal relation as we are likely to get in international relations!

Perhaps the crowning impertinence of the German and German-American propaganda, in the blindness of its pan-German conceit, was the bland announcement that "Anglo-Saxonism must be vigorously combated in this country!" It is funny as well as stupid and malevolent. If Anglo-Saxonism stands for anything it stands for liberty, for self-government, for fair play; it stands for truth, justice, and kindliness. It is precisely what our citizens of German descent came here in order to embrace when they fled from the Prussianism of 1848. Prussianism has never changed. Anglo-Saxonism, thank God, has not changed. And it is a heritage to be jealously guarded.

British blood, so largely Celtic in the British peoples as a whole, still easily predominates over any other strain in the American nation. We all know too much of biology and heredity to dismiss the fact lightly or to be willing to see it cease to be the fact. With the blood came the bases of our national life.

No German schloss nor Grecian temple, however fair, can sit well upon our old Colonial foundations. If America ever ceases to be an Anglo-Saxon nation, if Americans ever cease to be intellectually and spiritually the close kinsmen of the other English-speaking peoples, then either America will have ceased to be America or else the British peoples will have lost their identity. The preservation of our priceless common heritage of political, moral, and social ideas—of liberty, steadfastness, chivalry, and kindness—is the essence of the continued existence of America and of the British peoples. Who better suited, then, to covenant for the joint upholding and defense of the precious thing that gives to each its identity, its distinction, and its reason to continue in the world?

Safety for continued development, gained by joint defense, then, may be set down as the paramount aim of an alliance of the English-speaking peoples. To all of them there are many adventitious advantages. Although this war has shown how much more fancied than real is our security, still, in the last resort, we are somewhat less exposed to attack than is Great Britain, on whose side the defensive advantage may be thought the greater. For this reason some few of the peculiar advantages to America may be emphasized. For example, we should no longer stand exposed to the danger of having to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine alone in the face of a strong com-

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bination of hostile Powers. The joint use of coaling stations throughout the world could be arranged. Our tenure in the distant Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Samoa, and Guam would be doubly guaranteed against challenge—far more than doubly guaranteed if the relative size and location of the British and American fleets be considered. Our paramount position in Panama and the zone of the Caribbean, with the protectorates and quasi-protectorates we are obliged to maintain there, would be far freer from possible anxieties. Indeed, it is not unlikely that in a post-bellum adjustment of war debts England would have no objection to certain territorial readjustments to make sovereignty conform more logically to responsibility, strategy, neighborhood and economic interest in that region.

An Anglo-American alliance would go far to consolidate the interest of the West in equality of opportunity and the "open door" in China. The alliance would make even more unassailable the common position of all the English-speaking peoples in regard to any future immigration questions. However liberal, all of them recognize their absolute obligation to allow no emigration to the serious economic detriment of their own workers. After the war all of them, and especially the United States, certainly ought to recognize the necessity to restrict immigration to a point where it can never threaten the dis-

tinctive character and the solidarity of their peoples. If the Chamberlain idea of a customs union of the British empire is revived it will be important to the United States to enjoy, as an ally, special benefits. As one another's best customers, the English-speaking peoples should have no difficulty in making excellent commercial arrangements. In the carrying trade and in some other affairs they might define respective spheres.

Examination will show all these examples of advantage through an Anglo-American alliance to be mutual ones. How would such an alliance affect the world? The answer is the open record of what the two Powers stand for to-day—fairness to all, free institutions, truth, justice, and humanity, peace with honor, and evolution along the lines of the highest human progress under nature's laws. An Anglo-American alliance would be the strong fortress of these ideas in generations to come. It would be the rallying point and sure defense of worthy nations imbued with these principles. Already we see nearly every spirited people arrayed with us against those who would turn high civilization's clock back to a time before its dawn. Already we have a league fighting to enforce peace. An Anglo-American alliance will perpetuate its framework. It will stand ready for the rally of the honest and high-minded nations of the world if ever again the tocsin calls to

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defense against the ruthless, the treacherous, the unjust. So it would be good for the world as a practical safeguard of peace.

Our noble French ally would surely join us in a general understanding for the promotion of peace and possibly for other purposes. So, too, would other like-minded peoples. With the French we have the Celtic tie, and many a bond of admiration of their glorious qualities—bonds which we wish ever to preserve. The world is not ripe for internationalism any more than the nation is ripe for the abolishment of the family. Any present attempt at a really universal league to enforce peace would be impracticable and too likely to prove an incubator of group intrigue. The practical league to enforce peace for our kind of civilization is to be found in a league of those who believe in it—a league to keep the preponderance of might in the hands of those who believe in and practice right. Here the Allies may well all fall in line together. An Anglo-American alliance would facilitate this post-bellum world aim—a league to prevent recurrence of the horrors that have racked humanity since 1914.

The argument for a concurrent but distinct alliance of the English-speaking peoples, rests, as has been indicated, upon special bases and would have special objects and effects, aside from its convenience as a strong *bloc* in the world's peace party. The impor-

tance of those special bases—in our common language, institutions, and laws and in our strong blood relationship—cannot be overrated, and, on this side of the Atlantic, it seems to be thoughtlessly very much underrated. To emphasize it is to state plain facts, not opinions. Quite likely the very obviousness of the grounds for our sympathy with the British peoples accounts for the fact that our sympathy with France has seemed continually to receive far more official encouragement. The subject under discussion, as well as the above fact, makes it needless here to praise France, which is beyond praise, or to stress the reality and warmth of American sympathy for the glorious republic, or for Italy or indeed for any other of our Allies. Rather is it necessary here to invite cool common sense and reasonable judgment to consider the practical policy of Anglo-American relations. And the better to clear the way for this consideration there is preliminary work to be done.

Of course we are now in *de facto* alliance with Great Britain, and our honor has been pledged, we understand, in a manner as binding as the national conscience itself is binding upon us to see this war through to victory. That there is no formal treaty ratified by the Senate, is of course a quibble too small for the most meticulous mind and one that would revolt the heart. Two great peoples, of common language, of common institutions, of common laws, of

common literature, philosophy, morality, and aspirations, are allied for a common purpose. Is their association and comradeship being made as intimate and cordial as it should be made? Is a unique opportunity for a lasting entente, invaluable to both and logical in every way, being availed of to the full? Those who have time to think of the future would like to feel surer that they are.

Reports from Washington often sound almost forgetful of the fact that we are co-operating as only a very late arrived ally and not acting independently. Problems that must be old ones to the British (whose case most fits our own) are occasionally referred to with a disquieting air of novelty, when, next to trying a thing ourselves, a British experience is naturally the most instructive possible and the most easily imparted to us. We hear far more of French instruction, French conference, French fraternization than we hear of any of these with the ally who speaks our own language. We do not even know that comradeship in arms in actual contact with our British cousins is contemplated. We do know, from the public press, the fine tact and generous frankness with which British co-operation has been placed at the disposal of the Government and the army of the United States.

Conceivably the President so values the delicate growth of Anglo-American good feeling and has such great schemes for its florescence that he seeks to

shield it from even the hazard of rough contact. But surely the peoples concerned are too sensible and their feeling for one another is much too strong to admit of that hypothesis. Can it be that the dregs of a more than moribund tradition, or the feeling, now become effectively anti-American, of certain groups of our population is given a serious thought as a political obstacle to Anglo-American rapprochement? Surely such considerations are too small to avail at all when the world is in cataclysm and when the makings of a policy to bring blessings upon future generations are involved.

Nevertheless, it may be well to indicate the task of sweeping away the cobwebs of historical misappreciation and of silencing group prejudice that lies before a single-minded leadership of American opinion. Any "German-Americans" who oppose British-American accord may just as well drop "American" from their ambiguous title. Such opposition is opposition to the very nature of this country. If they do not like a land of Anglo-Saxon language, institutions, and laws, by all means let them return to Germany. They cannot love us and hate those most like us. They cannot love our institutions and hate our alliance for the protection of those institutions with the land from which they came. They cannot dedicate themselves through vereins, clubs, and German-language press to the fostering of the solidarity of

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Germanic tradition and at the same time remain true to a nation that rests upon and stands for its opposite, Anglo-Saxon tradition. There are no two ways about this.

Then there are some few Americans of Irish descent who seem to set Ireland above America in their hearts and to set their hatreds above Ireland's true interest. Happily they are quite exceptional. The wiser majority will feel rather to-day that her irreconcilables and fanatics are Ireland's worst enemies and that, now that the Irish people have at last been given the fullest opportunity to solve their problem in a reasonable way, that violent extremist minority, so far from serving Ireland, is in danger of depriving the Irish people of the world's sympathy. Wise Irishmen will see that an Anglo-American alliance would double America's influence for a liberal policy toward Ireland, that it would tend to be a solvent for ancient ill-feeling. As to the insensate pro-Germanism of a few misguided Irishmen, it is peculiarly grotesque in view of the absolute antipathy between the real Irish nature and the whole reality of Germanism. Indeed, very likely it is the faint Saxon trace in the Anglo-Saxon that has made sympathy so difficult between the Irish race and certain English types!

If America is to survive as a nation, she must build a much hotter fire under her melting pot and must be much more careful about putting new materials

into it. We must not be betrayed into a liberalism, or sort of *dementia liberalis*, too broadly international to condescend to concern for America's own interests. Group solidarities, counter-indicated for healthy, vigorous nationalism, must be frowned upon. Even the victims of *dementia liberalis* must have almost learned this lesson from the war. In the question under discussion group prejudice would appear to present no serious difficulty. An honest mind will find its defense difficult.

There remain the esoteric fallacies of Anglophobia and of the "no-entangling-alliances" dogma. Where these obsolete conceptions still darken the modern American mind they are symptoms due to wrong methods of teaching history and to the work of the quack doctors of our body politic. Charles Altschul, an American, in a small book called *The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks: An Attempt to Trace the Influence of Early School Education in the Feeling toward England in the United States*, concludes of our haphazard educational system in the past that "the public mind must thereby have been prejudiced against England." Of the present teaching he adds that "the improvement is by no means sufficiently marked to prevent continued growth of unfounded prejudices against England." As Mr. Altschul's study shows, the somewhat dramatic exaggeration of Colonial wrongs, with the suppression of

adequate portrayal of conditions in England and the slighting of the great efforts of many leading Englishmen on behalf of the then colonies, has been too long allowed to inculcate and preserve a baseless Anglophobia. This is a situation our educational authorities have too long neglected.

In his farewell address Washington opposed permanent and entangling alliances. He said we might "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." He feared "sympathy for a favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists." He said: "An attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter." He referred to our "detached and distant situation." All this, too, had for its background Washington's strenuous opposition to our alliance with France to make war upon England. Now there is nothing illusory in the common interest of the English-speaking peoples to defend their common form of civilization. There is nothing ephemeral in the need to be prepared to do so. There is no dangerous inequality of power between the United States and the British empire. And this war has sufficiently demonstrated, it may be hoped, that we no longer enjoy a "detached and distant situation." The lesson of Washington is the lesson of wise statesmanship, and it is not wise

statesmanship to allow a nation grown beyond all semblance to its infant size and placed in entirely different circumstances in a vastly different world to be debarred forever from exercising the sovereign attribute of making alliances. Wise sayings of the past, wrenched from their context, are too often abused as a cloak for shrinking from progress in politics. We forget the wisdom and recall the words.

The question of an Anglo-American rapprochement is not to be disposed of by facile dogmatizing. It may range, in result, all the way from a limited entente to consult together in case of threatened attack through the limitless nuances of diplomatic engagements to a treaty with many specific engagements. That a lasting accord and good understanding shall be implemented between the English-speaking peoples is the main thing. The details of degree and scope of the alliance will require wise and deliberate consideration. The immediate question is whether our war policy is now being so shaped as to lay the groundwork for the great event.

As Washington so well understood, sentimentality and favors without consideration between nations are a hollow and unreliable thing. The real service the English-speaking peoples can and have rendered one another would give exceptional solidity to their accord. Other nations have befriended us in the past because it suited their specific interest at the moment

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to do so. The British have stood by us on general principles. Who but they gave us their ungrudging moral support in the Spanish-American War? What but the British fleet has kept Germany off our backs? What but the attitude of Britain has made our enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine until now an easy task? Who but our British forbears blazed the way for France and for the world and have ever stood for political and intellectual liberty, constitutional self-government, and free institutions? To whom better than to their British kinsmen can Americans turn, in any crisis, assured of substantial sympathy of instinct and of idea, on the sure basis of a common tradition, a blood relationship and common language, institutions and laws? We love France. We are allies of France. We always remember Lafayette and Rochambeau. Are we not in danger of forgetting other and very profound truths of our international relations?

Our Government has most abundant powers and has the faith of citizens. In prosecuting the war to victory wise constructive action will be expected of it upon all policies incidental to the war. High among such policies stands that of Anglo-American relations. It is most earnestly to be hoped that the American Government and the American army and navy will act with vision in order that both at home and abroad our course may be laid always in ways conducive to

the great consummation so clearly favored by the course of events—a firm accord of the English-speaking peoples.

An Englishman said this of 1776: “There happened to be on the English throne a German gentleman named George. Over in Virginia there was an English gentleman named George. Now the German George started in to deny the rights of the English George. Being an English gentleman, of course he would not stand that. So he went to war and defeated the German George.” May it be recorded by history that in 1917 a German ruler brought the British and American nations into firm and enduring friendship, and was himself confounded in the process!

XII

JAPAN, RUSSIA AND THE WAR

THE situation reported to have precipitated the question of Japanese intervention in eastern Siberia is the alleged possibility that German prisoners, pro-German Russians or outlaws might ultimately destroy or convert to other uses the military stores sent to Vladivostok by the Entente Allies for use against Germany, or that Germany might later be able to gain a foothold in eastern Siberia. If either of these dangers shall become real, then each must be weighed against the possible effect of protective action in bringing greater detriment to general Allied interests. The American Government is accustomed, on occasion, to deal informally with any chieftain in the Caribbean countries who during a revolution controls a bit of territory. On the same principle could not the Entente Allies put the case of the supplies and of their military interest in eastern Siberia to the Bolshevik authorities? The moral obligation to prevent those stores from being diverted from the pur-

pose of use against Germany runs with the title to them. The moral obligation upon the Russians to prevent a German establishment in eastern Siberia is equally clear. The Bolsheviki could be asked, if either danger be real, to request the Entente Allies to take the necessary protective measures through Japan or otherwise. If the Bolsheviki should refuse to make such request it would then be difficult for them to escape effectually branding themselves as friends of the German cause.

The question of some military action by Japan in eastern Siberia, lately understood to be receiving consideration in Tokio and the other Allied capitals, is one to be viewed in the light of the immediate and also of the more remote future. It is a question to be looked at to some extent from the individual viewpoint of Japan, but above all it must, of course, be examined from the joint point of view of all the Entente Allies, including Japan. If Japan wishes to take any action she has to make out a case showing clear justification on the grounds of legitimate and pressing Japanese interests. There is thus far no evidence known to the public of the present existence of any real jeopardy of those interests. Such a motive would have to be overwhelmingly proved, and, in the present state of the world, could hardly conceivably be acted upon with any justification unless any action taken were squared entirely with the great joint

Allied interests, before which all else must at present yield. The question in its many aspects is a nettle to be grasped firmly. To slur it over instead of frankly to discuss and to decide it would work for estrangement and misunderstanding just when friendship and understanding are of the greatest importance.

It would seem natural, then, that the representatives of Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan and Italy should sit down together for frank discussion. The Japanese would be asked to state what their Government would like to do and why. The conferees would point out the arguments for and against action in Siberia and the dangers of such action. The inevitable upshot of such a conference would be that the Japanese Government would either make its policy conform fully to Allied war aims or would openly betray those aims in favor of fancied selfish advantage, to be grasped ruthlessly at the expense of friends and Allies. The latter course is inconceivable. That it should be even thought of at all in any quarter is perhaps attributable to the mistaken policy of the Japanese Government by which the present question is shrouded in mystery, due to the lack of any published reports emanating from Tokio. This is not a military question, to be safeguarded by secrecy, but rather is a matter of world opinion and politics, in which secrecy is dangerous in fostering sinister specu-

lation. It would seem clear that from such frank conference as mentioned above there should emerge a decision and a programme perfectly conformable to our joint aim—to remove for good, and as soon as may be, the Teutonic menace.

What, then, would be the decision of such a conference? A telegram from Amsterdam quoted a German newspaper as epitomizing the question in the terse statement that Japanese intervention in Siberia would result in either an alliance between Germany and Japan or an alliance between Germany and Russia. Certainly either of these alternatives would be repugnant to the true interests of Japan in the long view of world affairs, just as it would be deeply damaging to the other Entente Allies. Inasmuch as we cannot for a moment attribute to the Japanese the gross disloyalty, so contrary to their traditions and so destructive of their future relations with the West, that would be implied in a Japanese-German rapprochement, we may look for a moment at the alternative of a Russian-German understanding. That, too, is seen at once to be absolutely counter-indicated for the interests of Japan as well as for those of her allies. Besides these quite obvious dangers, there is, of course, most serious objection to any action not absolutely required by the military necessity and safety of the Allies, which, even if justifiable in a general way, could nevertheless be seized upon as a

weapon to weaken our moral position and complete solidarity. The possibility of Japanese or any other action in Siberia under present conditions is fraught with peril. Complete frankness, wise deliberation upon the present and future bearings of the question, and, on the part of all, a single-minded and magnanimous devotion to the Allied purpose of this war—the elimination of the Prussian menace and the furtherance of future peace—will be required in the highest degree if a sound policy is to result.

To advert again to Japan in particular, the future of Japanese interests, like that of our own, is dependent upon the destruction of the Prussian menace. With the aim of the war achieved Japan's interests will be safe. Otherwise they will never be. It is quite true that Japan, equally interested, should now make some serious sacrifices for the common cause. But on the sea and in Mesopotamia or elsewhere, now or later, an occasion can surely be found for important military action by Japan quite apart from any doubtful venture in Siberia *just at this time*.

As to Russia, in forecasting or analyzing any action whatsoever by the present Bolshevik power, there is one thing above all others to bear in mind and that is this: To an international Marxian Socialist there is only one aim (and one to which every possible other consideration is to be sacrificed), namely, the aim to expedite a universal proletarian revolution, which in

his mistaken view is the only road to a better state of national and international society. It is indispensable to keep ever in mind this plain fact, frankly avowed by Trotsky and reflected in Lenine's policy, as the one criterion for judging action by those now predominating in power, if not in numbers, in Russia. Granting this, we should not overlook the appalling hypothesis that these international Marxian Socialists might conclude that to let Germany spread over Russia as far as possible in order that, whether in conditions of formal peace or not, the two proletariats might intermingle, might be the best means, in their opinion, to achieve their one aim—a war for a universal proletarian revolution. Given the state of the world and the nature of Prussia and the temper of the more conservative majority of Russians, few could share any belief in the success of such a purpose or of such means for its attainment. Still fewer will have the patience, imagination and credulity to look upon such a course of events as a very hopeful means, as matters now stand, for the defeat of Germany within any reasonable time through an upset due to Russian ferment working from within. The fascinated rabbit does not destroy the boa-constrictor that has swallowed him. In looking upon Russia in relation to our own desperate struggle, we shall do well to stick to more practical and immediate considerations.

Looking into the future, whether or not Russia be wholly evacuated by Germany as a condition of quasi-peace, and whether this war shall abruptly end with a definite destruction of the Prussian menace or shall fade into a long-drawn-out struggle, during which the present alliance of the West shall continue to reduce that menace by siege with its economic and moral weapons, the *coup de grace* to the ambition of Prussian militarism for world domination may conceivably have to be looked for eventually from the East and at the hands of Japan, of China and of Russia. Such contingency, however, would have to await the growing up in the vast part of Russia still free from Germany of a new Russia with a new spirit and willing to fight for something else than a universal proletarian revolution as the stepping-stone to vague and chimerical social ideals. It would have to await at least a sober Russia, clearly seeing its own salvation in co-operation for Allied victory. Such a Russia would not misunderstand Allied intervention in the common interest. An utterly impotent and hopeless Russia might necessitate it in any case. To convert a disillusioned Russia to reunion in sanely socialized democracy and to aid such a Russia in internal regeneration for strong resistance against the Teuton power is one of the most urgent and difficult tasks of Allied policy. Is it being energetically dealt with?

That the Far East, like the Near East, is a front

demanding major political strategy on the part of the United States and our Allies is slowly becoming generally recognized. At the beginning of March it was those minor questions in Eastern Siberia that seemed first to begin penetrating the consciousness of the public with the fact. The great task of saving Russia and of helping Russia to repel Deutchtum from the East is one in which their geographical situation, their military power, and their policy clearly suggest the possibility, at the proper moment, of an important rôle on the part of the Japanese nation, with whom, for this and for general reasons, our allied relationship should be attentively fostered and strengthened.

XIII

AMERICA, JAPAN AND THE WAR

SINCE events in Russia have brought the Far East more vividly to mind as within the scope of the war, and also because of America's traditional interest in that part of the world, a few further observations on the subject may not be out of place here. While revealing nothing not already known or surmised and discounted by those who follow such matters, the Bolshevik publication of foreign office archives afforded a school of practical diplomacy which should be useful to a public too prone to conceive of the conduct of foreign relations as a mysterious, far-off affair hardly touching the real interests of the average citizen's life—than which nothing is further from the truth. What was published in regard to the Russo-Japanese understanding of 1916 hardly justified the rather sensational caption given it by the editors of state papers at Petrograd; but it did bear interestingly upon the long-known fact that Russia and Japan had agreed to support one another as

against third parties in the assertion of such "special interests in China" as the two Powers might mutually agree to claim as growing out of their relations to that empire. That such an understanding should have been entered into illustrates again the extreme sensitiveness as to their position in the Far East which has possessed the political thought of the Japanese for some years. The feeling referred to was quite overdrawn so far as it affected the United States. America is not China's keeper, and, while in no wise disposed to abandon the legitimate commercial and other rights and the assurance of fair play for our citizens in China, it has not been the policy of the United States to obstruct Japan's natural and legitimate interests there, whatever Japanese jingoes may have said to the contrary.

With the fall of the old Russian imperialism of territorial aggrandizement, and the succession of the Bolshevik imperialism of doctrinal aggression, fell also the exceedingly convenient Russo-Japanese understanding. Instantly there was necessitated a reorientation of Tokio's foreign policy. It had to look further West, and the first result was the American-Japanese understanding embodied in the Ishii-Lansing notes. Now, although the Lansing note only recognized undoubted facts and need not be given interpretations of any alarming comprehensiveness, nevertheless American official recognition of Japan's special

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interests in China had thus become something of greatly increased value to the Japanese Government, and, therefore, the power to give or withhold it was one of our national diplomatic assets of no mean value. Hence it was very proper to assume that the Ishii-Lansing exchange of notes was not a *nudum pactum*, or contract without consideration. As to the probable nature of the consideration from Japan, which must have moved the Government at Washington, it seemed that some valuable participation in the war, and probably a big allotment of Japanese shipping to the Allied cause, must have entered into the understanding, especially as it was intimated that the United States was also to assign to Japan a certain amount of steel, now so precious an article in our war preparation.

In his exchange of notes with Viscount Ishii, Mr. Lansing drew heavily upon the treasury of this nation's diplomatic influence when he handed out America's official recognition of certain Japanese special interests in China. The coinage of a nation's diplomatic influence is limited, and is a national asset of which the Government of the day is the mere custodian and trustee. That influence is a national property, and the people are the *cestui qui trustent*. Whether through amiability or through idealism, no Government ever has the right to expend the diplomatic influence of a nation otherwise than for the

vindication of a right, the redress of a wrong, or the definite benefit of the nation as a whole, any more than an ordinary trustee has the right to use trust funds for purposes, however good, unless they advantage those whose trustee he is.

Were the Japanese really making or to make any sacrifices for the successful prosecution of the war at all commensurate with their position as allies or with the benefits they expected to reap? Many assurances had been given of their desire to do so, and it seemed to be the duty of this country, when engaged in important special negotiations with Japan, to suggest ways and means. Was or was not the Ishii-Lansing understanding to prove a *nudum pactum*? When the extension of Japanese suzerainty over Corea was a *fait accompli*, the American Government hastily bestowed the precious favor of its recognition of the new situation without gaining for this country any favors in return. Of course this matter of China was quite different, both in nature and in scale. But it was fair to hope that Mr. Lansing had not indulged in another game of "give away" diplomacy with the national treasury of American diplomatic influence in China as his stack of chips; and the country long awaited the answer to the question.

It now appears, happily, that a substantial contribution of Japanese shipping is soon to be forthcoming. Was there any further consideration? And is

not Japan to do more, also, as an Ally and as a beneficiary of the war's success? Japan has got, subject to the peace conference, Germany's Far Eastern territories. Japan has heavy general obligations to the Entente as an ally. The Tokio statement some months ago that "Japan's assistance to her allies cannot reach the extent of infringing upon the necessities of her national existence" is reasonable enough so long as "the necessities of national existence" is given a definition not unreasonable in its comprehensiveness. Aside from shipping, nothing is known as to the large question of Japan's making some still more important contribution to victory. That Japan will wish to do this can hardly be doubted. The capture of Kiaochow and of Germany's insular possessions in the Far East gives to the Japanese Government a lively interest in the war as a whole and in some of the ultimate adjustments. But the question of just what form Japan's active contribution to victory shall take is a difficult one. Since the Germans were long ago swept from the Pacific, it has seemed at various times that the Japanese navy might more fully join forces with us in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean; that the submarine-free route to the Persian Gulf might have been used for Japanese troops to re-enforce the British army in Mesopotamia; that Japanese ships might carry that army its supplies; or that Japanese troops might possibly be transported to the *Ægean* to help

destroy Germany's Bulgarian gangway to the Near East.

The difficult question of how to use the power of Japan must be left to be pondered in consultation by the competent Japanese, American and Allied authorities; but for the moral effect upon Germany and her Allies, as well as for the material advantages, it is to be hoped a new way may be found to remind the world quite emphatically of the fact that Japan is still at war, earnestly and to the end, and is ready to make material sacrifices in order to hasten that complete victory which is as necessary to her safety as it is to our safety and to the maintenance of civilization. With Japan loyally willing to exert its full power in the war, it is for the Allies to discover the best method for Japanese co-operation now and later. A sobered and reunited Russian people, welcoming help against the common Teutonic foe, may, it is to be hoped, supply the answer.

XIV

CHINA, AMERICA AND JAPAN

WHEN Viscount Ihsii, the present Japanese Ambassador at Washington, was here last autumn on a special mission, he said in allusion to the "open-door" policy in China: . . . "I assure you that a closed door in China has never been and never will be the policy of my Government. The door is open, the field is there. We welcome co-operation, and competition, all tending to the betterment of the equal opportunity. . . . We want good government, which means peace, security and development of opportunity in China. The slightest disturbance in China immediately reacts upon Japan. Our trade there is large and increasing; it is valuable to us and China is our friendly neighbor, with vast and increasing potentialities for trade. . . . Not only will we not seek to assail the integrity or the sovereignty of China, but we will eventually be prepared to defend and maintain the same integrity and independence of China against any aggressor. For we know that our own landmarks

would be threatened by any outside invasion or interference in China." In these words the distinguished diplomat reaffirmed the pledge of the Imperial Japanese Government to uphold the "open door" and the principle of equality of opportunity, and to respect the integrity and independence of China, and indicated that his country would be prepared to defend these latter if they should be threatened.

The conditions in China which Viscount Ishii described as desired by Japan, and to support which he pledged his Government, will at once be recognized as precisely those which were expressed by Hay, were fostered by Root, were implemented in a broad and far-seeing policy by Knox, and which are still the aims of American diplomacy in China. As the speaker intimated, it is quite true that geographical and other facts have given to Japan in the neighboring field of Chinese enterprise a certain natural advantage over more remote although earlier cultivators of that field, such as the United States and Great Britain. To quarrel with this fact would be to quarrel with the map. Due note of Viscount Ishii's declarations and their cordial reception by Americans in that spirit of friendly good understanding and co-operation, which he bespoke in each of the speeches made during his mission, should go far to demolish the suspicion that has been maliciously and

sometimes thoughtlessly spread abroad in this country. So, too, should the work of Viscount Ishii have the equally important effect of eradicating from the Japanese mind the suspicion that America, so long as our legitimate rights and interests are respected, will ever have anything but a sympathetic and considerate regard for the very special interest in China which actual facts have given the Japanese empire.

Much harm has no doubt been done through the dissemination in both countries of seeds of misunderstanding sown by the tireless German propagandists. Those are supposedly being dealt with. It remains for the two nations honestly to strive for an invariable mutual understanding as firm as the historic foundations of their friendship. Changes in Russia, as has been said, brought about the necessity for a reorientation of diplomacy in the Far East. The war itself has brought about other changes there. All these facts give special impetus to a movement for closer relations between the Japanese and American Governments, just as they also bring to the fore the important question of Japan's fuller participation with her allies against Germany. The time is especially favorable for brushing away fancied difficulties, and, as Viscount Ishii recommended, examining facts. In this way relations that have always been friendly may be placed quite beyond the reach of misunderstanding.

There appears to exist no valid ground of Chinese objection to the provision of the Ishii-Lansing exchange of notes whereby America recognizes certain special interests of Japan in China; and, indeed, there is much else in those documents which should be as welcome to China as have been the many similar declarations of past years as to the integrity of that empire and as to equality of foreign opportunity for economic enterprise there. The Chinese Government's "protest" was a very reasonable and understandable affair. The new agreement's aim "to silence mischievous reports" was recognized. The Chinese Government made the point that with respect to special relations due to territorial contiguity, China would only recognize them in so far as they were provided for by treaty.

This is natural enough, for no one could deny the right of the Chinese Government to grant, to deny, or to reject any specific foreign claim according to the standing of such claim under those treaties and agreements to which China itself is a party and which, therefore, alone bind the Chinese Government. If the Ishii-Lansing understanding stipulates any contemplated restriction upon China's liberty of action, that restriction could only be read into the passages where opposition to encroachments upon China is pledged. So long as the Chinese Government values its independence it can hardly object to pressure of

that kind, even if it may theoretically be directed against China itself. The statement that the Chinese Government will not be bound by agreements between other nations and to which its Government is not a party would, of course, go without saying. "The protest," then, resolves itself into a notice that the Chinese Government is aware of the new agreement and takes this occasion formally to reserve the right to consider its foreign relations to be governed exclusively by its treaties, propinquity or no propinquity.

If the Chinese have on this subject thoughts that go deeper than the surface of diplomatic documents, that is quite natural. Since the beginning of her contact with foreign Powers, China has lost territory to Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Japan, the last named power falling heir to the German and part of the Russian holdings. If the Chinese Empire is to remain a great Power in the Far East, reliance must be placed less upon diplomatic documents than upon internal regeneration. China has the good-will of the western Powers, but to put her own house in order, to establish honest and patriotic administration, to modernize her Government, to develop her vast resources and her national vigor, and so to demonstrate to the world her worthiness to survive in accord with nature's laws,—this is the stupendous task of patriotic citizens of the Chinese Republic.

The two practical points of Far Eastern policy

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to-day would seem to be for us, first, how to make the most effective use of Japan's belligerency as an Ally in the war, and, secondly, how most effectively to co-operate with Japan now and later in such Far Eastern affairs as have any practical concern for the United States. To promote these purposes both Americans and Japanese can do good service by informing themselves of the facts of the Far Eastern situation, by expelling from their minds every seed of mutual distrust, and by entering in good part upon a habit of matter-of-course collaboration and sympathetic good understanding, resting upon reality rather than upon sentimentality.

XV

WAR DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA

ACHIEVEMENT of the nation's good is to be measured not by complacent standards of relativity, but by absolute standards of possible accomplishment. By such criteria will all the war activities of the Administration at Washington in due time be judged, and stand or fall at the bar of public opinion. Viewed from any standpoint of what it was reasonable to expect, this Government's achievement in swinging Central and South America openly and actively to our side in the great war of principles being fought out with military, with moral, with intellectual and with economic weapons must be set down as far from brilliant.

It is true that Brazil, Cuba, Panama and Guatemala and now Nicaragua and Costa Rica, be it said to their honor, have gone to the full extent of aligning themselves with the United States of America by declaring war on Germany. It is true that many of the other republics, great and small, have taken varying action

to trace their names with varying distinctness upon the honor roll of the nations of the western hemisphere who dare and care for the right. But what shall be said of the great Argentine Republic, where German intrigue still rages along with brazen German efforts for future economic domination? What shall be said of the virile Chilean nation, still in its equivocal attitude of expressed sympathy with those countries which take action against Germany, combined with mysterious failure on its own part to come out into the open? The case of Mexico may, perhaps, be dismissed with the thought that there a continued tolerance of German machinations is only one more symptom of a political madness incidental to the chaos of the last few years. The apathy of Colombia, our great neighbor on the Caribbean, is to be ascribed, of course, to the curious failure of our Government to press to ratification the treaty intended to set our relations with that country on their true basis of special friendship.

For American interests now and later it is obviously most important that the economic and political tentacles of the German octopus be loosed from the republics of this hemisphere. Failure to achieve this will be a calamity to the United States. Failure to achieve it will be a calamity likewise to each Latin-American country that suffers such failure. In the first place, it is the obvious interest of each of those

countries to free itself from a cunning network of sinister schemes for Germanic domination. In the second place, the ideals, the sincerity and the good sense of all Latin-American countries are now being tested and examined in the glare of this all-revealing war by the public opinion of the world, and especially by the public opinion of the United States, which will take due note of the reality or unreality of its friendships on these continents.

German propaganda in South America goes forward on a colossal scale. Of one cunningly worded pro-German and anti-American pamphlet, 50,000 copies were distributed throughout that continent. This is only one of innumerable cases. In a letter to the President Mr. Creel said only three months ago of our own propaganda: "Much has been done, but it can only be regarded as experimental. Machinery has been created and tested, and we are now able to commence 100 per cent operation in all confidence. It is for this that I ask sanction." Apparently the American Government is now getting ready to begin propaganda on a large scale! Germany is represented throughout Latin America by skillfully trained agents. Edwin Morgan, in Brazil, and Henry P. Fletcher, in Mexico, are the only trained and experienced diplomatists that were left to the United States as ambassadors or ministers in this hemisphere after Mr. Bryan's "spoils" orgy of 1913. Brazil, where

we have a trained diplomatist as Ambassador, has declared war against Germany. Roughly speaking, it may probably be said that the attitude of South American countries in the war is good or bad in each case in direct ratio to the quality of the diplomatic representation vouchsafed America in each country during these critical times.

That Latin-America should openly and dramatically side with the United States was so obvious, so desirable and so reasonably to be expected that the actual situation must be set down as very disappointing. And in searching for the reason of this, how is it possible to escape ascribing it to these three causes, namely: a lack of vigorous and intensive diplomatic policy; second, too many inexperienced and inefficient diplomatic representatives of the United States; and, third, tardy and utterly inadequate propaganda of truth and right to overwhelm and stamp out the ceaseless intrigue of our ever cunning and ubiquitous enemy?

XVI

THE COLOMBIAN TREATY

MORE than a year ago, in a letter addressed to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and by him made public, the President said:

"I take the liberty of writing to ask you if it will not be possible to press the pending treaty with Colombia again for ratification. I must admit my surprise that there should be any objection to its consideration or to immediate action upon it in view of the unusual circumstances of the moment.

"The main argument for the treaty and for its immediate ratification is, of course, that in it we seek to do justice to Colombia and to settle a long-standing controversy which has sadly interfered with the cordial relations between the two republics. . . . It seems to me that those who oppose this treaty must be thoughtless of the present situation."

The treaty under consideration during those few weeks a year ago was Mr. Bryan's changed adaptation of an elaborate arrangement for the settlement of the

Colombian affair, which had been the subject of negotiation by Secretary Knox. It is hardly regrettable that the earlier treaty failed of prompt action because the Colombians had appeared to commit the indiscretion of seeking to appeal to an American political party and a partisan section of the American press over the heads of the country's then government; and that was a tendency too unwholesome to be encouraged by success. Mr. Bryan introduced into the treaty a somewhat apologetic tone, among many other changes; but its aim and general effect remained the same.

During the discussion in the Senate there is said to have been introduced the argument of fear of Colombian collusion with Germany. Naturally the Senate's reaction to this idea was unfavorable to ratification. Senator Lodge rightly repudiated every vestige of the idea that America should tolerate the semblance of blackmail or of buying military safety. There is no evidence, however, that there was any justice in imputing to Colombia an attitude which would give the basis to so intolerable a theory. It seems to have arisen entirely from things said in Washington. Senators Lodge and Knox joined also in insisting upon a stipulation that the negotiations should not be considered as questioning the American title to the Panama Canal Zone, and the two Senators were equally insistent that the treaty should by no implication reflect either upon the honor of the United

States or upon the course of the American President under whom the speedy construction of the Panama Canal had been made possible. There was, moreover, some discussion as to whether Secretary Bryan's addition to the sum to be paid Colombia by the United States was justified. Senator Knox championed ratification of the treaty on the floor of the Senate in a speech in which he urged action upon the broad grounds of justice, reasonableness and national interest. Since then, so far as public knowledge is concerned, this treaty has lain in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in a more or less amended form and still awaits action.

It is as true to-day as when the President said it that the treaty should be ratified in order to do justice to Colombia and to replace unsatisfactory by cordial relations between the two republics. It is perhaps still truer to-day that "those who oppose this treaty must be thoughtless of the present situation," because of these considerations. To bring the German people to their senses and so to expedite a safe and satisfactory peace there is no mightier lever than the German fear of commercial ostracism; of the loss of foreign trade. There are few things much more important to keeping American interests in a safe position *vis-a-vis* German ambitions than in the alignment of all Latin-America in sympathy, friendship and economic co-operation with this country, and thus preventing any

dangerous German preponderance in our hemisphere. For these purposes there is perhaps nothing which would have a more useful effect just now than the settlement of our troubles with Colombia. If the ratification of the treaty was deemed so very urgent one year ago the country may well ask what became of the Colombian treaty and why it should not be ratified now.

In an examination of the question on its merits it will be just as well to discuss the Bryan version of the treaty. If there be in it the shadow of reflection upon our national honor or upon the great President to whom, more than to any one else, the world owes the Panama Canal it will be a simple matter for the Senate to introduce some slight change to eliminate the objection. The point is that this thing should be settled and settled now, because it is right that it should be settled and because it is decidedly to the interest of the United States that it should be settled.

This treaty should be ratified on the broad ground that the United States and Colombia should be friends; that the time for pamphleteering and discussion has been long enough, and that, although the treaty has defects, still we can afford to overlook them for the general purpose in view.

The treaty itself states the purpose of the two countries to be "the settlement of their differences arising out of the events which took place on the Isthmus of

Panama in November, 1903." To most Americans the situation is this: Incidentally to the preliminaries to the building of the Panama Canal, of which we are justly proud, our relations with Colombia got into a mess, and, quite contrary to our wishes, the Colombians were made very sore. This has gone on now for nearly sixteen years and we should be glad to have it ended. Representing this feeling of most Americans, the last Republican administration felt, to use the language of Senator Knox when he was Secretary of State, that "so far as consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States and with the principles of justice when applied to the true facts, no effort should be spared in seeking to restore American-Colombian relations to a footing of complete friendly feeling." Therefore, in spite of the unfavorable attitude created by loose and exaggerated partisan statements and attacks, informal negotiations were opened in 1912 and the United States offered to pay to Colombia \$10,000,000. The United States was to acquire an exclusive option to build a canal by the Atrato route (which, it is believed, is impracticable and will never be used), as well as the lease of two islands (which we did not really particularly need). The chief effect of inserting these stipulations was to give the arrangement in view the dignity of a fuller mutuality of consideration. This idea, however, was either ignored or misunderstood in Colombia, where these shadowy stipu-

lations of *quid pro quo* were quite over-emphasized and treated as fresh concessions greedily sought. Bearing in mind these facts, it will be clear that there is no real difference in principle between the adjustment proposed by the Republican administration and the treaty now pending. The Republican administration opened the way for direct settlement on the basis of a payment. The Democratic administration took the way thus opened and increased by \$15,000,000 the payment offered. Whether the Republicans would have increased their financial offer cannot be known because the change of administration relieved them of further direct responsibility in the matter.

The pending treaty as negotiated by Mr. Bryan (Article I) contains an expression of regret by the United States "that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations." In the next paragraph Colombia "accepts this declaration in the full assurance that every obstacle to the restoration of complete harmony between the two countries will thus disappear." There was nothing of this kind in the Knox draft conventions, but their very proposal as bases for Colombian overtures constituted in a way such an expression by our Government; for if we had not regretted the situation we should not have initiated these efforts to mend it. Since the paragraph, then, is a fairly colorless state-

ment of an obvious fact, it may be passed without very serious objection. The Colombian expression of acceptance does tinge the article with a faintly apologetic color, at which one tends to balk, but upon careful consideration it is seen that in the English text, at any rate, that implication is so unsubstantial as to be pretty nearly innocuous. We all know that Colombia has felt offended. With the acceptance of the treaty goes without saying the honorable obligation that the former feeling shall cease and shall give place to a quite opposite one.

An enlightened and sincere Colombian might well say: "For three-quarters of a century our attitude toward the Isthmus was usually very unfortunate. When it became clear that the United States, as the leading power of the Western Hemisphere, and as trustee, in a sense, of the world's interest in this work, must build the canal we were engrossed in our former malady of revolutions and the play of personal ambitions and rivalries blinded our sight. We forgot that the great world would not wait upon our political intrigues at Bogotá, and we repudiated the Hay-Herran treaty after solemnly signing it. This is regrettable, because it was a pretty good treaty and because Colombian development has been immensely retarded by all these years of disagreeable relations with the United States. In 1909 our Government, desiring to clear up the situation, solemnly signed the Root-Cortes

treaty. It did not mollify our feelings and we did not think it gave us enough money on account of our former interest in the Isthmus. We also made much of a provision by which we, as friendly neighbors, should accord certain use of our harbors. But, most important of all, we then had a president we were trying to get rid of and we seized the opportunity to bury him beneath that treaty. We are very sorry that from the first we allowed personal ambitions and domestic politics to make it so hard for the United States to deal with us and we regret the very important part we ourselves thus took in bringing about 'all controversies and differences . . . arising out of the events from which the present situation . . . resulted.' "

The two questions are: (1) Is Article I of the Bryan treaty admissible, and (2) is the sum of \$25,000,000 not too large? As to the first, looking broadly at the whole stormy history of Panamanian affairs, it may justly be said that the article might have been drawn with more explicit mutuality. As to this, however, it should be remembered that the mass of the Colombian people have been taught for years to know only one side of this question; that, although this is no affair of ours, still life is too short to undertake now to change their impression; and that in a transaction like this one, which is above all a friendly one, we can afford to take cognizance of conditions which, strictly speaking, we are under no obligation to heed. We

can afford to let the Colombians please themselves with the tone of Article I rather than prolong, by re-drafting the treaty, an affair already so tedious. We ourselves can well refer the expressions of regret to Colombia's exasperating course of obstruction, while they may think, if they like, of the final policy of President Roosevelt, which, we know, was so justified by Colombia's course that we have no apologies to make.

For seventy-five years more or less interrupted attachment to Colombia has been the object of revolt attempted or threatened by the Panamanians, and very often in protest against the Colombian attitude toward this same question of a canal. The revolution was publicly foretold the moment the Hay-Herran treaty was rejected. Without attempting to guess whether Panama could have seceded if left quite alone, or to measure the effect of the discharge of our conventional duty to keep open Isthmian traffic, and without trying to appraise in degree the influence of the United States in the success of the secession, let us assume merely for the purpose of argument that that influence was decisive. Well, then, we have political action. The morality of political action is to be judged by the standard of what is humane and broadly equitable and by the adequacy of the circumstances which cause it. It can readily be maintained that Colombian indifference, or worse, to the urgent

need that the United States construct the canal had reached a point justifying political action of the first magnitude.

Now if an ultimatum followed by war would have been morally justified, how much more then was political action short of war. Our action, whatever it was, was political. Hence, among other things, the futility of all the discussions of arbitration of any of the larger matters. That possibility came to an end when the Taft Administration initiated the negotiations which have led to the treaty now pending. Those negotiations, it should be clearly remembered, had the same essence and aims as the negotiations of the Roosevelt Administration leading to the Root-Cortes-Arosemena treaties. In all cases Colombia was to receive some compensation; Panama was to be recognized; Panamanian-Columbian relations were to be established, and bad feeling was to be ended. Indeed, the purpose of the United States has been benevolent, just and consistent from first to last.

Adverting to the second question, that of the propriety of payment so large as \$25,000,000, this will cost us \$15,000,000 more than the Hay-Herran treaty would have cost. But the Hay-Herran treaty would have left the zone of the canal in the amorphous condition of a sort of dual extraterritoriality shared with Colombia. It failed to give us that right of eminent domain beyond the Canal Zone in relation to strategic

considerations which we now have, and which is of great importance. Without further analysis, I believe that the contemplated situation on the Isthmus is \$15,000,000 worth better than that contemplated by the Hay-Herran treaty and that, although there be no legal necessity, the United States can afford to spend this sum in order to clear up the situation with Colombia and between Colombia and Panama, and at the same time to terminate years of controversy and bad feeling by the satisfaction of the extremest equity that one friend could give another. We paid Spain \$20,000,000 for the Philippines after we had got them by the right of political action. Now some persons want to give away for nothing, without a majority vote of the people, what was there bought with some blood and with a bonus of the taxpayers' good money. But our most sentimental politicians are not likely to try to give away the canal. Even to-day we may, perhaps, feel sure of this.

By the Root-Cortes treaty of January 9, 1909, we guaranteed Colombia national treatment as to the transport of products, mails, military forces, etc., across the Isthmus, freedom from tolls in the canal for its warships and exemption from duty and reduced rates for transshipment across the Isthmus of certain products. In connection with the simultaneous treaty with Panama, that republic assigned to Colombia the annual payment of ten of the \$250,000 installments,

payments to begin at once instead of after nine years. Colombia, on the other hand, was to recognize the situation as it, in fact, exists to-day. The effect of the pending treaty is, in the main, similar; but under it Colombia receives \$22,500,000 more than it would have done under the Root-Cortes one.

We may keep what we have with the ill-will of Colombia, or we may ratify the pending treaty and with it rectify American-Colombian and Colombian-Panamanian relations and seal a pact of friendship with Colombia. In an absolute study of the question, it is fair to look back to 1903 and the Hay-Herran treaty. It would have been fair for us then to pay what we now propose to pay if we had then got what we now shall have. Moreover, now we shall gain the rights to expect, to an even greater degree than we could then, the quite special friendship of the Colombian people. Thus from an absolute point of view practical people can be reconciled to the transaction. Still, they may ask what the friendship of Colombia is worth to us.

Let me follow that undue reputation for materialism which we used to enjoy abroad and state first the commercial figures. Colombia is among the half dozen largest of the twenty Latin-American republics. Even before the war our exports to Colombia led with about 30 per cent of all Colombia's imports. This is only one-third of one per cent of the total exports of the United States. Colombian exports to

the United States constituted about 50 per cent of all Colombian exports, and from some of the most important Colombian departments this ran as high as 70 per cent. Colombia needs capital for railway construction, harbor improvements, mining and many other developments. On the other hand, Colombia affords many opportunities, is near us and is one of the most promising and appropriate fields for the enterprise of American citizens. In the second place, the Panama Canal makes the zone of the Caribbean irrevocably the most vital field of American interest. Adverse and powerful political and strategic interests cannot exist with safety to us in that region. Our safety there must be assured, as the Chileans say in their excellent national motto, "Por la razon o por la fuerza" (By reason or by force). Let us try always to assure it "por la razon." But with this safety is bound up the safety of our immediate neighbors, among which Colombia, bordering upon both oceans, has a place of great importance; and strengthened by special relations with us Colombia should always be freer from outside anxieties. Thus, with the balance of probable material benefit proportionally so in favor of Colombia we may feel agreeably free of any duress in the relations of the two countries. It is quite certain that until the two countries become friends the door will remain closed as it now is to virtually everything American which can possibly be supplied from

any other source, and we shall meet obstruction where we should find sympathetic co-operation. Do we wish to remedy this situation? If so, half measures would defeat the ends in view. The remedy must be complete if it is to have the really important results it should have.

In the far-spread influence of the virile, industrious and enterprising Antioqueños, among the Bogotanos, and elsewhere, the Colombian population of between four and five millions shows, with all its faults, elements of energy and enlightenment which, with gradual emancipation from the old vices of Spanish-American civilization, give good hope for the future. Among the Spanish-speaking peoples of America, whose similarity and solidarity we are accustomed greatly to exaggerate, Colombia is among those countries having the larger proportion of their people of a type and tendency likely, relatively, to become not antipathetic to our own. However skeptical one may be of Pan-Americanism, here at least is a people geographically nearer and better adapted than many to mutual understanding and intercourse with ourselves.


With conviction that there is no objection to Article I that is not either trivial or easily curable, or to the payment contemplated, there remains in some minds the question of what assurance we have that the money to be paid Colombia will be well spent and that in the future Colombia will act as a true friend to

the United States in our vital political and strategic interests related to the canal and the zone of the Caribbean, as well as in the financial, commercial and industrial interests of our citizens in Colombia. In a message to the Colombian Congress President Restrepo recorded the intention that the sum received, if the treaty were ratified, should be devoted to the improvement of means of communication. That it should be devoted to such enterprises as railways and harbor works and under some wise general plan, and a part, perhaps, to currency reform and to certain educational work of more modern spirit, is undoubted. Also, it would be only natural that American experience and advice should be availed of and American experts and materials made use of in the resulting undertakings. Unfortunately, Spanish-Americans are not supposed to be noted for the qualities of appreciation and steadfastness, and there is room for some cynicism in this direction. Our dignity will not suffer if we refrain from quibbling over the form of this treaty or the sum involved. For the rest, let us make an experiment. Let us test the loyalty and chivalry of the Colombians and see what happens. Perhaps they will see that their future lies in friendly co-operation with us. As the Chilean motto intimates, where reason fails there is always force for the protection of vital interests; but with good feeling our vital interests will be Colombia's. As to other inter-

ests, such as commerce, with good feeling and with enterprise on the part of our citizens, whose opportunities are peculiar, those will take care of themselves. That there should be a flourishing commerce between the two countries is even far more important to the Colombian than to us.

The seal of Colombia bears a picture of the Isthmus of Panama with a ship on each ocean waiting to pass the canal so long dreamed of. For this reminder of a technical loss, the bitterness of which has obscured the vast gain, there should then be substituted the clasped hands of friendship between the two countries, which are natural allies in interest and between which there should be a full co-operation.

It was unfortunate that the German menace should have been ill-advisedly introduced as an argument for the urgent ratification of this treaty of 1913. That may have postponed prompt action upon the treaty just as Colombian flirtation with our then minority party and the insensate effort of certain partisan newspapers in this country to make Colombian relations a partisan and not a national affair killed the negotiations of five or six years ago. It is to be hoped that the President will renew his recommendations and that other senators will follow the course of Senator Knox in rising superior to tempting excuses for postponing a wise national policy, a policy approved in principle by the acts of two Republican and



two Democratic Secretaries of State, a policy non-partisan and jealously guarding the national honor and with it the honor of the great President to whom we owe the prompt creation of the canal. If there were any shadow of doubt upon this last important point, the Senate would know how to rectify it.

We are pouring out billions upon billions of dollars to attack the German menace on the fields of Europe. Moral and economic influences are of the utmost value to the achievement of our aim—a peace safe from that menace. To help consolidate the weight of the whole American hemisphere on our side, it is worth while to ratify the Colombian treaty without a day's delay. Both justice and self-interest demand such action. A year ago the President urged it as immediately desirable. What became of the Colombian treaty? Why is it not now urged by the President and ratified by the Senate as a wise war measure as well as a measure of right?

XVII

EQUITY VS. RUTHLESSNESS

THE immediate practical reason we must win the aim of this war, which is to defend ourselves and guarantee our descendants from the domination of Prussian brute force, is by this time, it may be hoped, clear to all. For this we must "carry on"; we must accustom ourselves to "war as usual"; we must organize for victory, whether it come soon or late. When the Teutonic menace is passed the war will be won; and only then. For victory we must press not only our military, but also our moral, intellectual and economic offensive, with foresight and vigor. All else now gives place to this. While keeping ever before our eyes the compelling urgency of our immediate war aim, we realize that transcending it is the issue of two principles of world relations. We may hope, although we cannot be sure, that this shall be the last world-battle of ruthless imperialism against international equity and justice. Our victory should see the dawn of a new day between nations—not a day when

force will not still have its place, but a day when force shall be the armor-bearer of right, when right shall have might. If we see to this last, we may realize our hope.

There is something else we must not forget. There is coming more than ever before into the clear light throughout the world a new sincerity and insistence of purpose within nations to make the individual and collective life of each nation a better life. International affairs can occupy our internationalism. This is a national matter. America must awake and grasp and carry out, according to her own genius, this purpose. Our minds must be stretched to new scales of values, of duties; to new standards of mutual obligation between citizens, of the common obligation of citizens to the nation as a whole, of solidarity of purpose, of co-operation. A new spirit of citizenship must build great policies corresponding to an awakened sincerity of purpose to make democracy as good as its word. The people are awakening, thinkers and laborers. An era is closing. We are to build for a new one. The soul and mind of man have been stirred. In the stress of war the seeds of ancient aspiration are germinating to ripeness for action. We shall not be quite the same again, nor will our social relations, nor will our politics, nor will our policies of government. And it is good that this is so.

In the shadow of the great war is preparing another

war, a war within the conscience of our citizenship. With us the question is, Shall the life of America be left to be ruled by ruthless economic force, whether applied by labor or by capital, or shall that life be determined increasingly by social equity and justice? Shall the cry of all men be for *more, more*, regardless of what is due, and always with the one sordid standard of money; or shall we have a better cry, a cry for what is due, economically, but ever a cry for a richer, a more human, a finer national life?

The immediate practical reason we must win this other inner war, which is to defend ourselves and safeguard our descendants from the domination of economic brute force, ought, by this time, to be clear to all. For this we must also "carry on"; we must accustom ourselves to constructive political, economic and sociological thought "as usual"; we must organize for victory in the vindication of democracy, whether it come soon or late. When we know ourselves to be on a clear road of sound policy based on sound and dominating public opinion, when the menace of ruthless economic selfishness has been thus honestly met and defeated through modernized policy—then only shall we know ourselves to be on the road to victory in this peaceful war within the national conscience. For victory there must be pressed among our own citizens an educational, moral and intellectual campaign. In concentrating upon our own im-

mediate aim to set our own house in order, to make our own great American family a happier and a better one, we may well be stimulated and warned by the fact that transcending our own problem is the same issue between the same principle of economic ruthlessness, individual or collective, and of social equity and justice, demanding solution in every other country in the world. There arises everywhere, as never before, the battle of social equity and justice against ruthless economic force, against individual and group selfishness. Victory will see the dawn of a new day within nations—not a day when economic force will not still have its place, but a day when the economic force of individuals and of groups, of capital and no less of labor, shall be the armor-bearer of right in an orderly march of the nation toward the gradual attainment of a richer, a more human, a finer national life.

Easy-going America should awake to these facts now. There is a curious analogy between the issue of the world war and impending issue presented to the national conscience. The international issue caught us unprepared. Luckily the machinery of our wonderful constitutional republic and the generosity and common-sense of the national character force upon us a fortunate degree of preparedness for our part in this peaceful war within the war that is everywhere discernible. But these are not enough. We

may fail in preparedness through easy-going indifference and the superficiality of intellectual indolence on the part of a vast majority, bounded on one side by ultra-conservatism and on the other by unsound idealism. If the majority is to rule, the majority must think, and think nationally, courageously and straight. If we do that we are sure to win in the inner as in the outer struggle. America is fortunate indeed in having institutions and citizenship so splendidly adapted to progress through orderly evolution. We are fortunate in starting with our general course in the right direction. We see in unlucky Russia a people unprepared and groping an uncharted course. We see there how the price of unpreparedness may be progress through the tragedy of revolution.

Thoughtless and selfish indifference can never carry us safely between the co-equal dangers of blind conservatism and of unbridled radicalism. The reactionary and the sufferer from *dementia liberalis* are equal enemies of national reform. A new nationalism must arise. A new preparedness must be undertaken to make sure the victory of democracy at home as well as abroad.

The world issue, then, is international equity and justice versus imperialism through ruthless force. The domestic issue is social equity and justice versus the unmitigated domination of the national life by

ruthless economic force, whether of labor or of capital. There is a striking analogy also between the limitations upon what it is possible or desirable to achieve in the reformation of international relations and in the readjustment of national life. These limitations rest upon the unalterable facts of human nature. In their recognition or non-recognition the visionary extremist and the practical man part company. The real work of constructive reform, both in international relations and in national life, must be done by those who do not mistake the ideal for the real and who pursue the ideal ever with a clear realization of the facts of human nature.

Inasmuch as the child is the microcosm of the man, the man of the family, the family of the nation and the nation, in a way, of the whole international group, it should not be too difficult, through appreciation of the analogous manifestations of human nature in all these forms, to reach a realization of the fundamental facts of nature's laws true enough to guide statesmanship safely between attempt of the impossible and neglect of attainable good. Any readjustment, whether of international or of national life, that attempts to contradict nature's laws as manifested in human action is, of course, doomed to failure. This fact, however, should not be made an excuse for neglecting the great ameliorations that are practicable in both fields.

The realization, emphasis and expression of individuality, and the corollary, selfishness, is the fundamental instinct and one through which evolution is carried forward. Unworthy and backward nations and tribes that fail to contribute their share and to discharge their proper function in the international body politic will gradually be surpassed and supplanted by those more worthy to survive. So, too, in the national life. The lazy, the inefficient, the defective, the vicious—those who do not contribute their share—must expect to find themselves in process of elimination in the national body politic. In both fields the task is not a futile and unwise attempt to set aside the law of the survival of the fittest, but an attempt to set up and to insist upon better standards of fitness and to modify the environment in order, so far as possible, to make it correspond to the type of nation on the one hand and of the individual on the other hand that a true civilization would wish to see survive. It is neither desirable nor possible to arrest the laws of evolution, but it is desirable and possible to turn them more and more in what the most enlightened thought of mankind deems the best direction. In short, neither internationally nor nationally should our institutions be made disproportionately for the benefit of the unfit.

In preserving, both as among nations and in the national life, a scheme giving scope to the ambitions

of the fit we shall only conform to a law of nature upon which all human progress depends. Not to do so would be to remove all competition and all reward and so to stultify and take all zest and stimulus from life, both national and international. If this planet were in communication with other inhabited ones, then mankind of this earth might achieve a complete international solidarity, a planetary patriotism; for we, as a whole, could then assert ourselves in rivalry with the races of other earths. Meantime, international rivalries are useful as stimuli to achievement, and international superiorities are useful in satisfying the national, or group, and through it the individual craving for distinction. Quite similarly, within the nation, rivalries and rewarded superiorities are necessary as stimuli to individual effort and to that possibility of individual distinction, that assertion, emphasis and expression of individuality, without which national life would be merged in deadly stultification. Both internationally and nationally the progress of civilization is not to be sought in contradicting this law of selfishness, but in directing it to higher aims, in setting before it prizes that may be striven for with less damage to others, in humanizing the rules of human nature's game of life.

Even a cursory indication thus brings out many analogies between the international and the national issues that are very striking. Between the means of

perpetuating the victory of right and justice to be won in this war and the means of gaining and perpetuating victory for equity and justice in the national life there is still another similarity. In both cases knowledge, mutual understanding and educated attention to the problem are indispensable. In each case all depends upon an intelligent, just and generous public opinion on the part of a clear majority, backed with the potentiality of dominating force. After the war, that majority may be found among the nations in an alliance of the English-speaking peoples leagued with their allies who are now fighting, or who may later join us, on the side of right, equity and justice to the world. Within the nation that majority must be found among citizens who are willing to stand for social equity and justice in the national life; who are willing, even at seeming sacrifice of personal interest, to help create a national life so much finer and richer that a share in it will be better and more satisfying to the human heart than what is now enjoyed by those deemed most favored.

At this point consideration of the international issue leads into the field of diplomacy, with its international law, its leagues, alliances and understandings, its spheres of influence, its tariff, commercial and financial arrangements; its hopes in arbitration and in the keeping of rivalries within humane bounds—a field as wide as human interests, but as limited as

any other by the facts of human nature. On the other hand, the national problem leads straight to consideration of the subjects of centralization of power in the national Government, paternalism in Government, socialism in the true modern sense, and, above all, to the need of that informed, active and high-minded public opinion without which democracy is doomed to failure.

If it be admitted that the national life is not now so good as it should be and as it could be made, it follows inevitably that its amelioration must be worked out through a certain degree of gradual socialization of our Government, along with increased centralization and paternalism. It is, therefore, high time that these subjects should be studied. An astounding number of otherwise well-informed Americans have scarcely a dictionary knowledge of the meaning of such words as socialism, syndicalism, anarchism, and so on. In its essence, socialism is a policy seeking to promote more economical production and more equitable distribution of wealth. There is surely nothing here to be shy of. Few would be willing to admit a reluctance to go so far as that! Among intelligent modern Socialists the Marxian idea of class war is pretty dead. Even Government ownership is being supplanted a good deal by the not very sensational idea of socialization through governmental regulation, toward which this country has at last made

some progress. It is high time that those who are enchanted with the status quo should cease to treat "socialistic" as a vague synonym for "damn." It is equally misleading that wild-eyed agitators should so often cover their vagaries with the word. We do not want socialism in any of the forms in which it has been worked out on paper, but we already have, and we shall have more and more that is socialistic in principle. Moderate Socialists of sincerity and common sense and unterrified "conservatives" who are generous and open-minded need hardly find themselves too far apart to co-operate in such socialization as our relatively very fortunate country needs.

XVIII

SOCIALIZATION

SOME persons believe that after the war there will be in the United States a strong reaction from the degree of socialization through Government control to which the war has brought this country back toward an individualism as little regulated as before. Of course, it is easy to point to many causes for congratulation in American life. It has many splendid phases; it affords the widest opportunity; it may be praised in innumerable respects. It is probably the best so far attained. Many persons, conscious of the good and possibly overlooking the evil, are sincerely satisfied and cling to a belief in the old doctrine of *laissez faire*. They would perhaps doubt that there is with us any great issue between social equity and justice and a too little mitigated domination of the national life by ruthless economic forces. It may, therefore, be well to indicate the existence of the issue by enumerating some of its manifestations in unsolved problems as they fare under the degree of the tradi-

tional *laissez faire* to which the nation still tends normally to cling.

Modern war forces an individualistic nation to reorganize itself for its common good, for a particular purpose. It is no less true that the efficient pursuit of the common good in time of peace equally calls for such reorganization. But in time of peace, not being compelled from without, an individualistic nation neglects to reorganize itself. We have all seen the radical changes forced upon America by the necessity of efficiency for the purposes of war. We have to-day a degree of centralization and paternalism quite new to us. We have seen our present Administration forced to revert to the principle of controlled combinations instead of enforced competition in industry, transportation, etc. Quite aside from the principles adopted as war measures, which many think will be afterward abandoned, it is worth while to remember that prior to 1913 the United States had made considerable strides forward in centralization and paternalism and in legislation that may be called socialistic in the proper sense.

About twenty years ago untrammelled economic force on the part of capital reached perhaps its height. The progressive policy of President Roosevelt and his Attorney General, now Senator Knox, grappled the problem, made the anti-trust law effective and set us on the road to the control of economic force in the

hands of capital. In President Taft's Administration we had the proposal of Federal incorporation, through which the Government would have all information necessary to supervision of business, backed by the "rule of reason." This would have led to the principle of treating excessive profits as evidence of monopoly and to insistence by the Government that the vast economics of combination should, after securing reasonable profits, benefit the nation in the form of lower prices and good wages. We were on the road to a wise policy, centralized, paternalistic and socialistic, to be sure, but of infinite good to the American people. This reference to that policy will suffice to make the point that it is the exigencies of peace, as well as those of war, which inevitably drive America forward on this road. To-day it may be untrammelled economic force on the part of labor that is in turn reaching its height and in turn equally calls for governmental regulation on behalf of the whole people.

There is another class of legislative activities of a humanitarian character, not so obviously related perhaps to the one issue of the control of economic forces, but equally calling for the abandonment of *laissez faire* and the adoption of a marked degree of centralization and paternalism. In regard to measures of the kind referred to there may be mentioned the national interests recognized, for example, in the report of President Roosevelt's Commission on National

Vitality and President's Taft's Commission on Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation. In this purview falls also much of the philosophy of what has been known as "The Wisconsin Idea."

Here we encounter all those human problems hitherto largely neglected by the Government and left upon the *laissez faire* theory to local or private philanthropic activity. There is a growing sense that so many of the things which most intimately affect human happiness can no longer be decently neglected by a Government which exists for the good of the people. Every year at Christmas time, in an appeal for charity, we can read of "the one hundred worst cases" in our large cities, and be reminded that innocent and merely unfortunate people may, so far as our intervention as a Government is concerned, be brought to the point of perishing. In the same great cities there are horrible tenements and bad conditions of sanitation and housing. Our Government gives free medical advice about hogs and cattle, but the people are left largely to charity hospitals, to take patent medicines still shamelessly exploited through some of our newspapers, or to quack doctors into whose clutches they may be drawn through chance. Matters of playgrounds, recreation grounds, libraries, public baths, civic centers and decent amusements are left mainly to private effort, or to the individual work of a few enlightened communities, instead of

being governed by any thoroughgoing or adequate policy. Little is officially done to break down through education the cruel and un-Christian attitude toward illegitimacy and unmarried mothers. All these situations cry out for the creation of a national department of health and welfare.

In order to achieve a triumph of deductive reasoning, Adam Smith, realizing that the world was governed by economic force and by human sympathy, wrote two complementary books which together should prove his thesis. It is significant that every one read "The Wealth of Nations," but nobody read the "Theory of Moral Sentiments." It would be difficult, even if one would do so, sharply to divide matters affecting human happiness and suffering according to the degree in which they affect the welfare of the nation as a whole and are, therefore, concerns of the nation's agent, its Government. But it should be axiomatic that the quality of the future nation concerns those who are preparing its inheritance. The great problems of the happiness, the quality and the welfare of the American nation, now and hereafter, should not be hidden beneath the interests of business. Business is good, to be sure, but except perhaps in that to be busy is an essential to happiness, it should be remembered that it is a means to an end and not a means in itself. Doubtless the new realization that there are proper and improper functions

for middlemen and that there are necessary and unnecessary industries will be a timely reminder of this truth. At any rate, if we are to modernize our policies and improve our national life we must set our eyes upon new national aims.

Certainly the nation is concerned in the rudiments of eugenics, in marriage and divorce laws, in sex hygiene, in the falling birth rate of native Americans and in the almost untrammelled reproduction of the unfit. Here again are matters for a Federal Department of Health and Welfare. It is to be hoped, too, that shaken out of stupid tradition by the war, our educators, clergy and press may cast aside old hypocrisies and seize this opportunity for sane education in those phases of the sex question which are known to have such a terrible bearing upon the future of the race. If the American nation is to endure as such and to be worthy of its inheritance, the immigration problem is another that goes to the source of things and that must be handled sincerely and scientifically. We would better not forget that our criminal statistics are the worst in the world and that our asylums are crowded with the unfit, disproportionately of foreign birth.

Then, too, not only for the newly arrived foreigner, but for the native-born American, our educational system suffers from lack of uniformity. It addresses itself too much to book learning, often superficial,

and too little to the conduct of life; too much to the teaching of rights, and too little to those obligations which are the invariable complements of rights. It fails to inculcate adequate understanding and serious sense of the duties of citizenship. It is inadequate on the side of vocational and well-thought-out special training for the nation's work in foreign trade and elsewhere. All this points to the need of greater centralization at Washington in the general direction of America's educational policy. And it inevitably points to a great increase in paternalism.

In all these things something can be done through legislation and something through administration. Most of all must be done through the infusion of a new spirit, a new attention to national affairs, new aims and a new comradeship in the nation. Herein is the task of preparedness for our victory in the issue which the war has made so much clearer. In one year we are spending \$20,000,000,000 on account of our part toward victory in the world issue. Can we not well afford to spend much for the victory in the recreation and betterment of our national life?

Even while blessed with peace had we not enough to war upon in our own country, if we have any conscience about the promises of our democracy, to make it worth our while to plan efficiency, through paternalism and centralization—efficiency to make our national life still better worth living, as well as to pro-

teet it from foreign assault? The European war shows what democracies like Great Britain and France have had to do and have been able to do to achieve efficiency for a great national purpose. They concentrate delegated power for quick decision. Their governments become in the highest degree representative. They limit profits. They compel service. They take over services where necessary. They assume an intensely paternalistic care of the nation. Did we learn by their example? No; we, too, must needs wait to be taught by war. It is not war, but war's absolute demand for efficiency, that has driven Europe into frank paternalism and increased centralization. In America, where we are so backward in political and social thought, where we do not always act as if we believed, at heart, that the true interests of each and of all are the same, some of us were shocked at those European innovations. Thinking of material things, we began to discuss the need of meeting in commercial competition the efficiency to be looked for in Europe's centralized paternalism, enhanced and developed by the war. A "practical" people, we were shocked at paternalism while admitting its efficiency!

British institutions are pointed to as a gradual growth, with little conscious purpose in their building. New forms and methods of government, like new religions, sometimes came about in spasms of reaction

against life as it had become. Neither method is suitable to the conditions of to-day. Modern life is "speeded up" to a terrific pace. Man has "made things hum" verily. He cannot leave his Government the only thing at the mercy of gradual growth. His constructive genius must reorganize government so that it shall keep pace with the scale and speed of the rest of his life. To neglect this is to prepare the way for reform by spasm. And how infinitely dangerous and costly that would be in the vast and complicated society of to-day.

American history has been a long, often unconscious, fight to put down excessive individualism. Before the Civil War this individualism asserted itself chiefly by State groups and was ever jealous of any extension of care for national interests by the national Government. In recent decades the sheer demand for uniformity and efficiency, as well as the lure of the Federal treasury, has with startling rapidity seen the whole country turn to the national Government for aid and for regulation in nearly every field of human welfare. The political party which used to raise the banner of "States' rights" has joined the van of this irresistible movement to substitute national for local government in all national concerns, whether the Constitution had looked forward to their Federal or to their State control.

This is as it should be. The dual system of State

and national regulation of really national affairs is obviously complicated, wasteful and inefficient as a system. Besides, no country is so densely populated with statesmen as to be able to fill with men of wisdom, lofty character, intelligence and high education forty-eight large Legislatures, countless State, executive and judicial offices and the innumerable offices of complex municipalities and of counties. It simply cannot be done. Our municipalities have been scandals of extravagance and bad service and our State Legislatures have so muddled matters of national interest that the people have turned in despair to the national Government. The supply of talent available for the national Government is cut down by the local demand. As one of our modern writers has intimated, a State Governor elected subject to recall on a definite platform, and supplied with a few experts in law drafting would probably run a State more efficiently and certainly infinitely more economically than is done by the present elaborate State government. Such have been the corresponding results where a small commission has been substituted for an elaborate municipal government.

The evolution, then, is toward the gradual decay of State government as a participant in national, as distinguished from really local affairs. In business, when a machine no longer pays, it is scrapped. As the work of State government is cut down to purely local

concerns, the State machinery can be cut down and simplified. Evolution should be met half way with a plan. If we could take the wisest two dozen men in the country and lock them up like a jury for a few months they would doubtless come out with an excellent plan. But to get that result through forty-eight Legislatures and a huge national Congress in a few years is a much more doubtful hope. Anyhow, centralization has arrived. The principle has at last won. The task now is to face the fact and to adapt our system to it.

With the new nationalization of our Government and the concentration at Washington of the sovereign authority we must not fall into another error, another violation of the rules of efficiency. Already we are piling up vast buildings and a vast personnel. With the centralization of authority and of legislation upon national affairs we must have a certain decentralization of administration. One of our old cries is the laudation of "government of laws not of men." Really we suffer from too many laws and not enough able administration. Legislation cannot go into every detail. It must vest discretion, as in the Interstate Commerce Commission and the increasing number of such bodies we have and shall require. The Federal reserve bank zones may have blazed the way for this administrative decentralization. In them we may find a clue suggesting such zones for the imping-

ing of national administration upon the people in groups of States. The centers of such zones might become subcapitals of the nation, the centers of the Federal administrative and judiciary activities corresponding to the surrounding States, the locations of the great Federal garrisons and training schools that are to come with universal military service, the sites of a few real universities. This new prestige would also tend to give the cities concerned a local leadership in learning, art, music, etc., so that in them might be concentrated a part of life which we have now spread so thin over the whole country that many of those who hunger for beautiful things must travel too far to find them in satisfactory quantity.

Paternalism and centralization have arrived, in principle, and have come to stay. We may blink at them as horrid apparitions. We may rattle the dead bones of *laissez faire* theory and of "States' rights," but this is true. Here again it will be better to make a plan and to meet evolution half way, instead of trusting to gradual growth at the risk of political and social spasm. If we meant it when we said our Government was for the people, when we said its aim was "the greatest good of the greatest number," how can we dodge the conclusion that our welfare lies in paternalism? To the father of a family is delegated by custom the family's object of caring for the family, of existing for the greatest good of the family.

To the Government the body politic, which is the nation viewed as a family, delegates the similar object of its existence; that is, the care of itself, the nation and the greatest good of itself, the nation. The immense complexities of modern life, the inequalities of wealth and opportunity, a thousand things have made it impossible for the nation to care for itself and to achieve its greatest good effectively while acting only through individual or group agencies. The nation needs its own full power—that is, its Government—for those vast tasks.

XIX

NEW NATIONALISM

SINCE the ideals of "liberty, equality and fraternity" reverberated around the world, what with increased education, rapid communication and industrialism, the democratic idea, backed potentially with modern weapons, has become too strong to be longer threatened. Democracy has slain the dragon of oppression. Now the giant democracy stands quivering in his strength wondering what to do next. He carries constitutions as a little shield lest in a moment of madness he turn and rend himself. Democracy must have very clear aims or else its appalling power will be used for mischief to itself. In the dangerous completeness of its liberty democracy holds the right to commit suicide. When modern democracy originated its task was to protect the people against governmental oppression by a small part of them—a power extraneous to the masses. Now the task is rather to protect all the people from oppression by all the people—from an oppression that might be

heavier than that of oligarchy as the whole is greater than its part. For it is oppression by the selfish and indifferent mass of the people that is transmuted into oppression by economic and social group interests. The whole people have the power; they must be held responsible for the effects of any failure to make full and wise use of their power.

What worse oppression, too, than that which reduces all ideals to the level of materialism; that robs the nation of lofty leadership and enthrones mediocrity? With its original object gone, how shall democracy justify itself if its cumbersome processes are allowed to hamper efficient administration, prompt justice, wise policy, noble national ideals and the best development of a finely happy people? The promise of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" means much here in America. But does it mean as much as it should? We go on interpreting it, in a modern world, according to the ancient theories of *laissez faire* still in vogue among those who think we still want "as little government as possible." What is "life" to the sick man who cannot pay a doctor or does not know where to find a good one? What is "happiness" to a laborer, whatever his wages, whose shanty is on an ash-heap, whose breath is factory stench, whose outlook is hideous devastation? What is "liberty" to the man for whom the nation finds no place in its mechanism of living?

The French Court at Versailles failed to meet social and political evolution half way. Caught without a plan, it saw reform by social spasm. The powerful are slow to learn *jiujitsu*—the art of fighting by yielding scientifically. They are so tenacious of more than they have a moral right to that they risk and often lose all rather than help in making a plan to secure them their just dues. Quite aside from the war, capital has already had to yield to great taxes and to increasing regulation and restraint. Stricter regulation and such limitation of profits, except perhaps for the first years of new and beneficial enterprises, are likely to outlast the war. The "rights" of both capital and labor must capitulate to the paramount equities of the nation of which they are parts. What is, in each field, a proper number of hours of labor and what is a fair and adequate wage are questions of the moral, mental and physical welfare of the people. They deeply concern the nation. They should not be left entirely to "collective bargaining," as if the State were disinterested. The moral, mental and physical welfare of its members is the chief concern of a family. Because the nation is a big family, why should it be expected to be indifferent to and aloof from those same concerns? On the contrary, the moral, mental and physical welfare of the people is the people's, and, therefore, the State's most vital interest. The national family does not want to

take over every member's work, but it does not wish to conduct itself for the benefit of any group of spoiled children, whether of the capitalistic or of the labor group.

People are naturally somewhat lazy and superficial and not very much given to thought beyond their more obvious personal concerns. In politics they are too often wandering sheep at the mercy of any shepherd's siren whistle. The average man is not a great thinker about public affairs. An Oriental sage, inspecting western civilization in England, reported home of the jury system: "Wise men are few, we all know, yet these people intrust to the judgment of twelve men chosen almost at random the decision of the most difficult questions." Well, we should not exchange ours for oriental justice. All the same, our theoretical assumption of supreme wisdom and diligent attention to public affairs on the part of our nation of voters is a time-honored hypocrisy, and we all know it. One may admire the sincere idealism of those fanatics who think direct democracy would be a cure-all. One must condemn the hypocrisy of those who make the people's unexercised power an excuse for their own inaction in office. Our leaders' frequent slavish reflection of popular prejudice differs not in principle from the Roman provision of popular games and feasts. It differs only in so far as the tastes of the masses have changed with the centuries.

This fashion creates a vicious equilibrium, a veritable paralysis of the national will. Oftentimes the people are attending to their private affairs and thinking little or not at all of a problem of public policy; our government, both executive and legislative, finds itself confronted with the distasteful duty of making a decision; so it listens for public opinion. Ninety-nine per cent of the public may not be opining at all on the subject, but may be leaving it all to "those fellows at Washington," or to the President. The spectacle is for all the world like the familiar sight, out shooting, of two dogs pointing one another, each assuming the other to have found the game. Literally direct government, were it not wholly impossible, would be preferable to a perversion of representative government into government merely reflective of popular indifference. In that is the evil of pure democracy and something more; for in pure democracy the people might awaken to some feeling of responsibility, whereas now they are often lulled to sleep by the theory that they are being represented, when they are really only being reflected. The nation cannot afford to be guided according to guesses at the opinion of people who are blissfully thinking of something else. Direct democracy, whether frankly so or through the perversion of the forms of representative government, could be successful only when the mass of citizens were supernaturally

thoughtful, diligent, well informed, high-minded and wise in public affairs. And when that stage had been reached we should be so near the millennium that nearly all government would be superfluous and we could blossom out into an affable anarchy of universal unselfishness and perfection.

As a predominantly Anglo-Saxon people we no doubt inherit the custom of appointing royal commissions to sit leisurely while Rome burns and come honestly by part of the latter-day sluggishness of our political genius. The urgent task of material exploitation of a new country has been another excuse. Our vast waves of the newer immigrations, who did not expect, in El Dorado, to find any obligations, are another factor. At all events, the slow muddling processes and the low efficiency of our Government are a sad microcosm of the political indifference of the public they reflect.

Until men are all heroes, to get efficient government in a democracy water must be made to rise higher than its source. Representative government was to insure this, but it is not adequately doing so. The public must be awakened to the necessity and given better means to force the election of the best men and to compel the prompter carrying out of better measures. The people own this complex instrument of our institutions. They need to learn how to play upon it.

The point is that we have made our aimless national life in peace-time and in its public aspect as stultifying as the millennium arrived would be. In our university athletics a hundred men overtrain, to the injury of many, while 5,000 sit degenerating for lack of exercise. So in our politics a few hundred men put out political cries or put popular labels on indifferent men or measures, while a hundred million persons are excluded from the game except just before elections. Surely there never was a country where public life was made so unattractive, where the handles to take hold of it were so inconvenient. The reference is to public life in the broad sense of general interest in and discussion of public questions; of a heart-warming policy of fellowship and participation in government; of enthusiasm in great and common national aims. We have cross purposes, unthinking prejudice, selfish indifference, no adequate means of either information or inspiration.

In this war between the forces of justice and right against the forces of ruthless injustice and wrong; in the bitter international rivalries of the future; in the national issues between equity and economic force, and in the future better and better working out of those issues the measure of a nation's strength is largely its spiritual solidarity and the quality and force of its spirit. A hundred million spirited people, however high and fine their spirit, may make a

spiritless and therefore a weak nation if the aspirations of the individuals, that is, their spiritual forces, are too much dissipated in a thousand individual aims. To generate spiritual solidarity there must be set before the citizens certain aims which all may share; a large part of the aspirations of all must be polarized in such fashion as to become the common national aspirations, the self-conscious national purpose.

The German Government knew this and made propaganda of patriotism, national consciousness and national aims a large element in the education of the people, while it supplied a wonderful technical training in order that the national spirit might find expression in works. Universal military service supplied the crowning unification of the national spirit, while it subserved also national efficiency and afforded the means, at least, of national safety. A common aim, discipline and efficiency might have been the happy result: but, given the German character, the discipline was overdone. Instead of the high goal of real spiritual solidarity, there was evolved a disastrous subserviency of intellect and spirit, a fatal dependence upon guidance by the Prussian ruling class. The German people's is the antithesis of our own situation. Instead of a Government often listening in vain for a sound popular mandate, as with us, we have seen in Germany a people always listening for

guidance, and getting many benefits, to be sure, in their internal material affairs, but getting orders also to conquer the world on the principle that might makes right—getting debauched, demoralized and barbarized until they have lost their spiritual value along with the respect of the civilized world.

The Germans knew that spiritual solidarity, or the nearest equivalent, was necessary to national strength. We need not imitate their too-leveling excess, nor for an instant condone their cynical pragmatism nor their horrible and barbaric jettison of all moral standards in the ruthless will to achieve power. But we may accept the fact that spiritual solidarity, concentrated in a strong national will to some purpose, and some degree of discipline are conditions of national strength. Although far behind the Germans were the French, before this war, and still further were the English, in this matter of unanimity of aim, nevertheless a thousand French or British, taken at random, would react in unison to certain sets of facts bearing upon the present actualities and the future of their countries. The spiritual solidarity of the Japanese, like their efficiency, reached a high pitch at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and it is still possessed by them to a marked degree, in spite of heavy drafts of western thought and consequent cleavages in opinion. A thousand Americans, picked at random and confronted with a question of American pol-

icy, would not normally react to the same extent with the degree of unanimity that is desirable in a nation. To gain a unanimous reaction our orators have been wont to fall back upon some cry of the past—some cry often dangerous and unsound when applied to to-day's problems. Uniformity of reaction to a certain number of sets of facts is a test of spiritual and intellectual solidarity. We are meeting it well while at war. A greater solidarity through an awakened national consciousness will be one of the war's best benefits to America.

Given the American character, there is no fear of overdiscipline. Even if we were sure there would never be another war, we ought to have universal military service. We ought to put more uniformity, patriotism and sense of duty and of ideals into our educational system. Success and money must be restored to their proper place below virtue and service as objects of worship. And, above all, must we set before our eyes some definite national aims.

Because Prussian aims are unconscionable, and Prussian modes of pursuing those aims are vile, it does not follow that aimlessness is good. When we see efficiency put to the service of crime or low aims we condemn the aims, not the efficiency. "What profiteth a man to gain the whole world if he lose his own soul" is true of ruthless militarism. It is true, too, of ruthless materialism. Because a strong Power

has run amuck it does not follow that preparedness and universal service are bad. Is the athletic training of the individual bad because a strong man, if a villain, will be more dangerous for his strength?

Spiritual solidarity and national consciousness in the service of clear national aims will carry America to victory in this war. They are equally needed to carry us to victory in the task of our new nationalism, to vindicate democracy by successfully meeting the issue between social equity and justice and economic force, between constructive action and ruthless indifference in the ordinary problems common to all countries. Some nations have had to travel, or still have to travel, the long road to democratic power and to the habit of its orderly exercise. Fortunate in having started with those blessings, America's new preparedness must be directed to see to it that we shall really enjoy them—to see to it that the new solidarity, the new spirit and aim, the new patriotism and the more serious and unselfish understanding aroused by the war shall be just as effective in the issues of peace.

The war has brought America a glorious opportunity to find herself and to school herself. In normal times everyday business, conventionality, custom and prejudice divert the gaze from stark truth. The well-to-do, the respectable, the comfortable and the indolent "let well enough alone," even if it be not

very well. The mind and heart of the nation, now risen to grasp the meaning of the war, are attuned to great things. The camouflage of habit falls away. Questions left as somehow settled will now stand forth fresh, to be settled better in the light of the nation's new spirit. Progress and reforms that might have had to wait for generations are now within grasp. What the politician thought "unpractical" has become attainable to statesmanship. Will America ride forward on this wave? Shall we avail of this glorious opportunity? Timid, mistrustful leadership and popular indifference are the familiar banes of democracy in peace as well as at war. The new era calls for a vast work of preparedness for peace as well as for war by patriotic and intelligent citizens.

In recent years all over the United States men of good-will and intelligence, but almost ineffective in the political life of the nation, have sat in groups and discussed and discussed and parted after hours, agreed that the country was going wrong in various respects and equally agreed that they did not know what was to be done about it. Such discussion was a sort of intellectual exercise. Many, grown tired of these squirrel-journeys in the revolving cage of the tentative through boredom or cynicism would eschew all discussion of politics. Only let the rain of prosperity fill their reservoirs, they would never look skyward unless drought threatened. If their own money-

bags were menaced they would think of political action; otherwise not. And this whether the bags contain good wages or huge incomes. The vagueness of these blind-alley conversations that lead nowhere has been often enough characteristic of newspaper discussion and of the stately harmony of journals of opinion; usually, too, of political platforms, or at least of the part of them that anyone believes. The meetings of our innumerable conventions, congresses, leagues and associations too often duplicate each other's work and duplicate the inconclusiveness of each other's programmes of action. It is like the family whose motto was, "Let us discuss it by all means, but for heaven's sake don't let's decide anything." The mind of the millions is not penetrated as deeply or continuously as is required for the safety and success of democracy. Possibly part of the trouble is that the wisest are reluctant to guess aloud at the solutions of confessedly most difficult problems. They hate to risk their reputations for being right, and hold to a policy of conservation of unnatural infallibility!

The sincere reformer of narrow and shallow views; he who would exchange obscurity for a flash in the limelight cheaply at the risk of any error; he who speaks for a class interest with a modest cloak of pretension to care for the national welfare; and the politician who guesses at a popular hobby to ride to vic-

tory—these are those who have too often given us our definite political cries. All this is of so little value to any real solution of our problems that it leaves us floundering in the endless process of tentative discussion. Now the groups of men all over the country who futilely tell one another about the drift of the nation in certain directions in recent years are singularly agreed as to the evils when they speak frankly in private conversations. They will even listen with sympathy to radical specific suggestions when privately put before them. The same men at banquets will applaud all the old artificial or obsolete cries. We have lived in a deafening chorus of unreflecting praise of our “glorious institutions.” Yet the very choristers, in the duets of private conversation, are often found to be somewhat doubtful of the promise of our institutions unless we give them more attention; alarmed at our bungling inefficiency; sad at the trend we have been allowing our civilization to take; skeptical of the certainty of hereafter successfully solving our problems under our form of government as it has grown, through public indifference, to work in practice.

Why should these hundreds of thousands of men of honesty, intelligence and patriotism sit idly by, seeing the evils, condemning them privately, accepting them publicly? Why should they be so ineffective in shaping the destiny of their country? How can

their brains and patriotism and honesty be made active for good? There is good reason to hope that there could be found common ground for their agreement upon the essentials of public policy; that their opinion could be galvanized and amalgamated with a real and articulate public opinion, which we generally have not in time of peace in this country, although we are forever talking about it.

Another respect in which the moral and intellectual vitality of the nation's political life is atrophied is in the lingering isolation of the South in an idea-tight compartment. Even when one recalls the sudden enfranchisement of ignorant ex-slaves and the "carpet-baggers" and "reconstruction," one can scarcely still condone this. The greed of the southern planter gave us the negro question; the greed of the northern manufacturer, demanding cheap labor, has helped nearly to swamp our nationality by reckless and excessive immigration. The South is one of our most purely American sections. The nation can ill afford to have the brains and character of the white South still shackled to a dead issue—the negro question—in party political questions of national import. The free thought and feelings of the American South must be mobilized to the unprejudiced service of the nation's great problems, free from the fascination of obsolete shibboleths.

To gain all those things needed to make American

democracy and American national life a brilliant success and to insure victory in war aims and in peace aims, in the international issue and in the national issue, the absolute and fundamental need is the inspiration and the schooling of the whole nation in patriotism and in political thought. For the excellent and consolidated spirit in which the war is being met to-day a vast debt is due the tireless and intelligent propaganda of our various patriotic societies in the work of bringing home to the people the facts of the war, which only needed to be known in order that public opinion should be molded for war purposes to the unselfish support of a righteous cause. In praise of this work the highest place seems to be due the National Security League.

Not one whit less for preparedness to meet the work of peace, the issue upon which hangs the fate of democracy, is such a campaign of education required. Even in this work, whether in time of war or of peace, the curse of excessive individualism is seen. If an amount of energy equal to that being spent to-day by existing organizations now seeking the national good, but dissipating their efforts in individual fields, could be put behind one consolidated undertaking to spread true discussion of national questions and energetic political action thereon in the light only of sincere conclusions, the country could be given the lesson in patriotism and politics it so sorely needs. How else

than by some great organized effort can a coherent public opinion be evolved and maintained, can intelligible national aims be crystallized, can the demand for wise policies ably carried out be made effective? How else can the American democracy be rescued from oppression by the indifference of the American people? No democracy can succeed unless a great mass of the people are enlightened upon and interested and active in their public life.

In combining their efforts under a joint direction the existing patriotic societies could cover the whole country with a network of channels of information and foci of interest in national affairs. In this would be real work of permanent usefulness for all those who feel that they are not doing enough for their country at war. The battle for right in the national is as real as that in the international war. Now is the time for preparedness for both.

In preparedness for war the American people have done themselves honor in a glorious unanimity of aim. In preparedness for the great struggle that is coming to us in the shadow of the war, we must, of course, expect cleavages of opinion. The point is that we should not exaggerate those cleavages. It matters not at all in result, for example, whether socialism is humanized or whether individualism is socialized. Either ideal must compromise liberally with the hard facts of human nature and human ex-

perience. It is for those who are wise to combat opinionated theory of both radical and "stand-pat" schools, to map out a course which shall gradually mitigate the rigors of the modern economic and social situation without destroying the indispensable incentives to individual human effort. Feudalism passed; individualism ran riot. Now should come an era of economic efficiency and social justice, through a wisely measured paternalism and centralization. If we do not prepare intelligently we shall drift dangerously.

XX

A BRITISH PROGRAMME

SECOND to, but along with and after, the war, the great task before the American people is to assure our national progress through wise and conscious evolution instead of through disastrous bungling drift or serious error. Hidebound ultra-conservatives and wildly unsound radicals form two extreme groups capable of making dangerously difficult that ordered progress to which our splendid institutions so fortunately are adapted to respond. Between those extremes are the mass of the nation. If "the tariff should be revised by its friends," as used to be said, how much more must the task of formulating the industrial, social and political policies which shall hold America safe in this era of accelerated change be an obligation of all patriotic citizens! Here is a plea to which the determined standpatter and the man who does not think himself very directly affected should alike give heed. Signs are not wanting that capitalists, merchants, traders, manufacturers and others most directly concerned are increasingly open-

ing their minds and their hearts to the need to respond to the changing times. A crude policy of "More, more!" on the part of labor and of "Only what you can force from me!" on the part of capital is obsolete and must give place to something more scientific and more sympathetic. Competition must yield more to co-operation. *Laissez faire* must yield more to paternalism. It is for the American people, which includes both "capital" and "labor," and for that majority of the American people not usually classed with but liable to be the victim of either to study this perennial but now unusually urgent question.

For the convenience of the happily increasing number of citizens who realize their civic and patriotic responsibilities in this grave matter it is worth while to attempt some analysis and criticism, from the point of view of its suggestive relation to American conditions, of a very interesting document that has recently come out of "the old country." It is the tentative draft programme of reconstruction prepared by its sub-committee for submission to the Labor party of Great Britain. At the outset the authors of the document voice their resolve "to look at the problem as a whole," "to make clear what it is we (they) wish to construct" and to see to it that "detailed practical proposals proceed from definitely held principles." We are so accustomed in this country to specious po-

litical platforms, narrow dogmatizing, vague rantings or idealistic aspirations and deductions conveniently disdainful of hard practical fact—all in the arena of a dangerously indifferent public opinion—that the high resolve to be broad in view, to be specific and to be practically sound must evoke our sincere admiration, even if the authors of the programme have not always been able to live up to it.

These representatives of British labor, we are told, see in the world war “the culmination and collapse of a distinctive industrial civilization, which the workers will not seek to reconstruct.” The problem, as they see it, is to assure that the British nation shall not “slip into ruin,” but “shall progress into higher forms of organization.” British labor as a party, whether in office or in opposition, is to favor, and to favor only, such measures as it deems consistent with the reconstructed society it desires to see arise. Here is recognition of a sound principle of social evolution and of the sound political principle, too commonly neglected here, of legislation in conformity to a general policy instead of in detached and opportunistic attention to specific matters. We are far away and still untouched, in comparison with our allies, by the war. They have lived nearly four years in intimacy with its horrors. Small wonder, then, if the present undoubted generating of need for an unusual amount of social and economic adjustment appears to

us as meaning one of the leaps by which a really orderly evolution often works, and to some of our British kinsmen as marking, if not the end of a civilization, at least an almost catastrophic change. Frankly, it may be admitted that the decisive power thrust upon labor and the high wages assured it by the war have expanded both its conscious and recognized position and its material desires. Then, too, that most powerful explosive which might be called Utopian Democratic Theory, and which has been so lavishly used in the war, has necessarily had some effect even upon the sober British mind.

Let us examine the general principles of the ideal of reconstruction set forth and of the proposed means of approach to that ideal. The document says: "The individualist system of capitalist production, based on the private ownership and competitive administration of land and capital, with its reckless 'profiteering' and wage slavery; with its glorification of the unhampered struggle for the means of life and its hypocritical pretense of the 'survival of the fittest'; with the monstrous inequality of circumstances which it produces and the degradation and brutalization, both moral and spiritual, resulting therefrom, may, we hope, indeed have received a death blow. With it must go the political system and ideas in which it naturally found expression * * * we must insure that what is presently to be built up is a new

social order, based not on fighting, but on fraternity; not on the competitive struggle for the means of bare life, but on a deliberately planned co-operation in production and distribution for the benefit of all who participate by hand or by brain; not on the utmost possible inequality of riches, but on a systematic approach toward a healthy equality of material circumstances for every person born into the world; not on an enforced dominion over subject nations, subject races, subject colonies, subject classes or a subject sex, but in industry as well as in government, on that equal freedom, that general consciousness of consent and that widest possible participation in power, both economic and political, which is characteristic of democracy."

With evident consciousness of the drastic changes that must condition anything ultimately approaching the vision set forth as a social ideal, it is remarked that "to-day no man dares to say that anything is impracticable"; but the tenor of the document gives indications again and again of a common-sense realization that the real and the ideal are separate and distinct and that gradual, although much faster, amelioration is the true goal of effort and is all that practical men look for.

We may pass over those portions of the programme which relate to existing or desired legislation in details determined by actual British conditions. Nor

need we examine here the language in which is emphasized, with a forethought that should be imitated in our own country, the necessity to prepare in advance a broad plan for the demobilization of the forces and their return to civil occupation after the war. We are concerned rather with getting a picture of the ideal in view and of the principles upon which it is proposed to pursue that ideal. A body of law is to secure to all members of the community and at all times "all the requisites of healthy life and worthy citizenship," and "at least the prescribed minimum of leisure, health, education and subsistence." Effort will be made to give to the individual "a situation in accordance with his capacity." The Government will be expected to prevent the standard rates of wages from suffering reduction "relatively to the contemporary cost of living." It is to be an obligation of the Government "to find for every willing worker, whether by hand or by brain, productive work at standard rates." This is to be done by the Government instituting national public works when necessary in times of threatened unemployment. Wherever practicable, the eight-hour day six days a week is to be the standard. In any case where the Government shall have failed to provide against unemployment, it must provide any man or woman affected "with adequate maintenance, either with such arrangements for honorable employment or with

such useful training as may be found practicable, according to age, health and previous occupation." Insurance is to be subsidized and largely taken over by the Government. "Only on the basis of a universal application of the policy of the national minimum, affording complete security against destitution, in sickness and health, in good times and bad alike, to every member of the community can any worthy social order be built up." And the unemployed are never to be driven to "anything so obsolete and discredited" as private charity or old-fashioned poor laws.

Paternalistic legislation to improve the conditions of life has advanced so much further in Great Britain and elsewhere than it has in the United States that the principle of that group of social matters set down under the heading of a "national minimum" is passed by as hardly contentious in principle. It is in its demand for "the full and genuine adoption of the principle of democracy" that the Labor party seeks specially to differentiate itself from all others—with how complete or incomplete success we can better attempt to examine later on. The "Labor party insists on democracy in industry as well as in government. It demands the progressive elimination from the control of industry of the private capitalist, individual or joint-stock, and the setting free of all who work, whether by hand or by brain, for the service of the

community, and of the community only. And the Labor party refuses absolutely to believe that the British people will permanently tolerate any reconstruction or perpetuation of the disorganization, waste and inefficiency involved in the abandonment of British industry to a jostling crowd of separate private employers, with their minds bent, not on the service of the community, but—by the very law of their being—only on the utmost possible profiteering. What the nation needs is undoubtedly a great bound onward in its aggregate productivity. But this cannot be secured merely by pressing the manual workers to more strenuous toil, or even by encouraging the captains of industry to a less wasteful organization of their several enterprises on a profit-making basis. What the Labor party looks to is a genuinely scientific reorganization of the nation's industry, no longer deflected by individual profiteering, on the basis of the common ownership of the means of production; the equitable sharing of the proceeds among all who participate in any capacity and only among these, and the adoption, in particular services and occupations, of those systems and methods of administration and control that may be found, in practice, best to promote the public interest."

"The Labor party stands not merely for the principle of the common ownership of the nation's land, to be applied as suitable opportunities occur, but also,

specifically, for the immediate nationalization of railways, mines and the production of electrical power • • • and for the national ownership and administration of the railways and canals" • • • along with "harbors and roads and the posts and telegraphs—not to say also the great lines of steamships which could at once be owned, if not immediately directly managed in detail, by the Government—in a united national service of communication and transport; to be worked, unhampered by capitalist, private or purely local interests (and with a steadily increasing participation of the organized workers in the management, both central and local), exclusively for the common good." Another demand is for the immediate nationalization of mines, the extraction of coal and iron ore and the retail distribution of coal to be carried on as national and municipal public services, with fixed prices for the product.

"Other main industries, especially those now becoming monopolized, should be nationalized as opportunity offers. Moreover, the Labor party holds that the municipalities should not confine their activities to the necessarily costly services of education, sanitation and police; nor yet rest content with acquiring control of the local water, gas, electricity and tramways; but that every facility should be afforded to them to acquire (easily, quickly and cheaply) all the land they require, and to extend their enterprises in

housing and town planning, parks and public libraries, the provision of music and the organization of recreation; and also to undertake, beside the retailing of coal, other services of common utility, particularly the local supply of milk, wherever this is not already fully organized by a co-operative society."

Such a vast transition to communism or State socialism in all these matters is sought in constructive political action, with modern disdain of the discredited ideas of class-war Marxian socialism, of the destructive methods of syndicalism and of the "malice-aforethought" frame of mind of the I. W. W. The plea is for open-minded scientific adjustment, for comradeship in citizenship, for co-operation. The manifesto as a whole shows common-sense realization that all this cannot come at a leap, for it appeals for protective measures whose applicability presupposes a necessary continuance of much of the old order. Whether or not one can concur in the whole programme as sufficiently in accord with human nature truly to subserve the welfare of man, one can feel pride that it is a political party of the English-speaking race that has spoken so unusually soberly and in such unusually good spirit of these profoundest and most difficult questions.

Under the eyes of the whole world the most individualistic nations, driven by war's life-and-death demand for corporate efficiency, have resorted to de-

grees of combination, centralization, disciplined co-operation and paternalistic government control far beyond their traditional polity. The efficiency of these things is on trial with prospect of vindication. Naturally the fact has given vast stimulus to those tendencies, as we see exemplified in this sweep toward State socialism advocated by the committee of the British Labor party. They think that "the people will be extremely foolish if they ever allow their indispensable industries to slip back into unfettered control of private capitalists."

It is upon financial policy that the authors of the programme anticipate the sharpest political division, and upon this they claim to stand for the interests of four-fifths of their nation. Let them speak for themselves:

"The Labor party stands for such a system of taxation as will yield all the necessary revenue to the Government without encroaching on the prescribed national minimum standard of life of any family whatsoever, without hampering production or discouraging any useful personal effort and with the nearest possible approximation to equality of sacrifice. We definitely repudiate all proposals for a protective tariff. * * * We shall strenuously oppose any taxation, of whatever kind, which would increase the price of food or of any other necessity of life. We hold that indirect taxation on commodities, whether

by customs or excise, should be strictly limited to luxuries. * * * We are at one with the manufacturer, the farmer and the trader in objecting to taxes interfering with production or commerce, or hampering transport and communication.

“For the raising of the greater part of the revenue now required the Labor party looks to the direct taxation of the incomes above the necessary cost of family maintenance, and, for the requisite effort to pay off the national debt, to the direct taxation of private fortunes, both during life and at death. The income tax and supertax ought at once to be thoroughly reformed in assessment and collection, in abatements and allowances and in graduation and differentiation, so as to levy the required total sum in such a way as to make the real sacrifice of all the taxpayers as nearly as possible equal. This would involve assessment by families instead of by individual persons, so that the burden is alleviated in proportion to the number of persons to be maintained. It would involve the raising of the present unduly low minimum income assessable to the tax and the lightening of the present unfair burden on the great mass of professional and small trading classes by a new scale of graduation, rising from a penny in the pound on the smallest assessable income up to sixteen or even nineteen shillings in the pound on the highest income of the millionaires. The excess-profits tax might well

be retained in appropriate form. * * * The steadily rising unearned increment of urban and mineral land ought, by an appropriate direct taxation of land values, to be wholly brought into the public exchequer. At the same time, for the service and redemption of the national debt, the death duties ought to be regraduated, much more strictly collected and greatly increased. * * * In this matter we need, in fact, completely to reverse our point of view, and to rearrange the whole taxation of inheritance from the standpoint of asking what is the maximum amount that any rich man should be permitted at death to divert, by his will, from the national exchequer, which should normally be the heir to all private riches in excess of a quite moderate amount by way of family provision. But all this will not suffice. It will be imperative at the earliest possible moment to free the nation from at any rate the greater part of its new load of interest-bearing debt for loans which ought to have been levied as taxation; and the Labor party stands for a special capital levy to pay off, if not the whole, a very substantial part of the entire national debt—a capital levy chargeable like the death duties on all property, but (in order to secure approximate equality of sacrifice) with exemptions of the smallest savings, and for the rest at rates very steeply graduated so as to take only a small contribution from the little people and a

very much larger percentage from the millionaires."

Turning to the matter of the surplus national wealth, "which ought by now to have made this Britain of ours immune from class poverty or from any widespread destitution"—complaint is made that it has been too greatly "absorbed by individual proprietors" and too much devoted to "the senseless luxury of an idle-rich class." The Labor party aims at "the future appropriation of the surplus, not to the enlargement of any individual fortune, but to the common good.

"It is from this constantly arising surplus (to be secured, on the one hand, by nationalization and municipalization and, on the other, by the steeply graduated taxation of private income and riches) that will have to be found the new capital which the community day by day needs for the perpetual improvement and increase of its various enterprises, for which we shall decline to be dependent on the usury-exacting financiers. It is from the same source that has to be defrayed the public provision for the sick and infirm of all kinds (including that for maternity and infancy), which is still so scandalously insufficient; for the aged and those prematurely incapacitated by accident or disease, now in many ways so imperfectly cared for; for the education alike of children, of adolescents and of adults, in which the Labor party demands a genuine equality of opportunity,

overcoming all differences of material circumstances; and for the organization of public improvements of all kinds, including the brightening of the lives of those now condemned to almost ceaseless toil, and a great development of the means of recreation. From the same source must come the greatly increased public provision that the Labor party will insist on being made for scientific investigation and original research, in every branch of knowledge, not to say also for the promotion of music, literature and fine arts, which have been under capitalism so greatly neglected, and upon which, so the Labor party holds, any real development of civilization fundamentally depends. Society, like the individual, does not live by bread alone—does not exist only for perpetual wealth production. It is in the proposal for this appropriation of every surplus for the common good—in the vision of its resolute use for the building up of the community as a whole instead of for the magnification of individual fortunes—that the Labor party, as the party of the producers by hand or by brain, most distinctively marks itself off from the older political parties, standing, as these do, essentially for the maintenance, unimpaired, of the perpetual private mortgage upon the annual production of the nation that is involved in the individual ownership of land and capital.”

The document under consideration is too long and too pithy to lend itself to an epitome at the same time

at all complete and at all short. Upon it, of course, are traces of the dreaming theorist and of the class-conscious materialist. Both in philosophy and in fairness, it is vulnerable enough. With the best intentions, it does not quite achieve that intellectual integrity always so hardly attainable by the partisan. But it is, in this nature, the work of partisans and of convinced protagonists of one school of thought. It is admirable in doing homage to science, even if it may not always reflect sufficient attention to the psychology of man. It is admirable in setting for itself a standard of open-mindedness which it would be rather more than human if it should quite attain. And it has the merit of definiteness. It does set up the judicial standard, not the self-seeking class standard; the standard of political, social and economic science, not that of sentimentality and vague idealism. It invites criticism by those criteria. If not a programme immediately or undoubtedly practicable, it ably marks out a conception of the road to a national betterment at which America must equally aim. Even as a mere index of grave questions which this country, too, has to face this remarkable document is worthy the study of thoughtful Americans.

So much for the picture of social reconstruction which will be offered to the British Labor party as a whole. But the framework of government and international relations also receive attention. Some of the

views expressed on those matters may be touched briefly. They will be better appreciated, perhaps, if we may assume the authors of this programme to be associated with the Henderson wing of the Labor party, whose views have been appraised as rather more international, socialistic and Utopian than those of the rank and file. What, for example, would the heroic sailors of the Seamen's Union say to the offhand dismissal of possible boycott of the German people who have been murdering their members for these years? What will practical men everywhere say to the bland waving aside of a league of like-minded nations to guard civilization, when a universal league of righteousness is still so problematical? Over dogmatic, too, in the American view, is the casual condemnation of a two-chamber legislature, since we know that two heads are wiser than one; and of tariff protection, since we know the whole world cannot to-morrow have the same standard of life. In foreign affairs and in the framework of government, that powerful explosive called Utopian Democratic Theory must surely be handled with care. If we indulge in premature dreams of an international Utopia, we may wake up to find ourselves no longer allowed to work for our national ones. Wise, constructive progress in democracy at home by all means; but not too much international sentimentality if the Prussian menace is to disappear and if Anglo-American civilization is to be safe in this cold world of international relations.

XXI

HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL THEORY

THE working out of the destiny of mankind in accordance with great laws is a field of work which we all flatter ourselves with the belief that the Creator concerns Himself. A French mathematician has amused himself with raising the delightfully whimsical but appalling question whether there may be an evolution of natural laws themselves; but we turn from so hopeless a hypothesis and we rightly call them immutable. When we enter ourselves that same field of effort and attempt conscious co-operation, it behooves us above all to study the laws of our being as deducible from science and from history. It behooves us, too, to approach with diffidence, deliberation and reverence for the task. A glance through the telescope shows yawning depths of illimitable space beyond millions of other worlds. The heart is devastated with the feeling of man's nothingness. The microscope shows us myriad lives in one drop of liquid. In infinite space filled with infinitesimal complexity, gov-

erned, like himself, by laws he so imperfectly knows, stands man with the glorious courage to live, to struggle and to demand a conscious part in his destiny. Philosophy, science and history have much to say to chasten the cocksure radical and to awaken the slumbering conservative. The mold of how many centuries is on the plans of Plato's Republic? Why are those thousands of cubicles in which the patrician and the peasant of China competed on even terms for the career of high office in the State to-day abandoned brick ruins for the curious to gaze upon? How little novelty in our advanced ideas or in our means to seek their fulfillment! And why? Because of the scarcely changing nature of man. In general, his brave struggle arises out of his egoism—whether it be that of the hero seeking holiness, the girl wanting a finer hat than her sister's, or the sluggard seeking mere comfort. The human effort to which progress is due has arisen from three stimuli—the necessity to work in order to live, the necessity to work harder in order to live better, and the ego's hunger for distinction. Man loves ease and comfort; he is not too fond of work for work's sake; he shuns hard thinking; he dislikes too much discipline; he loves variety and diversion, but clings to habit; he prefers the immediate to the remote. A fat man with mug of ale, pipe and easy chair, dreaming his heroics, chatting with his pals and dozing at ease is not a bad picture of a large part of

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every man's sense of good. But it is the potential ego that makes this placidity agreeable. Without it, without individual distinction, Heaven itself, in the impersonal form of the Buddhist's Nirvana, leaves us cold. We wish something more than to be indistinguishable globules in a limitless soup of felicity.

Louis XIV said, "*L'état c'est moi.*" With complete socialism we might say, "We are the State." But would any one enjoy being an equal one-hundred-millionth part even in the greatest earthly institution any more than a happy atom, without individuality, in a celestial state? Only those decent persons who, to the glaring disgrace of our civilization, need fear the lack of even a passable livelihood would accept that rôle at the obvious sacrifice of liberty, of opportunity and of potential play for the individual ego which gives life its value. Too rashly reduce the stimuli of necessity, of the desire for a better life and the desire for distinction and then idleness, apathy, decreased production, misery and cessation of progress loom as the logical results. In Russia, where, for the moment, realization of these real dangers seems eclipsed by the specious doctrines of a minority, their followers have been cynically characterized as "soldiers who do not fight, workmen who do not work and peasants who do not plow." And so it will be wherever human nature is deprived of its natural incentives to worthy action.

In these days of confusion the same voices cry for internationalism and "self-determination"; for liberty and for socialism. Pure anarchy is the government of the millennium. Doubtless the angels are worthy of it. The apotheosis of "self-determination," whether international or municipal, is anarchy. Who would assert that either individual or nation was ready for it? Pure socialism and real internationalism are the very antitheses of freedom, national and individual. Who would say that man, as individual or as citizen, was ready for so much bondage, so much loss of his ego, so very, very much discipline as either would involve? "The first condition of democracy is effective personal freedom," say spokesmen of the British Labor party—and then proceed far in advocacy of socialism and internationalism. Such are the fireworks of the new explosive, Utopian Democratic Theory! Out of new thought and old fact the truth must be sought.

The war may well make peace and a quiet life seem just now a sufficiently inspiring ideal; but the spirit of man will, as ever, ask more. The race that built the British Empire and gave its character to this nation of ours would not long be content in the dull humdrum of complete socialism. No virile race would endure a system designed wholly as a feather-bed for mediocrity. For the sum of progress we well know that it is quite as necessary to prevent the destruction

of opportunity or its monopolization by mediocrity (in the name of democracy) as it is important to assure fair opportunity to the talent of all men. Prussianization at the hands of an autocracy of a proletarian minority (again in the name of democracy) would be quite as incompatible with liberty as Prussianization by autocracy of any other minority—and would be in many ways even more fatal to progress.

But enough touching the easy *reductio ad absurdum* of complete socialism. Our professional radicals here, as elsewhere, need sobering; but they are few. That group of Socialists from which John Spargo and other thoughtful patriotic men seceded appears to take its tone (aside from war influences) chiefly from foreigners who seem to have come to America with a sort of "hangover" from embittered sickness with European conditions, and whom we have reprehensibly allowed to oppress one another here. The I. W. W. are not to be dismissed as a mere sign of depravity, but are to be examined, too, as a nasty symptom of something wrong in our civilization of to-day. The wild radical doubtless has his use in the "wondrous way" of the scheme of things. One may admit the instrumentality without admiring the instrument. To him is the voice; to the rest of our citizenship is the work of reform. Our pressing need is not so much to chide our extreme radicals, who are a little percentage of the population; but is rather the heavy task of arousing

the too indifferent majority and the ultra-conservative to the undeniable need of faster social improvement involving marked changes, and to their duty and interest to take a hand.

About the meanest thing you can do to an ultra-conservative is to tell him there are going to be great changes in social and economic conditions. About the meanest thing you can do to a professional radical is to tell him that there is no real need for hopeless disagreement about it all. To the ultra-conservative it is a horrid nuisance that a comfortable *status quo* should be modified at all. A picture of "still life" (Dutch school), with the nice fruit and other good things all arrayed (for him), is much more comfortable than a haunting canvas of joy and suffering and movement. Statics are less disturbing than dynamics; but life is not like that. To the professional radical it is rather a nuisance that man should be so little fond of theory in comparison to the satisfactions of his routine and creature comforts. Still, with most human eyes turned lazily to the "still-life" picture of good things, the radical nevertheless gets his hearing. He gets the joy of battle for opinions, and this is to him the breath of life. But for the ultra-conservative, where would the radical be? But for the professional radical, where the *raison d'être* of the ultra-conservative? These mutual enemies exist by the grace and for the sake of each other. The thought should be

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annoying to both! The radical lives by agitation, which can only be sincere and continuous and satisfactorily vehement if there is a really hopeless disagreement. If we can say that there are going to be great changes and if we can say, also, that there is really no need for hopeless disagreement about it all, we shall be able to confound both ultra-conservative and professional radical, which ought to be a great pleasure to the bulk of the population! A formula that must be accepted and that, in looking to change, upsets the *metier* of the standpatter and, in looking to peace, takes the zest from the life-business of the professional radical, ought to do the trick. Some wicked cynic, who preferred to serve man by the study of nature rather than by the study of phrases, might assert that the low-down natural law of instinctive self-preservation had rudely intruded even here in high social-economic politics and had dared to work upon both pillars of society and evangiles of reform!

Well, here is the formula to confound both soggy opposition and over-shrill attack. We all favor all measures to improve the spiritual, intellectual and physical welfare of mankind, provided that those measures conform to the known laws of nature, especially of human nature. All standpatters, except those of the four-feet-in-the-trough or the hopelessly stupid type, must accept this, disgusting to them as may be its implication of change. Aside from its ob-

noxious intimation of possible peace, this formula has another virtue. Hugely annoying to our professional radicals will be the obligation to study the past before building the future; very painful to them will be the suggestion that they study man before remaking his environment. Any biologist, or even the man at the "zoo," will explain this necessity.

Funny words, conservative and radical. Change being the law of life, those who would conserve should be the first to fall in with evolutionary change. And "radical" should be one who would go to the roots of matters. In politics, then, the "radical" should be the first to insist upon those radicals—the practical facts and the realities of human nature as known to history, science and experience. The ultra-conservative (alias the reactionary or "standpatter") is the skeleton at the feast of optimism. He is dimly aware that things have changed; that things are changing, and that things will change much more; but it eases his feelings to look away at the past, to hold aloof from change, to be a passenger rather than an engineer on the ship of progress, only going into the engine room occasionally languidly to throw a wrench into the machinery when he thinks he sees specific harm coming his way. But we cannot afford to demobilize him except with the simultaneous demobilization of his antithesis, called, oddly enough, the radical.

This is an epoch of too many seers and not enough

sages. Of course, the wild radical has his uses. Hyperbole and hot exaggeration are necessary to awaken sluggish human nature. But the gad-fly makes no honey. The seer of visions is not a safe architect for a temple to house the world. To intrust the drawing up of our reform policies to wild radicals or to ultra-conservatives would be equally futile.

Respectable, intelligent ultra-conservatives who care more for the "good old days" than for the better new days of to-day and the still better ones of all the to-morrows have sometimes been called in France the *bien pensants*. These right-minded people perhaps derive their title by a process somewhat like that of the story in which the little girl asked her mamma what "right-minded people" were, and was at last answered, "Why, people who think as we do, my dear." We have many worthy *bien pensants* in the United States. They are the officers of the army of the indifferent. In all time, whether individually or in organizations, they seem to have been obstacles to progress. In fairness we may admit that in horrible epochs sometimes lumped under the caption of "the good old times," they may have served as brakes upon retrogression; but in these modern days of ever better possibilities their passivity will be fatal; their co-operation is absolutely required.

There is a simple answer to all ultra-conservatives. It leaves them no shred of justification in heaven or

on earth. Almost any day one can read in newspapers that in this land of abundance there are still some innocent persons who are on the verge of starvation, who are without means of good medical care, who are perishing in miserable surroundings, with no recourse but the possibility of private charity. We still have in some places slums, foul tenements, sweatshops. We still have some old and worn-out faithful persons who are liable to end their days miserably. We have a more ridiculously inadequate public health service than any other first-class country. There has been improvement, of course, through private philanthropy; and for some years more modern laws have slowly been coming into force. Yet things of this sort remain; and, merely as examples, they show clearly enough a shocking neglect of the nation's own welfare by the nation as a State. With the extinction of feudalism liberty was given, but protection was withdrawn. Then came the era of *laissez faire* and *sauve qui peut*, the full liberty of unbridled individualism, mitigated only by religion and an individual charity gradually hardened and organized into societies, endowments, foundations, etc. As the *bien pensant* of to-day passes a beggar he is uncomfortable. His thought is that he must not be imposed upon and encourage vagrancy; that there must be some organization to which the beggar ought to appeal. There may or may not be. At best, if his is a "worthy case,"

if he is a good citizen in misfortune, then "we the people," generally speaking, have nothing much to say to or to do for him as a Government. We offer him the indignity of private charity instead of the right to national protection. But if he is a criminal or a troublesome defective, we, as a Government, acknowledge his claims; he is a public charge. Strange discrimination! Whether or not combination in industry is preparation for socialism, certainly philanthropic organizations offer a nucleus for the tardy assumption by the State of its first interest, the welfare of the people. Life will always offer ample play for the subjective advantages of kindness. Unbounded generosity does not justify failure to translate into actual conditions, through governmental policy, our national epigrams about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

We must accept as proper aims and concerns of the State a whole category of improvements in the conditions of the national life such as those discussed in the British Labor party's proposed programme under the topic of national minimum and social surplus. Rapid communication and machinery, with co-operation, have made abundance normally easy of attainment. Education, democracy and the modern spirit are at work eliminating philanthropy, whether religious or lay, as a tolerable means for some slight improvement in distribution. Combination and co-operation are ex-

tensively eliminating competition as a stimulus to production. Calculated national requirement begins to call for more accurate work than that of the unaided law of supply and demand—demand that is silent, even when justified and honest, if it is empty-handed. If a willing worker or an unfortunate may face starvation, so far as the State is concerned, through no fault of his own, then it is through the fault of his fellow citizens. Yes, there must be a national minimum. The great comparative luxury of modern life for all classes makes it possible to establish such a minimum for all decent persons, and thus to encroach just a little upon the first of the three indispensable stimuli to human progress through individual effort (namely, the necessity to work in order to live), because there will be no relief for the willful drone and because the contemplated reliefs of anxiety and suffering can be adjusted so as to leave intact the second and third stimuli (the necessity to work harder in order to live better and the ego's hunger for distinction). We have to achieve socialism's aim of better production and distribution while safeguarding those stimuli to effort without which society will die. Perhaps in America laziness, with intelligence as midwife, is the mother of invention, invention the mother of prosperity, and prosperity the mother of laziness. Vigilance will be required or that vicious circle may become a noose about our neck. Self-interest or some

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form of force is the only universal motive-power for man. To eliminate self-interest is to eliminate liberty—even if the process be carried out in the name of democracy. In the exaltation and romance of war men are happy as members of vast armies. Hardly would they be so as cogs in the universal officialdom of complete socialism. The preservation of the stimuli to work marks the absolute limit of paternalism.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the long list of proper fields for Government responsibility in improving the conditions of life. In the interesting programme of the British Labor party's committee the subjects of ways and means for providing a national minimum and a better use of the social surplus are discussed chiefly under their two remaining topics—the democratic control of industry and the revolution in national finance which they propose, possibly with a bark purposely worse than their intended bite (for they are, after all, a political party and, therefore, somewhat human). At any rate, they appear to aim, theoretically, at least, at gradual ultimate confiscation, through capital, income and inheritance taxes, of all private property beyond what is necessary, one gathers, to such a standard of living as that to which the great majority can aspire. The transfer and redistribution of income, one infers, are to come in wages from employers pending the nationalization of all important industries, whereupon they would come in

salaries and public benefits from the State. In blandly disposing of the existing order, these spokesmen of labor naturally fall into a certain amount of unfairness and exaggeration, the common disposition to set up the particular as the general, some inaccuracies, a measure of *ex parte* bitterness. For instance, in alluding to new fortunes from war profits they quite ignore the service rendered by the makers of those fortunes. Even they pass by the compensatory casting of old fortunes into the war—to say nothing of the most conspicuous sacrifice of life for their country made by an aristocracy to which they seem frankly hostile. As politicians they wisely intimate the raising of the limit of permissible income to a point where they hope it will appeal to the great majority as the price for forfeiture of greater opportunity. It must be confessed, too, with regret, that in the apparent purpose to safeguard labor from virtually all taxation, even indirect, and in the general tone of its discussion of the road to Utopia, the British draft manifesto is not so free from the sacrifices of the judicial attitude to that of the class-conscious partisan as could be wished. We ourselves, as a nation of advocates rather than of judicially disposed thinkers, shall have much trouble here when we seriously take up our similar problems.

The ultimate picture of the future painted on behalf of British labor is so nearly one of complete so-

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cialism that it has seemed both fair and necessary to criticize it in the light of the obvious arguments against that doctrine. Moreover, it is fair and also necessary to examine preliminary steps in full view of the destination to which, in strict logic, they lead. We must grant the need of paternalism in government for a great systematic amelioration of life. Every kind and just person must come so far as that. This means the idea of a national minimum, many works for national welfare and a better use of surplus wealth. And this brings us, too, face to face with the whole question of taxation and with the question of the proper degree of control by the nation, through its government, of industry and finance. These questions come up as part of a national aim we cannot escape. They come up still more in connection with ways and means to pursue that aim. Inasmuch as these things have been coming with accelerated speed ever since the decision in the Northern Securities anti-trust case, and have been coming in a veritable avalanche since we entered the war, we shall not be startled.

Granting, then, our agreement in principle that a great systematic amelioration of life through action by the Government is our aim and adhering to our formula that we all favor measures to improve the spiritual, intellectual and physical welfare of the nation, provided that those measures conform to the

known laws of nature, especially of human nature, we shall find ourselves compelled to grant also in the name of another of our national epigrams—the one about freedom and equality—that measures must be taken to render less sharp the existing differences in individual wealth. Looking at those differences as plotted in a curve, we shall have to flatten the curve somewhat by reducing excessive upward peaks and downward thrusts and giving to it a more gently undulating, although by no means a flat, aspect. This will be required both by the true aim of our institutions and in order to afford, through taxation, the funds for the improvements to be made.

XXII

AN AMERICAN VIEW

WHERE overwhelming American opinion will part company with the authors of the British Labor party memorandum we have been considering is in the degree of socialistic innovation that is necessary, desirable or safe; in the relative virtue of different modes of socialization, and, above all, in the point of view from which the problems are to be approached. These representatives of British labor propose the destruction of the existing order and the substitution of a new one. We in America shall generally quite dissent from this and shall see our way to obtaining the good and avoiding the bad by the method of developing, modifying and building upon our existing order while preserving, not destroying, its essentials.

To develop a point of view, which is of first importance in considering these questions, it has been necessary to make a discursive, if short, journey into the more patent aspects of the philosophy of socialism. We have seen that the preservation of the three stim-

uli to progress through human effort, namely, the necessity to work in order to live, the necessity to work harder in order to live better and the ego's hunger for distinction, marks the absolute limit of paternalism. On the same principle we see that the prizes of life must not be dangerously reduced. The inequality brought about by biology and heredity is beyond our reach. In seeking the practicable degree of equality of opportunity we must find means to do so without spreading opportunity so thin that it will be tempting to no one. Just so of private wealth. And just here persons quite unfamiliar with economics will do well to remember that the millionaire can eat no more than the poor man, can sleep in only one bed at a time—that, indeed, as said in some comic verses: "You can only wear one tie, one eyeglass in your eye, fill one coffin when you die, don't you know." Wealth in its present form spread thin would have little effect but that of removing all prizes for effort. What is wanted is co-operation to deflect from luxury to necessities and comforts enough work to cause plentiful production of the latter, and to improve distribution thereof.

In short, it is submitted that the present system wisely and moderately socialized, is probably the only system by which sufficient freedom and real progress can be combined with sufficient protection to the individual. The present system, socialized, can dimin-

ish handicaps (by taxation, better education, etc.), and can at the same time preserve enough prizes and stimuli to effort to keep the nation progressing. After all, will not men of talent, as owners, managers, and so forth, in industry, taxed and controlled, amount to much the same in effect as men of talent in the rôle of higher-paid officials in the industries of socialism, plus the fact that in the present system, properly controlled, they would retain more individual incentive? Taxed enough and controlled enough, the capitalist becomes, to a large extent, the steward of the public. Half a dozen years ago, with the Sherman law and its "rule of reason," with the proposal for Federal incorporation, with the resultant control to be expected through regulation which should assure to labor, to capital and to the public a fair share in the economies of combination, we were well on a safe road to which we shall have to return. Elaboration of the principles applied at that time approached a clear recognition of excessive profits as evidence of monopoly or wrongful methods and marked a pretty clear course. Add to this a systematization of our inheritance taxes, add excess-profits taxation and a heavy graduated income tax, and it would seem clearly within our grasp to socialize American industry and finance and gain all the hoped-for advantages without plunging into the dangers of socialism. We may, if we like, make further trial of municipal or State ownership, although

we ought to tread very carefully on that path for reasons which include, in the United States, the danger of mortgaging too great a section of the electorate to the political party in power at any time.

To repudiate the system of socialism is not to repudiate the soundness of its general aims nor, indeed, the wisdom of taking something from it. Many things are good in moderation, although deadly in excess. We may believe that the preservation of the just and equitable rights of capital are essential to freedom and to progress, while at the same time admitting the need of socialization. In this work which the American people should be able to approach with confidence the cornerstone of success must be mutual humanity, consideration and sympathy on the part of labor and capital alike. The capitalist who regards his business or his industry as so sacredly private that the nation shall have no voice through its Government in seeing that he shall serve the public, and that the labor in it shall have no representation or co-operation in its management, must change his tactics. Equally so must labor, wherever its whole view of national affairs is focused on the one question how much it can exact for the smallest service. Efficiency in service is the true measure of the individual laborer's worthiness of his hire and of the capitalist's title to his profits. To capital and to labor the nation owes not the highest possible interest per dollar or the highest possible wage

per hour, but a compensation into the computation of which there enters the quality and value of the service rendered by the individual. Against slacker labor there will have to be differentiation, by the unions or otherwise, just as there already is, by natural law and sometimes by municipal law, against slacker capital,—except that engaged in gambling. Until this new point of view of a sympathetic co-operation in service for mutual gain and for public benefit shall permeate both labor and capital, both will wear the aspect of blindly selfish forces and anti-social elements in the nation. With the new point of view, we can rapidly make America a true commonwealth, with enough for all but with ample prizes for individual effort.

Some of our ultra-radicals seem to forget that things, although very imperfect, are hardly desperately bad in the United States. Perhaps unconsciously they look at the worst slums or at the worst conditions in some foreign countries and apply their texts to the United States generally. Here we have made much progress and we can find our road if we will only look for it and if our conservatives will only cease to let well enough alone when all is not well and will, instead, join heartily to make good the promise of America. We have democracy and universal suffrage; the American people can have what they want. The national epigrams about life, liberty, hap-

piness, freedom and equality were earnestly uttered. We have now to put more energy and more wise constructive statesmanship into improving their realization.

It is believed with an elaboration of such indications as those given above there could be worked out an American programme of constructive progress on American foundations for the increase of social and economic justice in our country. Logically, such a programme would seem likely to appeal to the Republican party, which is so richly associated with the constructive statesmanship of the United States. Will that be so or shall we see that party splitting into two parts, the one dedicated to an unsound radicalism and the other to an equally unsound conservatism? The Democratic party appears in recent years, at least, to have cast aside all the shibboleths which formerly distinguished it as a party of principles. Will it attempt and can it succeed in holding the conservative South to a programme either moderately or excessively radical, or will the conservative South make of it a conservative party to which might go the determined standpatters among Republicans? Will the Republican party do the country the great service of publicly withdrawing from the local politics affecting the negro question in the South, as a party purely of national issues? If so, cannot the country gain the inestimable advantage of again having its whole electorate mal-

leable and free to respond at the polls to whatever be the national policies of which it approves? Such speculations become more and more interesting these days, and may possibly be illuminated in connection with the election of next autumn, in which even under the restraints of wartime the ultimate issue of fact vs. theory, in both national and international affairs, may possibly emerge somewhat.

XXIII

THE WAR OF THE UNBORN

THERE is one future war that is certain, and that is the battle of birth rates, the peaceful war of the unborn who shall be good in health, mind and character and who shall stand for the upward progress of mankind against the defective, the vicious, the degraded and all those who are ever a downward drag upon civilization. Criminality, ignoble character and social worthlessness, whether in those who as public charges are a burden upon society or in those who at large radiate the most evil influences in the social body, are more and more being recognized as due, in their unfortunate victims, chiefly to hereditary taint or weakness, with alcoholism, disease and bad bringing up as aids to degeneracy. The number of defectives is appalling. The birth rate among the fit is far below what it should be. The laws of this coming war are known. Victory will depend upon preparedness.

Now, an honorable and just peace among nations and an upward evolution of man must rest, in reality,

upon keeping predominant potential power in the hands of the most honorable, righteous and just nations. Domestic peace and an honorable, just and equitable national life and the evolution of an ever finer nation correspondingly depend upon assuring that the number of morally and physically healthy, intelligent people in the country shall be increasingly and overwhelmingly predominant. Higher standards of international or of national conduct may improve the conditions of evolution; they may advantageously modify the subject-matter through which the immutable laws work. Such is the method of civilization's progress. But the laws remain, and it will be perceived that to respect them is of equal interest to all. The holders of every shade of social or political opinion must alike bow to the unchanging laws by which the Almighty governs the universe; and most vital among these stand the inexorable truths of biology. Neither ritual nor ceremony, nor social or political scheme, can stand against those fateful laws. Those who consciously co-operate with nature's laws will hasten, those who do not will retard, that upward progress of humanity in spiritual, intellectual and physical welfare which may be supposed to be the aim of all—the care of religionist, scientist, economist and statesman.

A birth rate can only be good in effect if it is high by the qualitative as well as by the quantitative test

and if the children are supplied an environment that permits them to grow up to be decent, healthy people. In this one absolutely certain war of the future the ideas and aspirations of the nation or the collection of mankind which has the best birth rate—which most effectively respects the laws of eugenics, of sex hygiene and of children's welfare—will prevail. The fittest to survive—those who respond to nature's laws—will survive. Here is a solemn and fundamental concern of the people and of the Government of the United States of America.

Splendid work for eugenics has gone forward in this country for some years, centered chiefly in the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, under Doctor Davenport. Through lectures and writings and the publication of a magazine, the work has also been carried to the universities and elsewhere. But the meaning of eugenics is still popularly misunderstood and neglected. For the cause of sex hygiene most excellent work has been carried on by the American Society for Social Hygiene as a chief agency. President Wilson's Administration and Secretary Baker and the army and navy have done themselves great honor and the country unmeasurable service in starting promptly upon our entrance into the war to do the great work of minimizing the occurrence and the effects of venereal diseases in the American army and navy. All praise is due to the

officials, the officers and the doctors for the splendid work being done, and especially to Major William F. Snow, M. R. C., of the Society for Social Hygiene and now chairman of the committee on venereal diseases of the Council of National Defense, and also to the subcommittee for civilian co-operation in this matter. Only second to theirs are the efforts of Mr. Fosdick's commission on training-camp activities, of the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., and various other bodies aiding in this stupendous task. Among the most encouraging signs are the new and open co-operation of many women's clubs, the frank recognition of the need of open warfare upon venereal disease already made in the "Woman Citizen," and the unflinching attitude and words of Representative Jeanette Rankin at a committee hearing in the House, as reported by that magazine. But the horrifying and fateful truths about sex hygiene still remain largely matters of popular ignorance and misunderstanding. Only a corner has been lifted of the mask of age-long pharisaical hypocrisy and false modesty that still leave venereal diseases a blight and a menace to the nation.

A few years ago our democracy condescended to decide that it might not be altogether irrelevant if a government "for the people" should take a mild interest in the question whether people should go on dying quite needlessly and by wholesale during infancy or being deprived in infancy of the chance of

health and happiness. This, no doubt, seemed visionary to the "practical politician" and to his creator, the citizen-for-individual-prosperity-only. But the Children's Bureau of the Federal Government was established and Miss Julia Lathrop was placed at its head. Eugenics and sex hygiene go to the same purpose as children's welfare work. They are also vastly more vitally fundamental, for between them they cover the questions whether happy, healthy, normal people are to be born at all; whether the normal are to decrease and the defective to increase; whether people are to be born damned in advance to misery—mentally, physically or morally defective. Eugenics and sex hygiene are thus subjects the very most fundamental. Moreover, both have long emerged from the tentative stage and are scientifically as clear in many essentials as the formulae of mathematics. Our government "for the people" has been driven by the war to go into sex hygiene. Eugenics, the uttermost fundamental of human welfare, still fails to engage official attention. Stephen Leacock said with ridiculous truth of raising new war crops that Rule No. 1 seemed to be to begin last year or year-before-last. Quite similarly, if children's welfare and national welfare are to be taken up otherwise than in the most absurdly superficial and fragmentary way, then first and second places must be given to the common-sense elementary

facts of eugenics and to those of sex hygiene. Only so can we raise the birth rate of normal people and reduce the reproduction of the defective—to do which is to become powerfully girt for the coming battle of the birth rates, and thus fit to contribute as a great nation to the progress of civilization.

The newspapers have announced that the Government, startled by the physical defects of American manhood revealed by the selective-service examinations, will initiate through the Council of National Defense and the Children's Bureau a "children's year," to begin on the anniversary of America's entering the war. The idea is splendid. Miss Lathrop is reported to contemplate birth registration, midwifery and medical aid, children's clinics, bureaus of child hygiene, improved milk supply and a wage scale making decent living conditions possible to parents as the objects of the coming propaganda. These aims are excellent, but "children's year" will be only a beautiful and rather feeble gesture if it is to attend to these platitudes of child welfare, necessarily palliative in so many cases, while passing over the present Heaven-sent opportunity to give to the American people the always constructive, always fundamental and even more urgently needed education in the harsh rudiments of eugenics and sex hygiene. Can it be possible that prudery, superficiality, the lack of broad vision and bold action or the usual lack of co-ordination

shall be permitted to rob the nation of the present unique opportunity to do a great constructive work of real preparedness for national strength and welfare?

There is another fundamental that dovetails perfectly into any broad, honest and serious scheme of propaganda for this "children's year" which, rightly viewed, will be nothing less than the nation's year for real preparedness through the sincere, soul-searching and bold action for which the war has made us ready as never before. There is a commissioner of education at Washington. There are certain simple scientific principles, elucidated by Professor William James and others, for that basic education that can be given perhaps only in infancy: the education of the natural reactions—the building of good character. Those principles correspond rather curiously to the rough school of unmitigated nature from which, in this land, most children are barred by artificial luxury—and some by artificial misery. Those almost mathematical rudiments of infant education by experience and by example are not popularly understood. Children's year will be a time to make them so.

Conformity to the laws of eugenics and sex hygiene can alone assure that the child shall be born at all and, if born, shall be born normal. The ordinary measures for children's welfare will then preserve to the child the inestimable blessing of health. The observance of

a few principles of infant education here steps in to mold his natural reactions into the habit of spontaneous good reactions, which are natural good character and naturally lovable personality. Happy the man or woman who is the product of all those beginnings! Of such, no doubt, are those rare and irresistibly charming souls sometimes to be met who seem to be and to do almost without effort what the hardest idealist can hardly compass through a lifetime of strife with a nature less happy in its beginnings! The very existence of those rare people at least stakes out the road to national preparedness in its highest sense. It is marked above all by eugenics, sex hygiene, children's welfare work and truer education in infancy and later.

When President Roosevelt appointed a National Conservation Commission he added to the long list of his great services to the American people. The invaluable report made that commission by Professor Irving Fisher, of Yale, on "National Vitality, Its Waste and Conservation," marked a step forward in our democracy's belated governmental concern in many of the matters that most basically affect its declared object to have government "for the people," and "for the greatest good of the greatest number." What Professor Fisher had to say about sex hygiene was appalling. It should have been shouted from the housetops. It was not. The war had not awakened

America then. Our pioneer workers for education in the practical facts of eugenics have done the nation a great service. President Wilson's Administration is earning the gratitude of the nation by its magnificent work to preserve the flower of the nation, now called to the colors, in its fitness as the best we have for the fatherhood of the next generation. Miss Lathrop's work for the proposed children's year is excellent. The Commissioner of Education could assume an important national rôle. There will never again be such an opportunity. The war has shaken people out of their old ruts, their old reserves and selfishness. We have as never before leagues and associations, fearless and patriotic, and able to reach every community. The fundamentals of common-sense eugenics, the glaring facts of sex hygiene, the rudiments of children's welfare and the elementary principles of scientific education should be set forth in one brief and frank pamphlet. There should be co-operation for its compilation between the Eugenics Record Office, the committee on venereal diseases of the Council of National Defense (and the Society for Social Hygiene), the Children's Bureau and the Commissioner of Education. Such a pamphlet should be distributed broadcast to newspapers, teachers, the clergy and a thousand other categories of people. A veritable revolution in education could thus be achieved—by boldness and co-ordination of effort.

Here is a field for women who would show themselves serious, courageous and sincere, and able to be a great force for good in their country. Only they can set Artemis above Venus in the eyes of young manhood. Only they can impress the standards of fitness and clean living and healthy parenthood upon the young men of their country. Here, too, is a chance for the clergy of the land to show that they are abreast of the times, that they are not afraid to call things by their right names, that they are fit to lead in a movement for the amelioration, through frank education, of the moral and physical welfare of the nation. Here is a chance, too, for our broad-visioned millionaire philanthropists, a chance for our Government and a chance for all workers for real preparedness. This work is based on indisputable truth and it concerns every one.

XXIV

SOME PHASES OF FOREIGN POLICY

FROM the vast field of the social, economic and political problems of our national life out to the field of foreign relations, which forms the border to national life, is no far cry. The national life is the "inward and spiritual grace," of which any diplomacy that is worth while is the "outward and visible sign." The diplomacy of a country is the emanation of its national life. Through its diplomacy, in a broad sense, each country makes its contribution to the progress of world civilization. The quality and strength of international influence will depend upon the quality and vigor of the national life and of the representation of that national life by the State. So all rests, in a democracy, upon the degree in which the citizenship, acting through the State, is pursuing with noble purpose, intelligence and zeal the aim of national society—the increase of the citizens' spiritual, intellectual and physical welfare and happiness.

But in addition to its concern with national and in-

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ternational *growth*, statesmanship has the heavy obligation of *conservation*, that is, of the defense and preservation of what has been achieved, nationally and internationally. And until the Prussian menace shall have been removed this task of defense must engross all the care of State and of citizenship. Indeed, for an indefinite period of the world's future history, defense, the most essential form of conservation, must take first place.

In the diplomacy of defense there loom clear before the eyes of every thinking person certain great undertakings which not only seem to have been long neglected, but, so far as known, have not to this very day been entered upon with the slightest approach to the vast energy and resource that should be applied to them. We hope for and expect victory either on the battlefield of Europe, or through an overwhelming aerial offensive which shall crush the heart of Germany; but we have no absolute assurance that this is attainable. The melancholy reflection that if the American Government had shown wisdom, foresight, and promptness in facing facts and beginning war-like preparations in 1914, and even earlier, things would to-day be entirely different, does not alter the fact. If facts were not faced then, they must at least be faced now. Wise statesmanship prepares even more carefully for the worst than for the best possibilities. What, then, is being done in respect to our second line

of defense, in case of the remote, perhaps, but horrible possibility of our being too late on the present western front? Is it not perfectly plain that in such eventuality, we and our Allies must sit down perhaps to the very long task of building and maintaining a ring around the Central Powers with which gradually to bind them until they break? Indeed, in the absence of anything but the absolutely crushing defeat of the Central Powers, only by such a ring can the world be *kept* safe from Prussian dominion.

In this ring of military and naval power, of economic and political boycott, of social and moral ostracism, the Slavic power is a necessary link and the unanimous alignment of Latin-America, which must carry with it Spain, is clearly of great importance. America and her Allies should send into Russia a well-directed army of propagandists, sparing no money and no talent in the task. At the same time, as has already been indicated, there should be sent to the Bolshevik *de facto* authority an able and sympathetic commission empowered to offer Russia economic, military, and political assistance and strong support of any sanely socialistic democratic form of government that will reunite the Russian people for their struggle, long or short, against Deutschtum. The road via Vladivostock is open for this effort. Without such preparatory work, military aid, however disinterested, may be disastrously misinterpreted. The German

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propaganda and German diplomacy and economic offensive in Russia must be met and defeated from the East.* Surely this work done with great skill and upon a grand scale, if coupled with a guarantee to the Russian people of a democratic form of government, no matter how socialistic, if sane and conscionable, ought to be able to bring about conditions in which the Russian people could reunite, reorganize and take their place in the war. Through propaganda of truth carried out upon the same great scale, the Government of the United States ought also to be able to swing all the American Republics into the war against Germany.

In a fashion somewhat analagous to that of the Russian Bolsheviki, some of the people of Ireland are allowing ancient grievances to obscure their eyes to the patent fact that the liberty they love so well is the very thing now at stake everywhere. In both cases there is the strange phenomenon of ardent lip-service of liberty coupled with the willingness to stand aside, intent on selfish, narrow aims and ideals, while liberty, the foundation of all, shall perish or be saved by others. It would seem that the American Government, backed by the splendidly loyal portion of our citizen-

* Here, as whenever there emerges a great task calling for energy, magnetism, enthusiasm, courage and political sagacity, the country recalls with a pang the fact that no way has yet been found to put directly to its service Roosevelt, its most dynamic human asset.

ship which is of Irish blood, might devise ways here to be of acceptable use to our brave British ally and to the best of Ireland. The question is surely worth considering.

To return to the glaring need of unheard of efforts to align Latin-America and to bring about Russian re-organization, in order to complete the ring upon the East, the Entente Allies will need a strengthened China, an active Japan, even a Persia and an India more keenly alive to the danger. The work of this vast campaign of education and organization that long ago ought to have been under way is so essential, not only to make but to keep the world safe from the Teutonic menace, that it seems almost incredible that governments endowed with foresight should have left it, so far as is known, in almost complete neglect!

Thoughtless and dogmatic idealism based upon catch-words for popular prejudice is one of the familiar banes of American policy and opinion. We must not, because the word "propaganda" is just now so associated with the brutal aims and the low methods of the Teutonic power, shy at propaganda for our own good cause. We have had to fight the devil with his own kinds of fire, however repugnant to us, on the battlefield; why should we be squeamish in the intellectual and emotional field of propaganda? A campaign of truth in a good cause is a fine enough aim to justify a great deal; and our propaganda, to be effective, need

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not be of a quality to require any very exceptional justification. Truly it is more important to remember the serpent's wisdom than the dove's harmlessness in these times.

The Near East, where America still has formal diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, is another very obvious field for energetic propaganda, and one that may later prove fertile. Through the work of American missionaries, schools, and colleges this country has, in Bulgaria and in the Ottoman Empire, a potential moral and intellectual influence the extent of which few of us quite realize. The field is open on the Mesopotamian front; it is open on the Balkan front; it is even open, technically, through Sofia. It may prove possible for our diplomacy and for the right kind of propaganda to cause the seeds sown in many decades of work among the peoples of the Near East to blossom, at the proper time, into realization of the Prussian noose and vigorous action, with the help of the Entente Allies, to loosen it,—and so to advance the true interests of the Near East and the safety of the world.

Whether the war shall end abruptly or whether war shall very gradually fade into peace through the slow pressure of the vast league against Germany, there will in any case arise a huge number of great and profound problems of American foreign policy, problems having nothing to do with military secrets, but inti-

mately affecting the future interests of America. As a question of our future safety we shall want an alliance of the English-speaking peoples leagued with our present Allies. Territorial adjustments and responsibilities in the Caribbean region and even in Africa may arise in a manner to have great interest for the United States. There will have to be new tariff arrangements,—with no more sweeping “favored nation” clauses, but with flexible schedules to be administered in harmony with our world policy, our friendships and our national interests. In Mexico we shall have to reverse a policy of unreality which had the pretty sound and the theory of detached and disinterested altruism, but which resulted in practical damage to ourselves, to the Mexicans, and to the world at large. In returning to a positive, practical and constructive policy of reality we shall have to recoup the damages that have accrued to this country directly and through the obligations to Europe which run with the Monroe Doctrine. Everywhere, we shall have to return from the theoretical to the practical,—from a diplomacy of Utopian aspiration to a “dollar diplomacy,” of attainable good sought through practical economic, social, and political forces backed by the prestige of the national power. We are not, and cannot be if we would, disinterested spectators of Mexico’s course. Intelligent Mexicans must know this. How curious it is, how incredible,

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that the consequences of their short-sightedness and our own supineness still present us the grotesque picture of an adjoining American republic still the field of Prussian enterprise and propaganda, still the residence of an intriguing German legation!

XXV

FAITH AND WORKS

THE need of statesmanship and diplomacy of the highest order has never been so tragically vital to us as it is to-day when all is at stake. Wisdom, foresight, cleverness, promptness and thoroughness were never more urgently required in our government. The degree to which it is the duty of our citizenship to protest, to suggest,—nay, to demand,—this or that official action is measured by the degree to which we may be compelled honestly to believe that those essential qualities may be more or less lacking in the conduct of the State. Only if quite satisfied that the conduct of the State in a crisis is being determined by an entirely satisfactory degree of wisdom, foresight, cleverness, promptness, and thoroughness can the citizen conscientiously remain passive.

Are these qualities essential to statesmanship surely sufficiently active at Washington to-day? We have to judge mainly by the past. Now everyone must admit that, in spite of all warnings, years before August,

1914, and from that date until we entered the war on April 6, 1917, there was no evidence of foresight; nothing worth mentioning was done, in the face of the glaringly obvious and urgent demand for military preparedness. There was no sign at Washington of a forward-looking sense of the war's meaning to America. Neither is there any question that after we had entered the war many months were wasted in a farcical bungling of the ship-building programme; that the history of the air-craft programme has been grotesque; that the ordnance inefficiency was for many months an incredible nightmare. Let these few examples suffice. They are cited merely as known facts and not at all in the luxury of lament. We should not dwell upon them in dejection of spirit nor need we do so, just now, in order to place blame. We do need to dwell upon these sad experiences for another reason. They illustrate what government in a democracy may do and may neglect if citizenship be not alert and exacting. They do warn us not to assume too much; they do teach that faith without works on the part of public opinion is supremely dangerous; they do warn us that, unless the country absolutely demand them, there is no real guarantee that wisdom, foresight, cleverness, promptness and thoroughness will always be brought to the translation of the national purpose into governmental action.

It is well to remember that most of the ameliora-

tions that seem to have begun in many directions have been subsequent to the courageous, honest and constructive criticism of Senator Chamberlain and others. The fact that this is so only serves to emphasize the clear civic duty of watchfulness and of constructive, patriotic suggestion and criticism, however onerous and thankless they may be. The highest statesmanship does not wait, in a crisis, to be forced forward by a public opinion which must outrun government in foresight. It does not lie inert like drift-wood upon the sea of events. Even in a democracy, the positive mandate of public opinion should not be awaited, especially in a crisis, before the future is envisaged and adequate governmental action is taken. Where events, and among them the event of irresistible public demand, are awaited, policies will ever be those of *l'esprit de l'escalier*; and action will always be deplorably late.

Granting the greatness of the difficulties encountered, gratefully acknowledging the good achieved, admitting that public disquietude upon some matters kept secret for valid military reasons might disappear if the facts were known, yet there still remain very many matters as to which no secrecy seems called for by the public interest and as to which the country has not been made aware that adequate measures are actually being taken. Among such matters are vital questions of policy which cannot safely be neglected.

Upon these the country should either be assured that its mandate to pursue certain courses may safely be assumed to flow from the national situation and from the fixed rudiments of American policy, or else should be given fuller opportunity to express itself in the councils of the State. The lack of a real war council has obviously crippled the American Government in its most important function,—that of thought, foresight and planning, and of using the united sagacity and skill of all. With such a war council, auxiliary to a small bi-partisan committee of Congress, and composed, irrespective of party, of the country's wisest heads, the President's vast labors would be immensely more promptly and surely effective; adequate thought, foresight and planning would be possible; and the country would be immensely better informed and reassured.

As matters now stand, what do the public know, what do even Senators of the United States know, of the background of policy that is behind official action or inaction? Who knows, for example merely, what is brewing in the diplomatic witches' cauldron presided over by Colonel House and his collaborators? Surely neither military secrecy nor partisan exclusiveness should shut out the Senate, the President's constitutional council upon foreign affairs, from any adequate knowledge of the course of the ship of state, except what may be gained by inspecting its wake.

How, without knowledge, is the most intelligent co-operation possible or completely assured confidence attainable? Only by an act of supreme faith. And is it quite fair, however great and however justified the nation's faith may be, that the people of a democracy should be asked, in a supreme crisis, to accept faith not as an accompaniment but as a substitute for that thorough-going representation in weighty decisions of state to which their institutions have habituated them?

We have all approved the old adjuration to "Trust in God but keep your powder dry." Let us by all means trust the President, as indeed we must, for to the President falls the greatest share in the terrible responsibilities of the present and the immediately looming future; but let us not neglect criticism, or even party political action in the best sense whenever it is clear that the national interests can be served thereby. The voices of hifalutin, of unsound idealism, of wild radicalism are in the air; the voice of ultra-conservatism is certain to be heard. All these forces press upon an administration immersed in action and not yet well organized for deliberation. Surely it is no time for the voices of sound policy and practical knowledge, of whatever political party, to be silent.

In all our great problems, as in the demand for universal service and in war and after war policies generally, it will be the duty of American citizens to

take a keen and active interest. American governments are at all times the mere trustees of the nation's powers. These powers must be exercised for the practical benefit of the United States and must not, from however lofty motives, be deflected from the circumspect pursuit of the nation's true interests. Neither in the midst of war, nor later in the difficult days of settlement, must the national interest go by default through public apathy. There is hard work ahead for citizens who wish to see democracy vindicate its efficiency in the world as it is to-day. To the Executive, to which the war brings the responsibility of such extraordinary power, as well as to the Congress of the United States, citizens look with the greatest earnestness for the protection of the country, whether in action or in tendency, against the perils alike of hifalutin and of ultra-conservatism in the difficult times ahead. In return for the universal support so heartily given the Government, they can hardly look in vain.

THE END

APPENDIX

"DOLLAR DIPLOMACY"

THE relation of government to foreign investment by its citizens is one of correlative obligation and authority, general obligation to protect the citizens' rights, and authority to control the citizens' course by giving great or little protection, or none at all. In the discharge of its obligation the duty of government is to measure the protection to be given any investment first of all by the advantage of that investment to the nation; and secondarily to mete out that protection in proportion to the right of the investor to expect protection.

The authority correlated with the obligation to protect is that involved in the power to vary, in accordance with the criteria above cited, the degree of protection, if any, to be afforded in the case of a given in-

* Monograph by Huntington Wilson, on "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investments," reprinted from the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1916.

vestment. Without any legislation on the subject, the government's authority is automatically of determinative potentiality in this question of foreign investment in all countries except those of the highest credit and stability. And even in the case of such countries, an adverse intimation from Washington would tend to have a blighting moral effect upon a proposed investment of American capital.

From the days of the struggle of Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks and Romans in the Mediterranean down to to-day, it has been power, and above all sea power, which alone has protected foreign trade. Even in these allegedly softer times, we must admit, now at least, that it is only under the shadow of the great powers, those prepared or potentially able to use great power, that small countries like Belgium, or even relatively weak, although great, countries can, as independent nations, carry on a big foreign trade. The governmental relation to foreign investment in its authority and obligations presupposes and demands power.

THE RELATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN ENTERPRISE

For the purposes of this discussion, we shall do well to consider the relation of government to foreign trade and to all sorts of foreign enterprises, as well as to

investment in the narrower sense of shares and bonds, because the same principles apply to all alike. It may at first seem an extreme view, but one may go farther and apply similar general principles even to the relation of government to the presence of its citizens to reside for any purpose in any part of the world.

The relation we are considering is one to be dealt with by the diplomatic department. Like other questions of real and statesmanlike diplomacy, this question derives its importance and its charm and interest from its farspread ramifications and concatenations. It carries into the far future and it brings many sciences out of the "conference stage" to an entirely practical application in every day international business. Here, as elsewhere, diplomacy becomes everything that concerns one's country, fostered through its foreign relations.

During the four years preceding the present administration, when Mr. Knox, as Secretary of State, gave a new definiteness, intelligibility and practicalness to American diplomacy, the policy toward foreign investment was epitomized thus: "The Department (of State) will give all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign countries." This formula was the invariable answer to the prudent investor desiring to know in advance what would be done for him if, through no fault of his own, he got

into trouble, due, say, to oppression or failure to protect on the part of some foreign government.

Now the government's obligation to protect a particular American interest abroad, must, in its discharge, be measured and meted out, as has been said, in proportion to the benefit of that particular interest to the nation as a whole. Whatever influence or force the government may exert in the world is the prestige and power of the nation. Consider this collective power, moral or physical, as a great reservoir. The executive branch of our government has constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations untrammelled except by the authority of the Senate when it comes to a treaty, by the authority of the whole Congress when it comes to an appropriation of money, and in some few other respects. This authority is so appallingly broad, one may remark, that it becomes of vital necessity that the United States should have fundamentals of foreign policy that are accepted by the whole nation, to be permanent bases of action in all specific questions of importance. Otherwise the American people can be involved by the executive without referendum in any folly during every four years between presidential elections. Even party platforms about foreseen questions are no safeguard, for we see them violated, as in the Panama Canal tolls question with Great Britain. Now this startling breadth of executive authority in diplomacy places the executive,

as trustee of the nation's international influence, under obligations of the greatest solemnity and weight. Therefore how much thought must the Secertary of State take before turning the tap of the reservoir and drawing off for the protection of a foreign enterprise a measure of the national prestige and power entrusted by the people to his care!

"DOLLAR DIPLOMACY"

This theme and its illustration by example lead to an exposition of what has been called "Dollar Diplomacy." It might better be described as common sense diplomacy, in contradistinction from the diplomacy of perfunctoriness or that of whimsical sentimentality from which the United States has suffered so much. It is submitted, moreover, that one who will carefully study the so-called "Dollar Diplomacy" will be fully convinced that it was a diplomacy of common sense in the highest sense of that term, that is, a diplomacy determined by the application of scientific principles and sound thinking to plain facts studied and understood as they really are; a diplomacy preferring to build for the long future, rather than to dogmatize for the moment's expediency; preferring the truth to a beautiful idealization not resting upon truth.

Now the national advantage of a foreign investment

may consist in (1) political advantages or (2) economic advantage. Service to humanity is not mentioned separately because charity begins at home; because it is America's first duty to serve America; because America, as a government, can amply serve humanity in spheres and in ways in which America also serves itself; and because if it does that, the service to humanity may be considered by diplomacy, which is not, by the way, an eleemosynary institution, as merged in the service of America, that is, in American political advantage. Those who dissent from this view and yield to our national foible for grandiloquent sentimentality ought to reflect that a trustee, however admirable his private charities, would be put in jail if he used trust funds for benefactions; and that exactly so the American executive defrauds the nation if he uses its prestige and power in a diplomacy directed by sentimentality to the service of humanity in general, instead of a diplomacy seeking the political and economic advantage of the American taxpayer, the American nation.

POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Political advantage (1) then, comprises such factors as (a) strengthening American influence in spheres where it ought to predominate over any other foreign influence on account of reasons of funda-

mental policy, like the Monroe Doctrine, or of military strategy or of neighborhood. Such a sphere is "Latin America," where our interest increases in intensity from a vanishing minimum at Cape Horn northward to reach its maximum in the zone of the Caribbean Sea, the neighborhood of the Panama Canal, and in Mexico. In this category falls also, for example, the discharge of our historic obligation to Liberia and the preservation of that little country as a *pied-a-terre* in Africa, of possible potential value to us for commerce or for the emigration of African Americans. Such political advantage ranks highest. Next comes (b) the maintenance of a traditional position, favorable to our trade where trade may go by political favor, as in the Chinese Empire. Other cases of political advantage would be (c) the strengthening of our friendship with other great powers, or (d) with countries where it is wise to pre-empt a share in a dawning development, like Turkey, or (e) with countries whose markets are especially valuable. The cases merge so gradually into one another as to make clear-cut classification difficult. This is true also of the division of political from economic advantage. The idea is that in some cases trade is important primarily for its political effects through mutual interest and association, while in others a good political relation is valued (if not for safety and advantage in actual co-operation or alliances) for its tendency to favor trade. The stu-

dent of American diplomacy will readily enough place our relations with different countries in appropriate categories even without an attempt at nicer classification than is here intimated.

THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES

Inasmuch as political advantage comprises whatever touches national security, the first place in importance, among economic advantages, must be given to (a) those investments or enterprises which most promote vital political interest. Next most important is economic advantage to the nation and usually identical with (a) are (b) foreign investments or enterprises which establish permanent and valuable markets for trade, while at the same time subserving political strength where the policy of this country demands that it be strong if we are to have security and tranquillity. Other cases are (c) investments or enterprises which have these same purely material advantages while carrying with them some political advantage as well, as, for example, in safeguarding our Chinese trade; or (d) those investments or enterprises which serve in giving us a commercial standing in some valuable market where development may be pre-empted by others if a footing be not early obtained (like Turkey); or (e) in cementing friendship with our natural allies, as Canada and the English-speaking

peoples generally; or (f) in bringing profit and employment to the American people in general.

In the encouragement of foreign enterprise, diplomacy must beware of forcing it into spheres where vexatious conflict with the special spheres of influence and interest of other countries outweighs all commercial gain to be looked for. Every great power has some "doctrines" that it conceives to be as vital to it as the Monroe Doctrine is considered here. Korea and Manchuria, Persia and Siam, come to mind as examples of territory where, while conducting ordinary trade, we should be wasting our energies to attempt intensive development. In return we should gradually crowd out from our own sphere of special interest foreign interests wherever they are predominant to an uncomfortable extent and quite beyond the requirements of an ordinary trade outside the spheres of special interest of the foreign governments concerned.

Quite aside from this common sense circumscribing of our spheres of greatest effort to make them comport with the facts of world politics, it is still true that there is not enough American capital yet available for foreign investment thoroughly to cover the duty of consolidating our economic position in the spheres where that necessity is most obvious. Also, there is a lack of men trained for this work and willing to reside under tropical rain, amidst mountain peaks, on

broad savannas, and in ancient cities of manners and ideas quite alien to our own, in order to carry it on. "God gives a man his relatives; he chooses his friends." A nation is less fortunate. The hazards of history have made us a sphere of vital interest which we have to cultivate, however difficult it be.

PROPER SUPPORT TO LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES

Let us return to the formula. "The Department (of State) will give all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign countries." A legitimate enterprise must be honest and fair, and just to the foreigners concerned. But it may be legitimate so far as the interested American is concerned and beneficial to him individually while not beneficial to the nation. Such would be the case if the dangers of seriously involving this country in fresh obligations outweighed any national advantage; if the investment diverted from channels of real national advantage money that might otherwise serve that advantage either abroad or at home; or if the project involved offending a valued friend among the nations. To merit the strongest governmental support, the foreign investment or enterprise must be really beneficial to the nation.

In the formula, the phrase "all proper support" is advisedly indefinite. The Secretary of State must

reserve the question of how much support will be "proper" in a given case, because when the question is asked it is a hypothetical one; because the question will be a political question, to be affected, perhaps, by changing conditions; and because, above all, it will be one involving the careful consideration of subtle measures of national advantage—which is the first measure, as the citizens' right is the second measure, of the government's support. The government's obligation is its duty to the citizen, but the coefficient of that duty is its duty to the nation.

Proper support is the discharge of the government's obligation, limited by its variant authority or power, expressed in terms of action, diplomatic, or in the last resort, warlike. And that proper support is the duty to the citizen plus or minus the sum of political and economic national advantage.

This almost mathematical expression of the theory of "Dollar Diplomacy," to use the approbrious nickname, may assist a clear understanding of a subject deplorably little considered by our countrymen. Illustration, however, will perhaps supply vividness to a dry statement.

APPLYING "DOLLAR DIPLOMACY"

Without law, it is, of course, only where the citizen thinks he may ultimately need his government's help

to "pull his chestnuts out of the fire" that he can really be controlled. He will buy Anglo-French bonds in full faith in the honor and stability of Great Britain and France. If he jumped into a pet private preserve of Great Britain or France and engaged in enterprises subversive of some policy of "protection, guidance and control" (to quote the classic of Japanese aggression in Korea), it is not intended to imply that his government would abandon him to his fate. It would seek equitable damages for him, but probably not specific performance. So it was, in principle, to give an analagous example, when the American advisers were forced out of Persia by Russia and England. American influence in Persia was of no account to our national interest. An equitable adjustment doing justice in a general way to our citizens, would in such a case be proper policy. If, on the other hand, those advisers had been in a country where American influence was of national importance, the American government must have resisted their dismissal and insisted upon specific performance, although the contracts were no more binding in the one case than in the other.

The convention with Santo Domingo, the agreement with Cuba involving certain public works, the convention of 1911 with Honduras (rendered abortive by the vote of an adverse party majority in the Senate), the old arrangement and convention with Nicaragua, car-

ried out after a fashion by the present administration, the loan policy with China, which the present administration promptly killed and now has made an unsuccessful effort to resuscitate,—all these involved foreign investment of such great and unquestionable national advantage that the government was an active participant in them; and, by urging on the investors to lend themselves as instrumentalities of foreign policy, the government clothed those investors with rights to protection of especial dignity.

Since this is not a discussion of American diplomacy at large, but is confined, so far as practicable, to one phase of that subject, those transactions need not be described at length. Suffice it to say that the object of the Central American policy was "to substitute dollars for bullets," to create a material prosperity which should wean the Central Americans from their usual preoccupation of revolution. Those countries have great natural wealth. Lack of capital, lack of skill, and still more the absence of any guarantee against confiscation and destruction due to the frequent revolutions when law and order are thrown overboard, prevent the development of their natural wealth by the people themselves. The same conditions throttle their export trade and destroy their purchasing power. Attacks upon American interests, and even upon the personal safety of American planters and others engaged in those countries, call for our govern-

ment's protection. The similar jeopardy of European interests demands, as an unavoidable corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, the protection of the American government. For the frequent interventions, moral or physical, thus necessitated, we had no convenient base. With great pertinacity certain far-away European powers, with an effrontery engendered by the inchoate state of American foreign policy, have been at great pains to poach upon our preserves in the Caribbean and even on the Isthmus itself. In Central America, as in Columbia in theory, there was the question of an alternative inter-oceanic canal route, and that was a basis inconveniently open for the pre-emption of a special interest which we could not afford to see go to others than ourselves. Trade with Central America was retarded by the lack of railways and by financial instability. The ports of our southern states, the logical centers of this rich trade, were being deprived by those adverse conditions of a profit due them from the facts of geography. It is true that one or two of the republics of Central America are in far better condition than the others. To cite a case where the political and economic advantages are both of the first rank and where, therefore, the measure of governmental support should be at its highest, I will refer to the policy toward Nicaragua, which illustrates only more completely what should be the spirit of our policy throughout the zone of the Caribbean. Indeed

as now implemented our policy in effect is the same in principle in Panama, Cuba, Santo Domingo and Haiti.

OUR POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA

In Nicaragua a New York bank of the highest standing was induced to invest in the financial rehabilitation of the country, its transactions giving it an interest in the railways and in the customs revenues, which it is always desirable to remove from the reach of revolutionary depredations. Americans were engaged as financial advisers, as claims commissioners, and in other important capacities. A convention was signed to give the United States a naval station in the Gulf of Fonseca, dominating three of the republics. A perpetual option upon the Nicaraguan canal route was assured us. A large sum of money was to be advanced Nicaragua for its most pressing needs, but to be expended only under American supervision. The full fruition of this plan was postponed by partisan opposition in the Senate, but it was later taken over, in a general way, by the present administration and may now, it is hoped, meet a kinder fate. An outstanding feature of this particular policy is its effort to help our neighbors to help themselves and to do so in practical ways, which advance at the same time the very real and quite legitimate and, indeed, the inevitable interests of our own country.

The Nicaraguan arrangements are so comprehensive that they serve to illustrate many phases of the same policy we have seen pursued in Cuba, in Panama, in Haiti, in Honduras. The public revenues, especially the customs dues, must be placed out of reach of the revolutionary robber or the dictator. Capital must be brought in to establish peaceful husbandry and unmolested industry. Education and civilization must bring justice. A guiding hand must prevent foreign entanglements, which, under the Monroe Doctrine, straightway involve us. Even if the Monroe Doctrine had never been announced, common prudence would to-day force upon us the same policy from our southern border throughout the zone of the Caribbean.

THE LAW OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL

No far-seeing policy, but a natural human movement, accounts for the vast American investment in Mexico and for the penetration of thousands and thousands of Americans into Mexican territory as planters and miners and workers. Here a natural law and a political theory work together, as is the case whenever the political theory is sound. There are so many analogies between biology and international evolution that one may invoke a sort of "international biology." The march of civilization brooks no violation of the law of the survival of the fittest. Neighboring coun-

tries comprise an environment. The strongest will dominate that environment. Sentimental phrases about the sovereignty of weaker countries will no more permit them to run amuck with impunity than ranting about individual rights will permit an outrageous citizen to annoy a municipality and escape the police. The biological law of the tendency to revert to the lower type as the higher attributes are disused is at work among nations; and nature, in its rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors and takes its inexorable course with private enterprise and diplomacy as its instruments. And this course is the best in the long run, for all concerned and for the world. The murder of two or three German missionaries in far-off China, cost China Kaichow and practically a province. The murder of many Americans in nearby Mexico, where by every law of neighborhood and policy they had a special right to be and to be protected, has cost Mexico so far—the reading of a great many communications. Life is priceless; but what of the investors, great and small? Here is a case where political and economic advantage to the nation are at a high level, where the government's obligation to protect connotes a great degree of support as proper. This is so because no field of investment is more natural than that over the border, which fact gives the citizen the right to expect support, subject to the national interest concerned, in this case a high

coefficient. If so much be granted, the support, it has been said, is limited by its (the government's) variant authority or power. Since no one doubts its power, our government's task then becomes one of ways and means, with the evident duty of sparing so far as possible our own blood and treasure. The seizing and holding of revenues amply to cover all actual damages at once suggests itself as a practical measure and one readily assimilable with the chastisement and chastening due from us if we do not repudiate the duties imposed upon us in the nature of things by laws as real as those of biology.

This digression is perhaps excusable as anticipating the question of ways and means of protecting foreign investments and enterprises in various cases which differ as widely as the one just described differs from an economic question with a first-rate power. There, too, we bungle and are unprepared. We lack the weapons of a sliding-scale tariff, with discretion in the executive to force justice to our interests by the threat of effective and prompt retaliation.

THE SIX-POWER LOAN POLICY IN CHINA

The six-power loan policy in China is in point upon this question of how the government would protect its citizens' investments. Aside from the high reputation of the Chinese people for commercial morality, what

with the turbulent conditions of the country and its distance from us (except in the Philippines), one might say that the American Government could ill afford to undertake to protect its citizens in great investments there. In China we have a traditional position of friendly concern and a commerce that once promised very well. But we have not the political mandate of a cardinal principle of policy nor the natural mandate of neighborhood as we have in Mexico.

Mr. Knox "pooled" our interests in vast railway constructions and currency reform, involving huge investments of capital, with the interests of five other great powers. In this way, America secured its share in those lucrative undertakings while its share of responsibility in protection was only one-sixth of what it otherwise would have been.

Let us further examine that Chinese policy which the present administration in a heat of partisanship so ruthlessly reversed, to learn later, as it did in respect to a number of other matters, that foreign policy is not domestic politics. We may be our "brother's keeper" in the case of Mexico. We are certainly not China's keeper. I do not therefore attach to the purely political aspect of our Chinese policy quite the same importance that some do. There is working in the Far East an "international biology" that we have neither duty nor interest in radically interfering with. Times have changed since Mr. Hay expressed

in idealizations about the "integrity" of China the good will America had always felt for that empire. However, we wanted and we still want the "open door" of ordinary equality of commercial opportunity. Before showing how Mr. Knox's policy served those practical ends, the political aspect may be touched on, although it is rather one of sentiment than one related to a policy of the first class that a nation would fight alone for.

Naturally enough, Russia and Japan have designs upon outlying Chinese territory and certain Chinese provinces. Manifestly, to concatenate great interests of theirs with great interests of four other powers preferring to preserve China pretty well intact would tend to create a community of interest in the preservation of China's integrity. If two men with certain intentions were chained to four men with other intentions, the course of the group would differ from the untrammelled progress of the first two men. Thus, without any offensive or radical interference with other nations' natural expansion, the United States, with Great Britain, France and Germany, would have had a share in the first practical arrangement ever suggested to work with any effect along the lines of the rather illusory declarations of Mr. Hay.*

* Quite recently (May 18, 1918) the President expressed the high hope that the triumph of our cause in the war might "... make the whole world democratic in the sense of community of interest and of purpose." It is interesting to

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KNOX POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Turning from this now more or less chimerical consideration, we note the really brilliant statesmanship of Mr. Knox in placing us, with no danger and with only a small share of responsibility, and that divided with powerful partners, in a position not only of dignified equality, but of actual leadership in the large concerns of the Chinese Empire! To realize how important that rôle was to our general Chinese trade, one must know China. Besides indirect effects, the Chinese arrangement gave us such economic national advantages as these: American engineers would be appointed and American railway materials would be used on our proportional part of the whole railway system. That meant money to American industry. As to the bankers' profits in the loans and the ultimate bondholders' income, they were good for the country, too, economically, but were so clearly a means to a greater end that the bankers had to be urged into the whole transaction, and, during its diffi-

note in retrospect the fact that the crux of Mr. Knox's Far Eastern policy was precisely the conscious effort to do, in a practical way, just this, so far as all the great powers (for Italy and Austria-Hungary were touched also by the negotiations) were concerned in the whole region of China. It is also interesting to reflect that the principles of the policy referred to are likely to play in due time an important part in future instrumentalities of a practical sort devised to minimize international conflict in various parts of the world.

cult course, often urged to remain interested. If this had not been done, and if American bankers had not responded with a good deal of patriotism, the biggest transactions ever undertaken in China would have proceeded without the least participation by the country which had officially talked most of China's opportunities.

Reference to the direct economic advantages to the nation to be found in the railway loans to China brings us to a few last comments upon the measures of economic advantage in foreign investments. Lately a gentleman prominent among those who are at last making a campaign for foreign trade spoke of Russia as a great field for American enterprise and in doing so spoke particularly of the opportunities for branch factories. Now this question of "extraterritorial enterprise" is a familiar one to the practical diplomatist. A branch factory in a foreign country may be very profitable to the capitalist, and it will be better than nothing in so far as it brings money into the United States; but it does not directly pay American wages or enrich and build up American communities, as do great foreign orders to be executed in American factories at home. Therefore the foreign branch factory is of relatively slight national advantage and has relatively small claim on the benevolent interest of the government. Such, by the way, would not be the case of an American factory estab-

lished where it was especially desired to strengthen the national influence, particularly if the factory was not in point-blank competition with a home factory and in that way deflecting wages from Americans to cheaper foreign labor on the spot.

THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD GUIDE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

The necessity of having our exports paid for ultimately in goods or securities (and not always in gold) makes it of interest to the government to encourage investment in certain countries. We cannot, for example, buy the coffee crop of all Latin America. Indeed, to encourage here, to deter there; in short, more or less to guide foreign investment, is a proper function of government. There should not be obligation without authority. The value of our home investments rests, in the last resort, upon our municipal law. The value of our foreign investments rests, in the last resort, upon our diplomacy, the conduct of our foreign policy. The efficacy of these depends upon our prestige and our military power, and these last are the possession of the nation.

There would thus be a logic in a requirement of official permission to list foreign securities in our markets or to undertake certain foreign enterprises. For the exercise of this discretion we should need a little law. It might be vested in a small committee,

for example, of competent officials of the Department of State, of the Treasury and Federal Reserve Board, with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees of Congress.

It seems, after the question has been mooted for years, that we still need a law (perhaps!) to keep the Sherman Anti-Trust law from frightening our manufacturers and merchants out of their right to combine to compete with Europe in foreign commerce. Only now have our laws a little helped our bankers to establish themselves abroad and to give our trade and enterprise the needed facilities. We are very backward in foreign affairs, commercial, financial, and political, and disposed to neglect all that hard ground that lies between great visions and small details. The end of the war will leave with the problems of foreign investment and enterprise and the government's relation thereto a new urgency. And, laws or no laws, if we are to deal wisely with them, the realities of American diplomacy must become matters of conscious concern and intelligent interest to American citizens. Only so can government be compelled, under our system, to perform its task of leadership, to make effective its proper relation to foreign investment and enterprise.



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